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ABSTRACT 
This work assesses the continuing development of bank 
supervision in the U.K. Particular attention is focused on 
the recently published Ban~ of England discussion papers in 
this field. Emphasis is placed on the issues of (monetary 
, 
control, capital adequacy and liquidity~ The latter two are 
prudential concepts. The thesis assesses how and why the" 
Bank of England control and monitor bank balance sheets - and 
how this affects banks' capital structures. 
The thesis is structured in two parts. Part I analyses the 
stance of the supervisory authorities before 1980. We 
discuss the rather unique role and style of the Bank of 
England. The 1971 reforms of Competition and Credit Control 
are discussed. The limitations of this system are noted, and 
the case for a change in banking supervision made. As a 
result the issues of monetary control and prudential 
supervision are analysed in detail and the present stance of 
the Bank of England in each case examined. 
In Part II a quanti tative assessment of the impact of the new 
regime is made. The impact of the direct monetary controls 
can be seen, whilst the impact of prudential supervision is 
less certain - though the work demonstrates the potential 
threat of the new prudential guidelines. 
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CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
1.2. FORKAT OF THESIS 
1.3. KETHODOLOGY 
1 .1. INTRODUCTION 
lIn the U.K. the supervision of the banking system is 
entrusted to the Bank of England. In many respects the 
controls and guidelines issued by the Bank of England are 
unique. More importantly, however, during the last few years 
the system has been subject to a considerable degree of 
Change-:) This thesis assesses the growth of supervision in 
the U.K., why changes have been made and what effects these 
changes may have. The assessment is made with reference to 
the recently published Bank of England papers on monetary 
control and prudential supervision - and how they impact on 
banks' balance sheets. Thus this work is concerned with the 
-~ 
supervision of banks' balance sheets and not bank regulation. 
- -' .... 
The terms of reference are as follows. ~ the U.K. the Bank 
of England has sole responsibility for ensuring a sound. but 
competitive banking system. This is referred to as 
prudential supervision. In this respect the Bank of England 
now issue guidelines. These guidelines are often tailored to 
me eta n in d i v i dual ins tit uti 0 n' sow n re qui rem e n t s. 
Nevertheless, prudential supervision can prove to be an 
effective control mechanism) 
( On the other hand, the Bank of England is also responsible 
(to Government) for ensuring the effective implementation of 
Monetary Policy. This role, by necessity, tends to have a 
rather more direct impact on the banking system than the 
prudential guidelines. It is in this role that the Bank of 
England implements monetary controls. ~ 
(rn practice, however, both monetary control and prudential 
supervision represent forms of intervention by the Bank of 
England, both of which are almost exclusively applied to a 
bank's balance sheet. This work distinguishes between these 
two principal forms of intervention, explaining the rationale 
behind them and assessing their impact on bank balance sheets 
and the U.K. banking system. The impact of monetary controls 
can be said to be more precise than the prudential guidelines_ 
- yet the latter can be just as effective~ 
(The term bank supervision is not a new one - the Joint Stock 
Banks of the nineteenth century were supervised by the Bank 
of England in its role as the central bank. The significance 
is that banking supervision has developed rapidly in recent ( 
years, particularly during the latter half of the 1970's. ) 
(The 1979 Banking Act established a new supervisory framework 
within which the Bank of England could influence bank balance 
sheets for control and/or supervisory purposes. The need for 
change had been p~ovided by many factors, for instance the 
fringe banking crisis, inflation and the growing importance 
of the money supply in modern monetary policies. Thus Bank 
of England interference was now to be specifically directed 
towards the areas of capital adequacy, liquidity and monetary 
control. ') 
(In consultation with HM Treasury, monetary controls over the 
banking system have been relaxed by the Bank of England. A 
move towards controlling the monetary base of the banking 
system was dismissed as impractical in the U.K. Efforts were 
also made, in discussion with select banks) to implement an 
appropriate system of prudential supervision. Particular 
emphasis has been placed on maintaining the solvency and day-
to-day liquidity of banks. The Bank of England have issued 
guidelines which show their interpretation of the adequacy of 
a commercial bank's capital and liquidity. Banks in the 
U.K. will be encouraged to maintain an asset structure of 
sufficient quality. Unforeseen losses can then be charged 
(in addition to normal operating losses) to current earnings 
without affecting the solvency of that bank. Capital 
adequacy is therefore a long-term issue. In the short-run 
the Bank of England are also concerned banks do not become 
illiquid. This may occur where the assets and liabilities of 
a bank are mismatched. ) 
The current controls and supervisory gUidelines were 
published after 1980. Sufficient time has not therefore 
elapsed for significant research results to be obtained. The 
rationale of this work is to provide an initial assessment of 
the newly defined monetary control and prudential supervisory 
framework. 
1.2. FORMAT 
The thesis is structured in two parts. Part I analyses bank 
supervisi9n, the role of the Bal'!.k __ of.J!:.lJgland, the history of 
-----"-" ... -"'_.-"'--"..... -, 
bank supervision in the U.K. and the factors that led to a 
re-assessment of this position. Particular emphasis will be 
placed on monetary controls, ,capital adequacy and liquid 
adequacy. These topics will be analysed in detail; the 
recent changes will be incorporated to define the current 
posi tion in the U.K. In Part II the impact of the current 
.. 
regime will be assessed by use of quantitative models of bank 
balance sheets. The thesis will conclude that the impact of 
monetary controls is clearly discernable but that prudential 
supervision could now impose a very real threat to banks' 
balance sheets. 
1.3. HETHODOLOGY 
The literature review revealed that extensive coverage has_ 
been given to the topics of'monetary control and prudential 
supervision, most notably in the United Sta tes. The two 
topics were) however, in almost all cases treated separately. 
Thus, although the literature survey proved helpful, it 
failed to offer a base from which these issues could be 
considered in terms of an overall impact on bank balance 
sheets. To supplement this analysis, a computer-based model 
of a hypothetical clearing bank was constructed. The model 
used the Supercalc financial package, which allows the user 
to vary the assumptions of the model and observe the 
resul ting changes. The various controls and guidelines were 
imposed on the balance sheets. The model demonstrated the 
significant impact of the Bank of England's new supervisory 
framework - and the resulting effect upon a bank's 
profitability of these constraints. Finally a series of 
informal discussions with commercial bankers and analysts was 
undertaken. These discussions revealed widely varying 
interpretations of bank supervision, particularly concerning 
the rationale behind the present system of monetary control 
and the impact of the prudential gUidelines. 
PART I - BANK SUPERVISION, PAST A~D PRESENT 
CHAPTER 2 
CHAPTER 3 
CHAPTER 4 
CHAPTER 5 
CHAPTER 6 
BANK SUPERVISION 
BANK SUPERVISION TO 1980 
MONETARY CONTROL 
BANK CAPITAL ADEQUACY 
BANK LIQUIDITY ADEQUACY 
CHAPTER TWO BANK SUPERVISION 
CONTENTS 
2.1 Introduction 
2.2 Bank supervision:-
/2.2.1 Definition of bank supervision 
~.2.2 Why banks require supervision 
~.2.3 Defini tion of bank supe rvisor 
2.3 Bank supervision, the U.K. approach:-
2.3.1 Sta tutory provisions 
2.3.2 Non-statutory provisions 
2.4 Bank supervision, international comparison:-
2.4.1 America 
2.4.2 West Germany 
2.5 Bank supervision - conclusions 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will identify the concepts underlying bank 
supervision. Section 2.2 will argue why bank balance sheets 
are subject to external control and guidelines in respect of 
monetary and/or prudential policies. The role of the Bank of 
England as central banker to the ·U.K. will be discussed. The 
style of supervision adopted by the Bank of England will be 
considered in Section 2.3. This will be briefly compared. 
wi th the United States and West Germany in Section 2.4. The 
emphasis on the approach and style of banking supervision in 
the U.K. will be particularly important to an assessment of 
the prevailing supervisory controls in subsequent chapters. 
We are not therefore concerned with 'structural' regulations. 
Such regulations define the conditions for the establishment 
of new institutions and the branches of existing ones, 
various controls on interest rates and charges for 
services.(lp.16) 
2.2 BUK SUPERVISION 
2.2.1. Bank supervision defined 
(It ha~ .been suggested by H~lland (2p.34) that bank 
supervlslon should protect the legitimate interests of 
present and would-be bank customers and shareholders; prevent 
bank failures and be attentive to 
conditions. Kamath (3p.24) has added 
overall monetary 
./ 
the maintenance of 
--~-public confidence in the banking system; promoting a 
'healthy' banking industry (in terms of a desirable level of 
competition within the sector and maintaining the banks' 
ability to earn a rate of return commensurate with the 
banking risks invol ved) and allowing the banking sector to 
meet the needs of the community, both at present and in the 
future. 
rBanking supervision is therefore concerned with prudential 
\and monetary issues. Prudential policies will seek to /' 
encourage the growth of sound banking business) Horvitz 
(4p.~91) commented that n •••• failures of large banks (or at 
least worries about such problems) ar~ going to be a 
perrqanent part of the financial picture of the future".(' In 
the U.K. the Bank of England have recently focused on capital 
and liquidity measures in an attempt to limit the possibility 
--of a recurrence of the difficulties highlighted by the fringe 
banking crisis.) 
(Monetary controls, however, are determined largely by 
official policy;and any measures taken by the Barik of England ,--
will be with the approval of the government.) Gardener (5p.4) 
has argued n •••• the prudential stances of individual banks 
become of much less significance when the monetary 
authorities themselves act in an irresponsible and imprudent 
manner". This is because monetary policy, inflation, interest 
rate levels and changis, and the general state of the economy 
are all factors beyond ,an individual bank's control. (Monetary 
supervision acts on liabili ties by affecting the growth of 
deposits (and therefore of the money stock) through changes --
in interest rates brought about by Bank of England 
intervention in the financial markets) A major factor in the 
rate of monetary expansion has been the growth of bank 
finance, the banking system's principal risk asset. This is 
9 
also influenced by interest rates, though monetary 
supervision can also impose more or less direct controls -
for instance specific quantitative limits on lending and~ 
compulsory reserve requirements related to the behaviour of 
bank lending. 
Table 1 below shows the areas of a bank's balance sheet over 
which the Bank of England has now sought to exercise greater. 
supervision under the terms of the Banking Act. To date the 
proposals have been issued under four main headings: 
1. Monetary Control 
2. The Measurement of Capital 
3. The Measurement of Liquidity 
4. Foreign Exchange Exposure 
In the final analysis, because of their effect on bank 
balance sheets, all four papers are inextricably linked. 
Bank capital standards interact with both national economic 
and monetary policies. Increased capital requirements may. 
when new capital cannot be raised, directly decrease the 
availability of funds to borrowers and therefore the rate of 
growth of bank credit and money. Rigid liquidity standards 
may promote ill-timed banking actions; fl~xible liquidity 
standards could frustrate (for a time) the thrust of monetary 
policy.1Prudential supervision will tend to monitor the 
changing quality of management~ credit and balance sheets. 
Such information can be very useful to the makers of monetary 
policy. Lomax 2 has argued for an integrated approach towards 
both the formulation of monetary policy and the supervision 
of the banking system. 
TABLE 1 THE CENTRAL BANKS CONTROL AND SUPERVISORY ROLE 
LIABILITIES 
CAPITAL 
Sterling 
BANK PAPERS 
Measurement of Liquidity' 
Measurement 
of Capital 
Monetary Control 
- Provisions 
Currency Deposits ~\-r----------------~~------~--~ 
Other 
BANK OF ENGLAND 
ASSETS 
~ANK OF ENGLAND BALANCES 
Liquid Assets 
Market Placings 
Sterling Advances 
and Investments 
Currency Advances 
and Investments 
SOURCE: D. Child, Presentation, Loughborough University of Technology, 26 November 1981 
2.2.2 Why banks require supervision 
I Reed most et.al.(6p.3) stated "Commercial closely regulated businesses". banking is one of the-r I This is because the! 
: 
social consequences of large and widespread banking failures 
are " ••• generally viewed as sufficient justification for some 
form of prudential regulation, or supervision, of banking / 
activities"(7p.1). Secondly bank deposits and advances have. 
become a crucial constituent of monetary POlicy.;JIn the U.K:-
(as in most other countries) interest rates remain a major 
determinant of monetary policy because of their effect on the 
demand for both money and bank credit. ~anking systems Willl\ 
therefore be supervised to the extent that the authori ties / 
think it prudent to do so and the monetary authorities define 
their objectives in terms of bank assets and liabilities~ In--
the U.K. bank deposits are the main component of the money 
supply. 
In section 2.1 it was shown bank supervisors are concerned tol / 
maintain a 'safe' banking industry. This could be achieved 
by a bank's own regulations yut Revel13 has 
increased competition has increased risk taking 
--argued tha 
which in the 
abscence of external regulations has led in almost all ~ 
instances to the growth of 'bad banking practices'. In the 
U.K. this is illustrated by the failures of Overend Gurney in 
1866, City of Glasgow Bank 1878, Baring Brothers 1890; the 
major financial crises accompanying the outbreak of war in 
1914, and subsequently 1929-1932; the fringe bank crisis 
1973-74. "The step from primitive self-regulation through the 
suspension of inter-bank competition to regulation by the 
authorities was a necessary one as soon as it was) 
, 
demonstrated that self-regulation could break down". (8p.22). I. 
/ 
/ 
Prudential supervision of a banking system is thereforeV 
required primarily because of externalities such as poor \ 
I 
---management and fraud.) To a lesser extent the risks inherent 
in a bank's balance sheet are also important. (The essence of 
banking is to achieve an appropriate balance of risk and ~ 
return which permits a bank to maintain adequate levels of, 
liquidi ty, sol vency and profi tabili ty. ) 
This was recognised by Crosse and Hempel (9p.59): 
"Taking risks can almost be said to be the 
business of bank management. A bank that 1s run 
on the principle of avoiding all risks, or as many 
of them as possible, will be a stagnant 
institution and will not adequately serve the 
legitimate credit needs of its community. On the 
other hand, a bank that takes excessive risks, or, 
what is more likely, takes them without 
recognising their extent or even existence will 
surely run into difficulty." 
Two factors~ however, tend to lessen the possibility of banks 
taking excessive risks: (10p.5) 
1. Banks are highly geared institutions and are for the 
most part lending their depositors money. If a banks' 
assets are reduced by more than a relatively small 
percentage, their earnings and capital will be 
completely eroded and the bank will become insolvent. 
2. Banks are remunerated by a small and fixed margin over 
their cost of funds (excluding any fee income). This 
means a bank does not have an 'upside potential' on its 
assets - they are unable to share in any unexpectedly 
high profits accruing to the borrower. In contrast to 
an equity investor or venture capitalist, a commercial 
banker cannot work on the principle of balancing out 
losses against successful ventures. 
A full discussion of banking risks will be given in Chapter 
5. The purpose of this section was to show why it is 
necessary to supervise a banking system. ~e conclude that 
monetary controls are imposed because bank's assets and 
liabilities form a major component of official monetary 
poli cy. On the other hand prudential supervision is 
necessary because of externalities and because internal bank 
controls have, on certain occasions, proved to be 
insufficient on their own. 
2.2.3 Bank Supervisor Defined 
~rOadlY speaking a banking system will be supervised in 
practice by the central bank of that country. The central 
bank was defined by Sayers as " .... an organ of government 
that undertakes the major financial operations of the 
Government and by its conduct of these operations and by 
other means, influences the behaviour of financial 
institutions so as to support the economic policy of the 
J 
/ 
government". (11p.66) The whole criteria and obj ectives of a 
central bank therefore differ from commercial banks. Central 
banks are not profit maximisers. A central bank is governed 
by people who are more closely connected with Government. 
The most important objective of a central bank is to control 
the money stock in such a way as to promote the interest of 
the general public. (12p.154). 
The functions of the Bank of England in the U • .K. may 
therefore be described as follows: 
1. Note - issuing authority. 
2. Banker to the Government:-
a) maintaining the accounts of Government 
departments; 
b) handli ng Government short-term borrowing through 
the (weekly) Treasury Bill tender; 
c) handling the issue of Government stocks. interest 
payments on them and redemptions at maturity; 
d) managing the Exchange Equalisation Account (or 
similar fund). 
3. Banker to the banks - thei r source of cash and a means 
of settling transactions with each other (for instance 
cheque clearing) and with the public sector. 
4. Lender of last resort. 
5. Implementing Government monetary policy - principally 
by influencing the cost and availability of credit by:-
a) varying the terms of 'last resort' and other 
support; 
b) open market operations; 
J 
/ 
c) directives to banks; 
d) calls for special deposits/variations in banks' 
reserve asset ratios (the latter ceased August 
1981) • 
6. Supervision of the U.K. banking system. 
7. Maintain accounts for overseas central and other 
foreign banks and for bodies such as the LM.F. and ) (}.;l. El· R. D. 
un~1979, the 
~ 
--
traditionally established by the 'necessity of recognition' 
role of bank supervisor was never formally 
r 
Instead the role has been entrusted to the Bank of England. 
of financial institutions by the Bank of England. This i 
! 
process applied particularly to the discount houses (beCause! 
of their unique position as intermediaries between the Bank; 
, 
i 
of England and the banking system) and the merchant bankS 
(because the Bank of England was prepared to discount theirl 
, 
acceptances). In return for 'recognition' by the Bank off 
i 
England, financial institutions were prepared to accept that 
the " ••• regulation of their activities was desirable in th~ J 
common interest ••• " and " ••• that rules for the performance of. / 
functions 
( 13p.379). 
and of duties should be accomplished and enforced ll • l\ 
Thus the Bank of England was considered to be the \ 
, 
practical " •••• supervisory body since de facto the banking 
community accepts this situation. and the Bank's supervision 
and control" (14 p.5). 
\ 
--.. 
Bank supervision in the U.K. now involves at least three 
separate areas of Government, each with differing /' 
responsibilities: 
1. The Treasury who seek to have available an effective 
system with which to control, if necessary, the growth 
of the money supply. By implication, this means 
dictating the terms at which the banking system would 
be supplied with, or relieved of, cash. 
2. The Bank of England Policy and ~arket Department whose 
responsibility is to ensure thi~ there is sufficient. 
liquidity available to relieve any day-to-day shortages 
in the banking system. 
3. The Bank of England's Supervision Department whose 
responsibility is to ensure that individual banks are 
prudently managed and hold adequate capital and 
liquidity. 
2.3 BANK SUPERVISION - THE U.K. APPROACH 
In the U.K., bank supervision has been and continues to be a 
" ... blend of both statutory and non-statutory 
provisions"(15p.379). The latter has traditionally been 
carried out by the Bank of England through its role as the / 
central bank. The supervision and control of the U.K. 
banking system has never~ however, been a formally designed 
process (until recently). 
~ 
2.3.1 Statutory Bank Supervision 
Prior to 1979 the Bank of England supervised the U.K. banking 
system as a result of the 'necessity of recognition' and not 
through statute. The 1946 Bank of England Act gave the Bank 
of England power to issue directives to banks, but this has 
only rarely been utilised. This lack of formality was 
reflected in the Bank of England's supervisory department. 
By 1967 there were only four Principals of the Discount 
Office wi th a supporting staff of about fifteen, whose 
primary function was not bank supervision but discount window 
lending and the bill markets. This was primarily because it 
was not until the 1979 Banking Act that a statute definition 
~ 
of a bank was given. The following are the principal 
statutes of banking recognition: (16) 
1. Exchange Control Act 1947 - authorised a list of named 
banks who could deal in foreign currency or open 
accounts for non-residents of the United Kingdom. This 
list was not closed; banks were added to it as 
appropriate. The Act is now defunct. 
2. Companies Act 1948 - schedule 8 empowered the Board of 
Trade to exempt recognised banking or discount 
companies from disclosing the size of their hidden 
reserves. This was revised by schedule 2 of the 
Companies Act 1967. 
3. Protection of Depositors Act 1963 - imposes conditions 
to be fulfilled by anyone wishing to advertise for 
deposits. These do not apply ,to banks and discount 
houses who were recognised for this purpose by the 
Board of Trade under Section 127 of the Companies Act 
1967. 
',-
\ 
4. Companies Act 1967 - the two relevant sections were:-
a) Section 123 which empowered the Board of Trade to issue 
certificates to 'banks' provided these institutions 
would carry on bona fide banking business for the 
purpose of section 6(f) of the Money Lenders Act 1900-
19275 • 
b) Section 127 prohibited the use of the words 'bank, 
a ,,/
A 
banker or banking institution' in an advertisement by 
company not on the exemption list. 
5. Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1970 - section 54 
enables the Inland Revenue to confer the right to pay 
and receive interest gross of tax to companies 
considered to be conducting a banking business. 
6. Banking Act 19796 - the Act is primarily concerned with 
bank supervision. New supervisory responsibilities 
were placed on the Bank of England to determine which 
institutions may legally operate as deposit-taking 
businesses (excluding Building Societies). Further, the 
Act established a deposit protection fund and 
controlled the use of banking names and descriptions. 
The Banking Act established a two-tier system of 
deposit-taking businesses, categorising such 
insti tutions as 'recogni sed' banks or licenced deposit 
taker's (LDT's). The Bank of England has the sole 
power to grant recognition or a licence, and may revoke 
either. Once granted, the institution comes under the 
continuing process of supervision by the Bank of 
19 
England - the Act does not however lay down rigid 
statutory prudential ratios. By February 1982 there 
were 293 recognised banks and 300 LDT's. 
Recognition is granted to an institution which enjoys 
and " ••• has for a reasonable period of time enjoyed, a 
high reputation and standing in the financial 
community" (Sch.2, para. 1(0), provided that its 
business is carried on with integrity and prudence. A 
licenced institution must likewise " ••• conduct its 
business in a prudent manner" (Sch.2, para.10). 
Both institutions are now required to observe 
guidelines on capital adequacy requirements. 
Recognised banks must maintain " ••• net assets which, 
together with other financial resources available to 
the institution of such a nature and amount as are 
considered appropriate by the Bank, are of an amount 
which is commensurate with the scale of the 
,institution's operations" (Sch.2, para 6(1)). LDT's 
are however specifically required to maintain an amount 
which is " ••• sufficient to safeguard the interests of 
its depositors" (Sch.2, para 10 (1)). In addition a 
licenced institution must:-
a) maintain adequate liquidity having regard to the 
relationship between its liquid assets and its 
liabilities and also to the times at which its 
liabilities fall due and its assets mature, and 
b) make adequate provision for bad and doubtful debts and 
obligations of a contingent nature (Sch.2, para 10 r 
( 1) ) • 
2.3.2 Non-statutory Bank Supervision 
Prior to 1979, banking supervision in the U.K. was based on 
an informal approach. Gowland argued "The lack of statutory 
backing to the system was a matter of pride" (17p.91) whilst. 
Richardson has stated it is " ••• because of our traditional 
disposition to use unwritten, rather than codified., systems 
in some areas of our national life" (18p.367). Evenso this 
informal approach has long been viewed by the financial 
markets effectively as mandatory, a feature unique to the 
United Kingdom. Within this framework, the clearing banks 
and British overseas banks with large foreign branch networks 
have consistently remained the least supervised sector 
because of their operations and the security provided by 
their greater resources. 
\ Blunden has stated that the 'natural evolution' of bank 
supervision in the U.K. has given rise to four unique 
characteristics - a flexible, personal, progressive and 
participa ti ve approach7. 
1. Flexible - a flexible and pragmatic attitude has been 
adopted. The Bank of England recognise the many groups 
of financial institutions and their individual needs 
and practices. It is because of this diversity, the 
l 
b 
Bank of England have never attempted to impose. rigid 
rules on the banking system, viewing ratios merely as 
yardsticks and not categorical imperatives. 
2. Personal - by viewing each institution as unique, the 
Bank of England has always had particular regard to the 
quality and reputation of management and, where 
appropriate, ownership. Thus the degree of supervision. 
exercised has varied greatly according to the type of 
bank. 
3. Progressive - as a logical extension to the principal 
of recognition by supervision, the Bank of England has 
tended to graduate the levels of supervision according 
to the degree of recognition each institution is 
afforded. Thus the degree of supervision considered 
appropriate was a function of the belief that a bank 
will only attain its status after a long period of 
growth; informal recognition could be achieved by 
eligibility of bills, membership of associations -
formal recognition was by legislation. 
4. Participative - in the absence of legislation, the Bank 
of England have traditionally regarded the best way to 
judge what constitutes sound banking by observing the 
behaviour of banks which have an established reputation 
for prudential management (19p.367). The Bank of 
England would establish their standards accordingly. 
J 
To assess an individual bank, the Bank of England would 
rely not only on the information given by that bank but 
would also encourage views from other banks. 
2.4 BANK SUPERVISION - UNITED STATES AND WEST GERMANY 
The purpose of this section is to compare the uniqueness of 
the informal approach to bank supervision in the U.K. The 
United States (U.S.) and West Germany offer two similarlY 
advanced western banking systems yet banking supervision per 
se is more clearly defined. 
2.4.1 Bank Supervision - The United States 
(-
~e central bank of the U.S. is a system of twelve connected 
banks called the Federal Reserve Banks. The Federal Reserve 
System (FRS) was founded in 1913; most of the fundamental 
central banking powers of the system are entrusted to a 
central body, the Board of Governors of the FRS. There are, 
however, over 14,000 commercial banks in the U.S. who are 
----principally supervised by three different bodies -
the Office of the Comptroller of Currency (OCC) 
the FRS, / 
and the V 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). In fact there 
are 55 supervisory agencies because banks may also be 
supervised by the relevant state authorities. 
Supervision is accorded as follows. All U.S. banks must have 
a charter before commencing business. To be eligible for a 
national charter, commercial banks are required to have a 
given level of net worth (National Banking Act 1864). 
Nationally chartered banks are supervised by the OCC. State 
chartered banks may seek membership of the FRS8. Member 
banks (and Bank Holding companies) are supervised by the FRS. 
Non-member state chartered banks, whose deposits are insured, 
are supervised by the FDIC. Non-member 'uninsured' banks 
come under the auspices of the relevant state authority. 
There is a degree of overlap between the FRS, the FDIC and 
the state authorities. 
The FDIC was established in 1933 following the bank failures 
of the late 1920's. During a period of only three years 
10,000 out of a total of 25,000 banks failed. The result was 
that since the 1933 Bank Holiday, all personal deposits up to 
a c~rtai~sum have to be compulsory insured with the FDIC. 
/ 
I 
/ 
~on of the th~;;~ain supervisory \I'l . ,,""Q -agencies contrasts 
with the authority of the Bank of England in the U.K. 
Holland believes a sole agency could " ... tend to become 
inflexible, or even ossified,,(20p.34). This may well be true 
in a country with such a diversified and impersonal banking 
system. Evenso the FRS is being encouraged to become more 
closely involved in bank regulation and supervision. Davies 
(21p.72) questioned this on two issues. Firstly, federal 
consolidation might adversely affect the viability of the 
~ banking system under which banks have the choice of a 
S-t.a.t.e or federal charter. Secondly, he qUestioned the 
desirability of vesting supervisory authority over banks 
within the agency responsible for the conduct of monetary 
policy. U.K. experience would not appear to attach much 
weight to the latter criticism • 
..,,, 
Supervision of the American banking system therefore remains 
divided. Proposals have recently been forwarded to consider 
consolidating the functions of the OCC within the FRS, as the 
creation of a Federal Bank Examination Counci19 but they have 
been generally opposed. Supervision of the banking sector 
throughout the States is however a far more legally defined\ 
process than in the U.K. ~ 
2.4.2 Bank Supervision - West Germany 
-
In direct contrast to the U.K., bank supervision in Germany 
was formally designed by the Kreditwesengesetz (KWG Banking 
Act) of 193410. Also supervision is not directly conducted 
by the central bank (Bundesbank) but by the 
.-/ 
Bundesaufsichtsamt fur das Kreditwesen (BAK). The function 
of the BAK was defined by article 6(2) of the KWG as 
" ••• containing abuses in the banking sector which endanger 
the security of the funds entrusted to banks, or which impede ( 
the orderly conduct of banking business, or which could lead 
to considerable disadvantages of the economy as a whole." 
Broadly speaking supervision is the responsibility of the 
BAK. It can order the immediate cessation of business and 
has the power to request detailed financial information from 
the banks. Within this structure however the Bundesbank 
maintains an active role. 
~ 
The German approach has until recently had one noteable 
advantage vis-a-vis the U.K. In Germany there has always 
been a clear distinction between requirements imposed on 
banks for prudential reasons and those imposed for monetary 
/ 
/ 
control.) The main similarity is that both supervisory 
systems have been, and are, undergoing change, but a change 
which is more in response to banking crises than planned 
policy" • 
2.5 BARK SUPERVISION - CONCLUSION 
The distinction between monetary control and prudential 
supervision was made. Both will affect a bank's caPitay 
structure - the extent of this will be examined in subsequent 
chapters. 
~Q the U.K. the Bank of England is solely responsible for 
bank supervision. The lack of formality to the U.K. system 
was highlighted though recently the Bank of England has been 
empowered by statute to act.)It was shown that the Bank of 
England supervise on the basis that a n ••• bank is only as 
good as it's senior management ••• n thereby being more useful 
to n ••• influence a bank's policy from the top rather than to 
try to monitor its procedures from the bottom n(22p.369). 
Moreover the U.K. has now developed its own distinct style of 
banking supervision. This is important to note when 
analysing the current supervisory controls. These features 
were shown to be rather unique to the U.K. in contrast to 
America and West Germany, where more definitive and 
formalised control systems exist not necessarily under the 
auspices of the central bank. 
\ 
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3.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter analyses the controls and supervision that were 
applied before the 1980 reforms, distinguishing between the 
pre-1971 and post-1971 periods. The policy issues that 
influenced the supervisory process will be identified and 
discussed. It will be argued that in neither period was 
there a clear understanding of, nor intention to identify, 
the issues of monetary and prudential superv iSion. The 
review will be conducted in the context of these themes and 
the limitations of these controls highlighted. Section 3.4 
will further demonstrate the need for a reassessment of bank 
supervision in the U.K. In total this provides the 
foundation for the subsequent chapters in Part I. 
3.2. BANK SUPERVISION PRIOR TO 1971 
During the period to 1971 bank supervision in the U.K. 
concerned only a small number of banking institutions and was 
largely dominated by what was considered 'normal' banking 
practice. In essence bank supervision prior to 1971 was a 
loose monitoring procedure - the Bank of England did not 
explicitly recognise the need for bank supervision and were 
content to monitor the growth of some of the larger banks. 
3.2.1. MONETARY SUPERVISION 
The principal controls were imposed for monetary control 
reasons. It could be argued that the liquidity and cash 
ratios were prudential ratios but they were undoubtedly used 
as instruments of monetary control. Before 1971 therefore, 
bank supervision resulted from the need to subject bank 
balance sheets to control for monetary policy purposes. 
Monetary policy was directed towards maintaining confidence 
in the markets for government debt and controlling bank 
lending (without the use of disruptively large fluctuations 
in interest rates). This policy was principally designed by 
the monetary authorities understanding of the government debt 
markets and the proposals of the Radcliffe Committee(1). 
Confidence in the government debt markets would be achieved. 
by maintaining the stability of bond prices and yields, as 
the' authorities believed the public's demand for. government 
debt was marked by instability(23p.2). Thus given the large 
amounts of government debt for which holders had to be found, 
the way to maximise net sales was to maintain an orderly 
market of stable bond prices. The Bank of England, in its 
capacity as banker to the government, had for many years 
attempted to smooth out the price of government securities by 
its dealings in the money markets. The demand for interest 
rate stability also resulted from the belief that higher 
interest rates would tend to discourage investment in housing 
and industry. It was this desire for stable interest rates 
that caused the authorities to support the clearing banks' 
interest rate agreements or 'cartels' during the 1960's. The 
clearing banks did not compete on their deposit or lending 
rates, but rather linked these directly to Bank Rate2, which 
was set by the Bank of England. 
Monetary policy during the 1960's was also dominated by the 
proposals of the Radcliffe Committee. Policy assumed a very 
'Tobinesque' approach, concentrating on what was vaguely 
termed by the Committee as the 'liquidity of the economy'. 
In practice this concerned a broad category of short-term 
assets and not just the stock of money(24p.25). Monetary 
control was therefore also directed towards controlling the 
total demand for credit mainly by affecting the ease of 
access to such finance. 
Monetary controls were implemented in the form of both 
quantitative and qualitative controls: 
1. ~ntitative 
The two types of quantitative controls were direct 
controls and ratio controls:-
(a) Direct controls - comprised lending ceilings and 
Special Deposits (SDs). The main system of credit 
control was a system of ceilings on the growth of 
lending by individual banks. They were applied 
for long periods during the 1950's and 1960's. 
Ini tially these ceilings applied only to the 
clearing banks but were gradually extended to non-
clearing banks and other financial institutions. 
However, from 1960 the London and Scottish 
clearing banks were further subj ect to call s for 
SDs. This involved placing additional balances at 
the Bank of England equal to a specified 
percentage of their deposits. 
(b) Ratio controls - principally comprised the 
liquidity and cash ratios. They had prudential 
origins and were applied solely to the London 
clearing banks. The liquid assets ratio was set 
as a formal requirement in 1955 at 30% of 
deposits. Liquid assets were defined as cash, 
money at call and short notice with the discount 
houses~ bills of exchange and Bri tish government 
Treasury Bills. In 1963 the ratio was reduced to 
28%. The cash ratio was set as a minimum of 8% of 
deposits in 1946. Cash was defined as till money 
and balances at the Bank of England. 
2. Qualitative 
Qualitative controls of 'guidance' generally 
accompanied quantitative directives~ requiring the 
banks to give certain categories of borrowing priority. 
This frequently covered exports and industrial 
investment. 
The emphasis was, however, placed on direct lending 
controls. Calls for SDs and qualitative controls were 
generally of limited significance. Direct lending 
controls avoided the need to vary interest rates in 
order to control credit. The liquidity ratio was also 
used as a method of restraining bank lending. The 
liquidity ratio had been re-emphasised by the Radcliffe 
Committee(25para.505), but during the 1960's there was 
a revival of interest in the control of bank deposits 
by the cash ratio. The cash ratio had been used as a 
means of regulating short-term interest rates. 
3.2.2. WEAKNESSES OF THE SYSTEM PRIOR TO 1971 
The system was unsatisfactory for several reasons:(26p.2) 
1. Ineguitable 
(a) The combined effect of the liquidity and cash 
ratios, and calls for SDs~ was to force the 
clearing banks to keep more resources than 
commercially necessary in low-yielding assets •. 
This was an unfair profitability constraint. 
(b) Only a limited number of financial institutions 
were required to observe lending ceilings. 
Institutions not subject to these requirements 
could carry on profitable lending business which 
those subject to control could not. 
2. Inefficient 
(a) The banking system was inefficient to the extent 
that competition was severly limited not only by 
lending ceilings but also through the cartel 
arrangements and the uneven imposition of 
controls. 
(b) The control mechanism was inefficient. The supply 
of liquid assets as defined was not totally under 
the control of the authorities. A shortage of 
liquid assets could be overcome by the banks 
increasing their holdings of private sector assets 
(such as commercial bills) instead of being forced 
to reduce their non-liquid assets (such as 
advances) in order to observe the required ratio. 
To a limited extent banks could also sell bonds as 
the Bank of England had agreed to underwrite the 
bond markets. 
3. Uncomoetitive 
Prior to 1971 the clearing banks - indeed the banking 
sector generally - were under continual attack because. 
of the apparent lack of competition within the system. 
Shaw contends it was virtually an oligopoly(37p.20). 
One of the major considerations given for the need to 
change was the need to inject a spirit of competition 
and innovation into the banking system as a whole. 
3.3. BANK SUPERVISION 1971-1980 'COMPETITION AND CREDIT 
CONTROL' 
Introduced in September 1971) Competition and Credit Control 
(CCC) represented a complete overhaul of the monetary 
supervision of the financial system. It explicitly refuted 
the previous methods of credit control as highly 
unsatisfactory. CCC illustrated a changing trend in monetary 
policy. The authori ties were attaching more importance to 
the money stock as an objective of policy and therefore 
required a framework which would allow them greater control 
over the broad monetary aggregates, rather than specific 
control over certain institution's lending. The system had 
two broad objectives(28p.33):-
1. to ensure that the available supply of financial 
resources was allocated to various uses by the free 
operation of the price mechanism - abandoning rationing 
methods such as quantitative controls, and 
2. to enable the authorities - by appropriately 
influencing market conditions and thus inducing changes 
in market behaviour in response to the alterations in, 
market conditions - to exercise firm control over the 
size or rate of growth of the stock of money and other 
monetary aggregates. The authorities would thereby 
treat banks and consumer credit (hire purchase) 
institutions in a more uniform manner for the purpose 
of credit control. This complemented the first aim as 
the price mechanism can only operate efficiently in a 
genuinely competitive market. 
eee was an attempt to control the credit expansion of 
" ... banks and finance houses by operating on their resources 
rather than by directly guiding their lending,,(29p.17) such 
that - ... the aZ Zocation of cz>edit is pz>imaz>iZ y de tez>mined by 
i,ts cost"(30p.5). This reflected the view that the most 
important variable in the economy was not the total quantity 
of money3, but the price and availability of liquidity. 
eee represented a shift from direct control to market forces. 
It attempted to remove the impediments to competition arising 
from the liquidity and quantitative lending controls. An 
integral part of these proposals was that the London and 
Scottish clearing banks should abandon their collective 
agreements on interest rates 4• The authorities would now 
seek to influence the structure of interest rates through a 
general control over the liquidity of the whole banking 
system. The basic objective would be to influence the demand 
for money by changing the level of interest rates when 
necessary. 
3.3.1 COMPETITION AND CREDIT CONTROL5 
ecc involved many changes. Lending ceilings were withdrawn, 
cartel arrangements abandoned and, in order to directly 
improve their ability to control the money stock, the Bank of 
England discontinued its practice of supporting the price of 
government securi ties6• Quali ta ti ve guidance was w i thdr awn 
but only on the terms that it would be re-introduced if 
considered necessary. The four crucial institutional changes 
were: 
1. A reserve asset ratio applied 1Q ~ whole banking 
system 
A twelve and a half percent reserve asset ratio was the 
crux of the new system. It applied to all banks on the 
statistical list with eligible liabilities of £5 
million or more7. The ratio was a minimum daily 
requirement. calculated as a percentage of eligible 
liabilities8• 
Reserve assets comprised:-9 
(i) balances held with the Bank of England (other than 
special or supplementary special deposits); 
(ii) secured money-at-call with listed discount market 
institutions and brokers; 
(iii)Treasury bills issued by the British and Northern 
Ireland governments; 
(iv) British government marketable securities (gilts) 
with less than one year to maturity10; 
(v) U.K. local authority bills eligible for rediscount 
at the Bank of England; 
(vi) commercial bills eligible for rediscount at the 
Bank of England to a maximum of 2 percent of 
eligible liabilities 11 • 
The uniform ratio did not ignore the wide diversity of 
business between banks. The ratio was based on that 
part of their business which involved the taking of 
sterling deposits and their employment in sterling 
assets - which was the control objective. The Bank of 
England argued the similarities of function were more 
important than the dissimilarities 12 • According 
different treatments to parts of the banking system 
would have been difficult to reconcile with the 
objectives of CCC. It would also impede the 
authorities in making uniform calls for SDs. 
2. Special D~p~s~ 
The SD scheme was extended to all banks on the 
statistical list and finance houses observing a reserve 
asset ratio. Calls were made as a uniform percentage 
of eligible liabilitiesJ to be placed with the Bank of 
England. Such monies were not available for use by the 
banks. In this way the liquidity of the banking system 
was reduced. In the early 1970's. calls between one 
and five percent were made. Amounts called were 
rounded to the nearest £5,000. SDs usually earned a 
rate of interest equivalent to Treasury Bill rate13 • 
SDs were used in conjunction with the reserve asset 
ratio to mop up any abnormal excess liquid assets, and 
occasionally to force the banking system to dispose of 
assets not eligible as reserve assets. Such a method 
was unlikely to produce a precise multiple contraction 
of bank assets, but could be expected to influence the 
structure of interest rates. Calls for SDs for 
instance could exert upward pressure on interest rates 
- not only rates in the inter-bank market but also 
rates in the local authority market and yields on 
short- term gil t-edged stock. The growth of liabil i ty 
management, however, meant that the combined use of the 
reserve asset ratio and SDs was only partly 
effective(31p.26). 
3. ~sb ratio 
The London clearing banks were, in addition, required 
to maintain a minimum cash ratio of one and a half 
percent of eligible liabilities, on average, over each 
banking month. This was to be used as a fulcrum for 
money market operations. The requirement was also 
designed to provide a major source of income for the 
Bank of England as it was non-interest bearing. 
4. Intervention Technique~ 
The intended method of influencing the growth of 
monetary aggregates in the short term was to influence 
interest rates. The preferred method was to 
deliberately create shortages in the money markets, by 
setting the amount of Treasury bills on offer each week 
in excess of the government's reqUirement. 
This could be done because in 1971 the Discount Houses 
agreed to underwrite the whole of the Treasury bill 
tender. Thus they were constantly forced to borrow 
through the 'discount window' at an interest rate of 
the Bank's choice 14 • Clear signals about the 
Authori ties view on interest rates were given in this 
way, and by changes in Minimum Lending Rate(32). These 
rates would affect the rates the discount houses were 
prepared to pay for bills and other assets, and the 
rates at which they were prepared to borrow. Thus the 
terms on which the Bank lent to the discount houses 
represented a major influence on the level of short-
term interest rates generally. In practice this meant 
the authorities still maintained rigid control of 
short-term rates rather than allowing market forces to 
dominate. 
Bank rate was replaced by Minimum Lending Rate (MLR) in 
October 1972. MLR was again the rate at which the Bank 
would provide the necessary assistance to the discount 
market, but was formally calculated as Treasury bill 
rate plus half percent rounded to the nearest quarter 
percent. This meant MLR was a penal rate because the 
discount houses could usually obtain their funds from 
the banking system at a cost below that. 
3.3.2. COMPETITION AND CREDIT CONTROL IN PRACTICE 
Within months of CCC the volume of bank deposits and advances 
were actually increasing rapidly. Calls for SOs had been 
made in late 1972, July and November 1973, but the response. 
from the competitive markets was not as expected. Under the 
new controls,the banks had unexpectedly switched from asset 
to liability management - or rather they developed their 
liabilities but not necessarily at the expense of assets. 
Thus instead of responding to reserve asset pressure by 
reducing assets, the banks began to bid for funds in the 
wholesale markets that had developed rapidly in the early 
1970's. This meant a bank's lending was no longer 
constrained by the amount of funds that its customers 
deposited. The bank could simply bid for the extra funds 
required. 
The growth of the sterling Certificate of Deposit (CD) as a 
means of attracting large sums of money at attractive rates 
was considerable 15. The total amount of negotiable sterling 
CD's outstanding from all sources had risen from less than 
£1.900m in October 1971 to over £6,000m by November 1973. 
The growth of liability management also encouraged 'hard 
arbitrage' or 'round tripping'. Aggressive liability 
management forced up (wholesale) money market rates. Bank 
base rates did not always rise in line with these market 
rates, partly due to the informal pressure exerted on the 
banks by the authorities who were concerned to keep 
industry's borrowing costs down. This allowed the 
possibility of profitable arbitrage. Larger customers 
(notably corporate treasures) utilised thei r overdraft 
facilities, on-lending the funds in the money markets at 
higher rates back to the banks. This again had the effect of 
cosmetically increasing the money supply. 
In sum the banks were faced with a strong demand and, 
unconstrained by ceilings) bank lending to the private sector 
grew by 33 percent during 1973; the broad monetary aggregates 
(which included large denomination deposits and CD's) grew 
rapidly: M3 grew by 28 percent during 1973. 
Monetary control was further weakened by the problem of 
perverse interest rate structures. By aggresively bidding 
for reserve assets, banks widened the interest rate 
differentials between Treasury bills and other rates. This 
not only created unstable interest rate movements but had 
very severe repurcussions on the Bank of England's influence 
over short-term interest rates as a result of the formal link 
of MLR to Treasury bill rate. 
The spirit of CCC had also been weakened by the re-
introduction of lending guidance and quantitative ceilings. 
In August 1972 the banks were instructed to make credit less 
readily available to property companies and for financial 
transactions not associated with the maintenance and 
expansion of industry. During 1973 banks were asked to 
restrict lending to private customers. A credit control 
notice issued 17 December 1973 requested all banks and 
finance houses not to provide loans to persons or check 
trading facili ties for the purchase of goods covered by the 
terms control order16 on terms easier than those permitted by 
hire purchase controls. 
Quantitative ceilings were re-introduced in September 1973 •. 
The authorities, concerned to maintain the competitive stance 
of Building Societies required banks to observe a maximum 
interest payment of nine and a half percent on deposits of 
less than £10,000. Though the possibility of such a measure 
had been allowed for when eee was introduced) it was contrary 
to the spirit of the new market. orientated approach. 
The most important development of the eee regime was however 
the introduction of the SSD scheme or corset 17. The 
fundamental objective of the corset was to improve the 
authori ties control over the growth of the money stock, to 
enable them to achieve monetary restraint without resorting 
to the interest, rate mechanism to limit credit and without 
threatening the liquidity of the banking system. The corset 
was not a direct control in the form of previous lending 
ceilings but a deterrant to restrain excessive bank lending. 
It was a direct control on the sterling operations of banks 
and deposit-taking finance houses in the U.K., acting on 
their liabilities. It could thereby prevent banks from 
bidding up rates in the money markets. 
The corset acted to restrain excessive growth of an 
institution's interest bearing eligible liabilities (IBELs). 
This was a new approach:- controls were not applied to bank 
lending as during the 1960's but to the growth of certain 
liabilities which were under the direct control of the banks. 
This was done by imposing penalties on individual 
institutions whose rBELs grew faster than a prescribed rate. 
Such institutions were required to lodge non-interest bearing. 
deposits with the Bank. The scheme had three elements:- a 
base from which the subsequent growth in banks' rBELs was 
measured, a ceiling on that growth and a scale of penalties 
as shown by Table 2. 
The result of these very penal measures was to encourage 
banks to manage their assets rather than liabilities, In 
theory a bank faced with the prospect of moving into penalty 
would restrict credit expansion, The monetary growth target 
would not be exceeded and the control objective achieved, 
Griffi ths and Batchelor have shown, however, that in certain 
circumstances it may have proved profitable for a bank to 
violate the first, and even second tranche of penalties(33), 
The model is based on the assumption that a bank must be able 
to command a spread (between the rate it pays on new deposits 
and the rate it receives from the corresponding loans and 
reserve asset holdings) sufficient to offset the loss of 
interest entailed in making supplementary special deposits. 
Ce te ri s pa r i bus, it will be profi ta bl e to break through the 
corset ceilings if: 
, 
i 
Tl'.BLE 2: THE SUPPLE}!ENTARY SPECIAL DEPOSITS SCHEHE 
DATES OPERATIONAL BASE PERIOD PENALTY FREE ZD:lE RATE OF DEPOSIT EXEHP7IO~1 t!-! 
la. 17 Decetlber 1973 Average IEElS on make-up a. 8~~ gro'\yth in firet six 5% in reepect of excess of 3 
to dates in October, Nove:r.ber months fOllowed by 11% up to 1% 
11 Kove~.ber 1974 and December 1973 growth 0:1 a thri!e l:lonth 25% in respect of of excess 
moving: average 17. - 3% 
50% in respect of excess of 
over 3% 
. 
lb. 12 Nove::.ber 1974 ditto b. 1l% IEELS growth 5% in respect of excess of I 5 
to as above up to 3% 
28 February 1975 25% in respect of excess of 
3% to 5% 
,507. in respect of excess of 
over 5% 
2. 18 ~over.tber 1976 Average rEELS on make-up 3% for first six months As above 5 
to dates in August, September and !7. per month 
11 August 1977 and October 1976 thereafter 
3. 8 June 1978 Average IBELS on I:iake-up 4% gro''''th for average As above 10 
to days for six months November IBEJ.S for three r.1onths 
18 June 1980 1977 to April 1978 August to October 1978 
and thereafter 1% per 
month of the. base aver.::.ge 
IThe scheme did not apply to ban~s and finance houses with IBELS below the amount shown. 
2 The arnOUMe:-ent of the termination of the scheme was made on 26 March; final depo~i,ts were repaid in August 19,80. 
SOURCES: (a) The Supplementary Special Deposits Scheme, Bank of Englanc! QuarterIy Bulletin Narch 1932 p.78. 
(b) The Framet.;rork of UK ~1onetary Pnlicv 1982 He5.ner.".ann, Tsble 6.2 D T Lle"",ellyn, G E J Dennis, 1-1 J B Hall. 
I 
I , 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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RLA - RIBEL > K (RIBEL - RRA) + ~ (RRA) 
1-K 1-K 
such that K = RAR + SDR + SSDR. where 
RLA - rate of interest on bank loans and advances 
RIBEL- rate of interest on a banks' IBELs 
RRA - rate of interest on a banks' reserve assets 
RAR - reserve asset ratio 
SDR - special deposits ratio 
SSDR - supplementary special deposits ratio 
Given these equations. Table 3 sets out the minimum margins 
between returns on bank deposits and reserve assets 
compatible with given bank lending margins) at various levels 
of interest rates and corset penalties. 
From the above figures it may be concluded that it was almost 
always worth incurring the first tranche of corset penalties. 
but almost never the second tranche. If a bank found itself 
in the second penalty zone, it was virtually impossible for 
it to get out again(34). A bank would be forced to bid for 
funds (and thereby weaken its own position further) just to 
finance the corset penalties. However, in practice the 
margin between bank lending and deposit rates was rarely 
above 1% for prime borrowers during the 1970's. The rates of 
interest on banks' reserve assets were consistently between 
101 and 151. Thus, in practice there were arguably only two 
pOints at which lending could be profitable. 
underlined in the Table. 
These are 
TABLE 3: CONDITIONS FOR PROFITABLE VIOLATIONS OF CORSET CEILINGS 1 
Margin between bank Minimum margin between bank deposit rates and 
1 end inr, and deposit reserve asset rates (RIBEL - RRA) 
rates (J,LA-RIBEL) 
First Tranche Second Tranche 
SSDR = 0.05, RRA = SSDR = 0.25, RRA = 
5 10 15 5 10 15 
1 2.66 1.46 0.26 -1.63 -4.73 -7.83 
2 6.54 5.34 4.14 -0.16 -3.26 -6.36 
3 10.42 9.22 8.02 1. 31 -1. 79 -4.89 
4 14.30 13.10 11.90 2.78 -0.32 -3.42 
5 18.18 16.98 15.78 4.25 1.15 -1.95 
SOURCE: Competition and Regulation in Financial Market, ed Verheirstraeten 
Table 9.5 p.207 
lCalcu1ations assume a 12.5 per cent reserve asset ratio and a 3 per cent 
special deposits ratio. Thus in the first tranche K = 0.205 and 0.405 in the 
second tranche. 
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3.3.3. eee - WEAKNESSES 
eee failed to distinguish between the concepts of monetary 
control and prudential supervision. Some prudential 
guidelines (of dubious distinctions) were applied to very few 
institutions. Monetary control was also limited to the extent 
that market forces were not allowed to dominate. Despite the 
attempt to encourage competi tion in the financial markets, 
the authorities had maintained control of all interest rates, . 
particularly short-term rates. Nevertheless the crucial 
limitations were inherent in the control systems themselves, 
notably the reserve asset ratio and the corset. 
In 1971 the Bank of England stated the reserve asset ratio 
was intended to " ... provide the authorities with a known firm 
base for the operation of monetary policy"(35p.3) yet the 
supply of reserve assets was never fully under the control of 
the monetary authorities. The ratio itself was largely based 
on the former liquidity ratio which had prudential origins 
and included the 8 per cent cash ratio which was based on 
what had appeared normal banking practice in 1946. The ratio 
was therefore designed to include a banks' primary liquidity 
yetJ because of the nature of the ratio, a bank could not 
rely on such liquidity for fear of falling below the minimum 
level. This need to observe a minimum requirement also 
distorted the yield relationship between short-term assets 
qualifying as reserve assets and other assets. 
The corset had also proved to be an inefficient control 
mechanism for three reasons - it inhibited competition, 
encouraged artificial resource allocation and 
disintermediation. 
1. ~mpetition li~ inihibited 
When the lending of banks is fixed to a base figure it 
is impossible for them to increase their market share. 
of advances without suffering penalty. Shaw argued 
that control was being achieved not in conjunction with 
competition but at the expense of competition(36). 
2. Artificial resource allocali.Qn m: 'liindow-dressing..!. 
It is now clear that the banks had taken part in 
" ••• elaborate window dressing operations"07p.19). 
During the first six months of the scheme they managed 
to take £2 billion of IEELs out of their balance 
sheets, even though they had increased sterling lending 
by £2.5 billion. After the abolition of the corset, 
large changes in balance sheet structure suggested 
other forms of window-dressing included " •• ,abnormal 
transactions with the discount market, currency swaps 
with depositors, and possibly substantial sales and 
repurchases of government stocks over make-up day"(38). 
After June 1980 there was a rapid increase in IEELs and 
sterling M3; in banking July private sector deposits 
rose by £3,000 million, sterling lending to the private 
sector by £2,200 million and sterling lending overseas 
by £700 million 18, IEELs rose by some 14% in the month 
and eligibl e liabil i ties by around 9 percen t<39p.83). 
This problem was further compounded by the inherent 
nature of on/off direct controls - anticipation of 
their application will also cause certain structural 
changes. Banks may have been encouraged to raise their 
IBELs (in the months prior to the corset) in 
anticipation of the corset so as to raise their base 
figure. 
3. Disinterm~diation 
The banks tried to avoid the penalties by bringing 
together lender and borrower directly rather than 
acting as the financial intermediary between the two. 
This had three di sadvantages( 40p.41): 
(a) It was inefficient as banks were forced to act as 
'marriage brokers' and not in their traditional 
role as financial intermediaries. 
(b) Lender and borrower had to match, which meant the 
banks were unable to follow their usual practice 
of taking lots of small deposits to manage one big 
loan. 
(c) Whenever disintermediation occured, the published 
monetary aggregates invariably gave a misleading 
prediction of the thrust of monetary policy. The 
usefulness of the money stock as an indicator of 
monetary conditions was considerably weakened. 
The application of the corset (as with many direct controls) 
therefore had the effect of diverting credit flows into 
uncontrolled channels. Disintermediation occured largely 
through the banks' acceptance business. an off-balance sheet 
form of finance and not therefore subject to control. Rather 
than borrow direct from a bank, a company would be encouraged 
to issue commercial bills which would be 'accepted' by the 
bank19. With bill finance the company receives the money it. 
requires and the supply of liquidity to the public increases 
in the form of additional holdings of commercial bills. The 
net effect is broadly similar to an increase in bank lending. 
The Bank of England have since estimated that before the 
corset, bills held outside the banking system amounted to 
£350 million, but by the end of the first period they had 
grown to £500 million( 41 p.82). The 1976 corset was redef ined 
to restrain the banks' acceptance business, though after the 
third corset was announced, the 'bill leak' grew to £710 
million in the third quarter of 1978, reaching a peak of 
nearly £2,700 million in the second quarter of 1980. After 
the corset was abolished bills held outside the banking 
system fell back to less than £500 million. 
The broad consensus is that the corset was ft ••• an instrument 
of highly dubious effectiveness ft (42). The corset was 
probably a useful aid to monetary supervision but the 
weaknesses and severe penalties that accompany such a method 
of direct control almost invariably invalidate its use as a 
control. It has been described as a mechanism where 
ft ••• under set rules, everything that is not specifically 
forbidden is permitted,ft in which the commercial banks showed 
" ... commendable ingenuity in protecting their own interest 
wi thin the letter of the supplementary special deposit 
rules,,(43). The corset was finally disbanded in June 1980 
following the abolition of U.K. exchange controls in October 
1979, which allowed the possibility of large-scale offshore 
disintermediation. The abolition of exchange control allowed 
U.K. residents to channel funds to and from banks outside the 
U.K. Thus there was a possibility that all wholesale. 
deposits in excess of the penalty-free amount could have been 
channelled offshore via the Euro-sterling markets, as the 
corset controls applied only to banks in the U.K. 
3.4. BANK SUPERVISION - REASSESSMENT 
eee had in many respects failed to achieve its key objective 
of monetary and credit control. More importantly however, 
banking supervision had not kept pace with the changing 
banking system in the U.K. During the 1970's the U.K. 
economy had dramatically changed, showing signs of 
persistantly increasing inflation, unemployment, volatile 
money and foreign exchange markets, and a rapidly increasing 
money supply. The nature of banking had changed; ecc had 
encouraged the unexpected growth of secondary banks. Banks 
had become the residual means of finance for the OPEC oil 
price increases, increasingly lending on longer terms. 
Maturity transformation had increased, spreads had declined. 
The limitations of ecc demonstrated the need for a trade-off 
between competition and credit control which would include an 
element of flexibility to allow the relative growth of 
insti tutions to reflect, at least in part, differing levels 
of efficiency. Within this framework other events during the 
1970's encouraged the need for a tighter system of prudential 
supervision of the banking system. A change in supervisory 
concepts and techniques became almost inevitable. 
3.4.1. MONETARY CONTROL - REASSESSMENT 
The limitations of monetary control under the ece regime have 
been noted, but the lack of stability in the money markets is 
of particular importance. Prior to 1976 the growth of the 
money supply had not been targeted. Instead it tended to be 
a residual of the Bank of England's operation in the money, 
gil t-edged and foreign exchange markets. The result was an 
erratic growth pattern. Between 1972 and 1973 this was in 
the region of 25-30 percent, sharply decelerating in the 
first half of 1974. Griffiths has determined that between 
1975 and 1978 the money supply (when measured by a three 
month moving average of sterling M3) twice rose by over 20%. 
yet in mid-1978 growth fell to nearly zero(44p.23). This 
instability is further reflected by comparing the monetary 
targets for M3 and sterling M3 to the actual growth rate 
since 1976 in Table 4. 
The 1970's were also characterised by large movements of 
interest rates over short periods. Table 5 illustrates the 
trend of these important short-term rates. Until mid-1973 
interest rates were below 5%, rising sharply from July to 
November 1973. During 1973 bank base rates rose from 8.5% to 
13% By September 1976 MLR was raised from 11.5% to 13%, 
having touched 15% in March. MLR had risen to 17% by mid-
.I<l~ .It:.. Monet<lry T<lrgets .fQr. M3.L£M3. .in .tM .llnit~ KiIlill!Qm 
Annu<ll growth r<lte (%) 
T<lrget 
1976 - 1977 12 
1977 - 1978 9 - 13 
1978 - 1979 8 - 12 
Oct. 1978-0ct.1979 8 - 12 
June 1979-0ct.1980 7 - 11 
Feb. 1980-April 1981 7 - 11 
Source: M.K. Lewis, Economics, Autumn, 1981, p.69. 
(1) As <It Febru<lry 1981. 
Result 
10.7 
16.4 
10.9 
13.3 
17.2 
20.2( 1) 
November 1979. These rapid increases had been largely 
'engineered' to fund government debt - the so-c<llled 'Duke of 
York' effect - slumping rapidly when it appeared the growth 
of the money supply had been constrained. 
These factors and the influence of Friedman et.al. combined 
to produce a general agreement that the growth of the money 
supply must be restrainted if inflation was to be 
constrained. Sir Geoffrey Howe recently commented: "Ever 
since the coll<lpse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed 
exchange rates in 1971 the need to control the money supply 
has become accepted worldwide"(45). Persistent infl<ltion 
problems have stimulated more interest in monetarist 
policies: "Whereas the main emphaSis in the late 1950's, and 
much of the 1960's was on the rate of interest, the 
TABLE 5: SHORT TERM MONEY RATES 
Year MLR Treasury Bill London Clearing Bank 
Yie1d(1) Deposit Accounts(2) 
196..9 8 7.80 6 
1970 7 6.93 5 
1971 5 4.46 2l:; 
1972 9 8.48 5~ 
1973 13 12.82 9l:; 
1974 Ill:; 11.30 9l:; 
1975 ll~ 10.93 7 
1976 I4/; 13.98 11 
1977 7 6.39 3l:; - 4l:; 
1978 12l:; 11.91 10 
1979 7 16.49 15 
1930 14 13.45 11l:;- 12 
1931 
-
(3 ) 15.39 12~ - 12l:; 
SOURCE: Financial Statistics Table 13/9 
1 Average discount rate expressed as the rate at which 
interest is earned during the life of the bills. 
2 Seven day notice ordinary deposit accounts. 
3 a. 10 March MLR cut frore 14% to 12%. 
b. 20 August MLR suspended. 
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.combination of developments in academic analysis and in 
influential opinion with the harsh reality of persistently 
high rates of inflation caused us (the Bank of England) to 
switch our focus to monetary aggregates as the better guide 
to the thrust of policy ••• ,,(46p.246). 
In the U.K. the trend to adopt monetary targets was 
encouraged by the IMF in 1976, whilst the election of the 
Tha tcher government in May 1979 committed the U.K. to a 
" ••• progressive reduction in the rate of growth of the money 
stock ••• " to achieve ,a " ••• permanent reduction in 
inflation,,(47p.iii). Finally the trend towards reform of 
monetary controls resul ted from an increasing demand for a 
more efficient and equitable means of credit control. In 
,particular monetary control should allow institutions 
extending credit to the private sector to maintain adequate 
return on capital to provide their shareholders with adequate 
returns and to maintain or increase their own funds as 
required for prudential purposes(48). 
The need for a reassessment of prudential policies had, 
however, resulted from events as early as 1973. The crucial 
importance of adequate capital and liquidity was dramatically 
shown by the 'fringe banking crisis' of 1973/74. The crisis 
has been well documented 20 , but the following causes noted by 
Revell should be discussed:(49) 
1. The rapid expansion of non-deposit banks required a 
great increase in skilled staff who were not available 
at such short notice. The result was the growth of 
poor and inexperienced management. 
2. Stringent credit ceilings since the 1960's had 
encouraged the growth of fringe institutions who were 
only loosely supervised by the authorities. Fringe. 
banks were able to compete for profitable lending 
business turned away by more controlled banks who had 
reached their lending ceilings. 
3. The abolition of interest-rate agreements in 1971 
allowed the clearing banks to compete in wholesale 
banking, not just through subsiduary banks as before, 
but under their own names. 
4. The portfolios of fringe banks were characterised by 
property holdings and developments, loans to property 
companies) second mortgages and ordinary shares. Such 
assets were long term but largely financed by short-
term wholesale deposits. 
The rapid expansion of liabilities of financial institutions 
produced many important trends noted by Lester(50), and is 
shown in Table 6. Bank lending increased from £12,400 
million in 1970 to £24,000 by the end of 1972. Clearing bank 
advances alone to property companies increased by 70% between 
May 1972 and 1973. There was a marked increase in maturity 
transformation. By the end of 1973 Cedar Holding held 85% of 
TABLE 6: Liabilities of Financial Institutions 
Institution Amount Em Compound 
1960 1965 1970 1975 1960-65 
Najor deposit banks 8618 10760 12234 26223 4.54 
Discount houses 1197 1455 2352 2536 3.98 
Accepting houses-resident (134) 530 1287 2356 31. 6S (1) 
non-resident 250 398 1238 1865 9.75 
Other banks - resident(l) (268) 1012 4527 16293 30.44 
non-resident 1096 3000 15042 60858 22.31 
Finance Houses 678 1108 1222 1199 10.32 
Building Societies 3183 5577 10940 24364 11. 87 
Source: M.K. Lewis, Lloyds Bank Review, p.42, July 1980 
(1) Excludes U.K. banks' holding of non-sterling currency deposits 
annual rate of 
1965-70 
2.60 
10.08 
19.42 
25.48 
34.94 
38.05 
1.98 
14 .43 
g:rowth% 
1970-75 
16.47 
1. 52 
12.85 
8.45 
29.19 
32.25 
(0.38 ) 
17.37 
co 
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deposits with a maturity of less than three months, compared 
to 70% of its assets held in second mortgages. Cedar 
Holdings also typified the great expansion of the fringe 
banks. From a balance sheet of £11 million in 1970 it had 
grown to £128 million in 1973. During the same period London 
and County expanded from £5 million to £129 million. 
The potential banking crisis was saved by the establishment 
of a Control Committee from the Bank of England and the 
London and Sco t ti sh Clearing· Banks. The Com mit tee firs t me t 
on 28 December 1973 and was subsequently known as 'the 
lifeboat'. The lifeboat support operation involved 26 
institutions of whom 18 were institutions wi th Section 123 
certificates. Table 7 shows the scale of the lifeboat 
operation to March 1978. 
The fringe banking crisis therefore proved instrumental in 
encouraging a reassessment of prudential supervision in the 
U.K. Further impetus came from the need to harmonise bank 
supervision with other EEC members21. Article 3(1) of the 
1977 EEC Banking Directive had committed the UK to following 
certain requirements for authorising credit institutions(51). 
This was implemented by the Banking Act which we noted in 
Chapter 2 placed new supervisory responsibilities on the Bank 
of England. Finally in June 1980 the Wilson Committee20 
contributed further to the developing appreciation of a need 
for improvements in the field of banking control. 
TABLE 7: Total Amount of Lifeboat Support At Shared Risk Outstanding 
At End Quarters 
End-quarter Er.lillions End-quarter Emillions End-quarter 
1974 March 390.2 1975 September 949.9 1977 March 
June 443.4 December 913.5 June 
September 994.3 1976 March 876.1 September 
December 1181.7 June 827.2 December 
1975 March 1173.4 September 774.5 1978 March 
June 1148.5 December 782.7 
Source: Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, June, 19_78, p.237 
Emillions 
752.1 
731. 7 
713 .8 
676.5 
656.5 
3.5. SUMMARY 
The previous discussion has provided the framework within 
which the new monetary and prudential controls may be 
analysed. The limitations of the previous control systems 
demonstrated the need for a reassessment of monetary control 
policies. The fringe banking crisis illustrated the need to 
impose prudential supervision on the U.K. banking system if 
competi tion and public confidence were to be maintained in 
that system. Particular attention was given to the various 
controls embodied in eee and the changing na ture of banking 
and economic activity during the last decade. It became 
apparent that there was not a clear understanding of, or 
intention to identify, the issues of monetary control and 
prudential supervision. 
NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE 
1. ~ Committee on ~ Workings Qf ~ Monetary System, 
HMSO, Cmnd.827, 1959. 
2. Bank Rate was originally the rate at which the Bank of 
England would re-discount first class Bills of Exchange 
for the discount houses. The link between Bank Rate 
and bank base rates during the 1960's meant that Bank. 
Rate was used by the authorities as the lynch-pin of 
credit control. In October 1971 it reverted to its 
original role and in October 1972 Bank Rate as such was 
discontinued. 
3. The 'stock of money' in this context was defined as 
notes and coin in circulation plus bank deposits. 
4. This was subject to a proviso concerning the terms 
offered on savings deposi ts. For further details see 
'Competition and Credit Control', l3.ru!k Q.1 England 
Quarterly Bulletin, June 1971, p.4, paragraph 15. 
5. For a more detailed examination of the CCC reforms see 
the Banking Information service, Monetary Control ~ 
Britain 1971-1981. 
6. This does not apply to government securities with a 
year or less to maturity, because they were redefined 
as reserve assets. 
7. Deposit-taking finance houses were also subject to this 
requirement in the form of a 10 percent reserve asset 
ratio. 
8. Eligible liabilities were broadly defined as:-
a) sterling deposit liabilities (excluding deposits 
having an original maturity of over two years), 
plus 
b) sterling resources obtained by switching foreign 
currencies into sterling. 
Inter-bank transactions and transactions with the 
discount market (other than reserve assets) and 
sterling CD's (both held and issued) were taken into 
the calculation of an individual bank's liabilities on 
a net basis, irrespective of term. Adjustments were 
also made in respect of transit items. 
9. A comprehensive discussion of reserve assets is to be 
found in 'Reserve Ratios: Further Discussions', llaJlk 
Qf England Quarterly Bulletin, December 1971, pp.13-16. 
10. This meant the national debt could only be funded by 
gilts with greater than one year to maturity. The 
government did not therefore have a short-term method 
of debt finance, which may have been a considerable 
disadvantage. 
11. A maximum restriction was imposed as this was a reserve 
asset the banking system could simply 'manufacture' by, 
for example, raising sterling CD's and placing the 
proceeds on call with the discount market. 
12. This view was expressed in 'Competition and Credit 
Control', .B.ank Qf England Quarterly Bulletin., June 
1971} para.l0. 
13. This arrangement was modified in October 1973 because 
of the so-called 'endowment' effect. Interest rates 
(partly as a result of official encouragement) had 
risen to very high levels, thereby benefi ting bank 
profits where lending was financed by interest-free 
current accounts. The government sought to reduce this 
benefit by withdrawing the interest paid on SDs placed 
in respect of such deposits. In November 1974 this 
penalty was withdrawn? reverting to the previous 
formula. 
14. Access to the formal discount window facility is 
confined to the members of the LDMA. The members 
operate as principals in the short-term money markets 
and function as intermediaries in the relationship of 
the authorities to the banking system. For a more 
exacting account of these issues see M. Blanden 'Bank 
of England Moves Cautiously Towards A New Monetary 
Policy', The Banker, February 1981, pp.42-43. 
15. The sterling CD had first been issued in 1968 following 
the successful introduction of dollar certificates in 
the U.K. two years earlier. They were issued against 
the deposit of funds between £50,000 and £500,000 for 
a period of three months to five years. 
The advantage to the borrower is that he has the funds 
for a fixed period, but the depOSitor, should he_ 
require the funds before the maturity of that 
certificate, may sell it in the secondary market (the 
market where existing certificates are traded). It 
thereby combines a fixed term deposit for the issues, 
with liquidity for the holder who often prefers it to 
the ordinary fixed-term deposit which, though earning a 
higher rate of interest, cannot be sold in a secondary 
market. 
16. The terms control order limited the maximum repayment 
period and the minimum down payment for different types 
of consumer goods purchased on credit. In 1982 several 
modifications were made to this, particularly the 
provisions relating to car purchases. 
17. For an excellent description of the mechaniCS of the 
Supplementary Special DepOSits Scheme as a control 
instrument see G. Pepper and R. Thomas, 'The 
Interaction Between The Corset And Reserve Asset 
Control', paper presented to the Money Study Group 
Conference, Brasenose College, Oxford. September 1979. 
18. The dramatic increase in sterling lending to non-
residents suggested some re-intermediation of sterling 
business driven offshore by the corset. 
19. By accepting a bill a bank guarantees that the holder 
will be repaid when the bill matures and has the effect 
of making investors more willing to buy bills. 
Accepted bills would be almost identical in terms of. 
marketability and default risk to CDs, and as such 
could be sold at a similar price to holders other than 
banks. 
20. For some excellent discussion see: 
a) 'The Secondary Banking Crisis and the Bank of 
England's Support Operation', .B.ank.Qf. England 
Quarterly Bulletin, June 1978, Vo1.18, No.2, 
pp. 23 0-23 9. 
b) T. Lester, 'The Secondary Scandal',Management 
Today, October 1974. 
cl M. Reid, .Ih.e. Secondary Banking Crisis 1973-1975, 
.lll causes .arul course, 1982, The Macmillan Press 
Ltd., London and Basingstoke. 
21. A discussion of the issues raised can be found in 
R.J.W. Henderson, ~ Harmonisation .o..f. Banking 
Legislation in ~ European Economic Community, Thesis 
for Bachelor of Philosophy, April 1976, Oxford Centre 
for Management Studies, Oxford. 
22. Committee.t..Q Review ~ Functioning QJ:. Financial 
Institutions, HMSO) Cmnd.7937, June 1980. 
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4.1. HONETARY CONTROL - INTRODUCTION 
In the context of our previous discussion it might logically 
be expected that a replacement system of monetary control 
should ensure stability in the money markets (avoiding the 
necessity of periodic interest crises); avoid artificial 
distortions of certain assets (reserve assets); and result in 
a money supply series that is a more accurate reflection of 
the underlying thrust of monetary policy(52). The latter is. 
important to bank balance sheet supervision because emphasis 
has now been placed on sterling M3 1 as the key money supply 
series: sterling M3 is largely composed of bank deposits. 
Thus the desire to target and monitor sterling M3 as a major 
indicator of monetary policy necessarily implied that bank 
balance sheets would continue to be subject to supervision 
for monetary control reasons. Monetary targets are 
considered in Section 4.2. 
The new control methods were introduced on 20 August, 1981. 
They were influenced by the 'Monetary Control' Green paper2 
from the Treasury (in consultation with the Bank of England) 
and the following Bank of England discussion papers:-
1. Monetary Base Control, June 1979. 
2. Methods of Monetary Control - Background Note. November 
1980. 
3. Monetary Control Next Steps. March 1981. 
4. Monetary Control - Provisions, August 1981. 
The rationale of the new system was described by Richardson: 
"What we are not prepared to do is to take a leap in the dark 
when the direction is not clear. We are trying to see what 
effect a change would have"(53). Thus, only certain changes 
to bank balance sheet controls and intervention techniques 
have been made. 
It is nevertheless prudent to begin with a discussion of the 
relevant issues raised by a monetary base control system. A 
move to monetary base control was considered by the 1979 
paper(54) and the Green Paper. The case for monetary base. 
control fails if it either does not ensure control over the 
money supply or the disadvantages of the alternative control 
framework are greater than those of the present arrangements. 
On both counts it was rejected by the 1979 paper. The Bank 
of England has, however, since argued that " ••• the present 
moves would be consistent with a gradual evolution in that 
direction"(55p.21). 
The current system will be discussed in Section 4.4. The 
implications of the new controls will be analysed in terms of 
their effectiveness and impact upon the banking system. It 
will be our conclusion that the new system of monetary 
control is essentially a 'tidying-up' operation which has 
removed much of the regulation from bank balance sheets. 
4.2. MONETARY CONTROL - MONETARY TARGETS 
We have shown that at the end of the last decade the monetary 
authorities chose to control the monetary aggregates. The 
government believe that their monetary policy can best be 
formulated if targets are set for the growth of certain 
monetary aggregates, against which progress can be 
assessed(56p.10). Quantitative monetary targets are intended 
, . 
to give precision to monetary aims and can provide an 
indication of the thrust of monetary policy by stating 
quantitative aims for the rate of expansion of one or more of 
the monetary aggregates. In the U.K. Richardson( 57> argued 
such targets should allow a degree of flexibility to meet the 
financial needs of industry for two main reasons - the U.K. 
does not exhibit a continuing stable relationship between 
money and incomes; and secondly there is a need to look at 
the economy at large, because he argues the objective of 
monetary policy is not to keep monetary expansion at a 
particular level, but to bring about a reduction in the 
levels of inflation and unemployment, together with a 
recovery in growth and the balance of payments. 
Nevertheless, there is still disagreement as to which (if 
any) single statistical measure of the money supply can be 
expected to be of value in crea ting stable expecta tions and 
curbing inflation. Sir Jeremy Morse argued " ••• it is not 
easy to find a good working measure of money,,(58), whilst Sir 
Geoffrey Howe agreed that " ••• no single measure of money can 
fully describe monetary condi tions,,(59). 
To mid-1982 monetary policy was defined to " ••• control the 
rate of growth of £M3 in the context of a published Medium 
Term Financial Strategy involving a decelerating trend of the 
money supply".(60) The principal monetary target has been 
sterling M3 because the government regard it as best suiting 
the present circumstances of the U.K.(61p.l 0). It is now a 
well known indicator and according to Lomax(62p.3) has a 
further advantage of providing certain accounting 
conveniences as it is the same measurement as that used for 
other government policies (fiscal policy, policies to 
restrain bank credit and the balance of payments). 
The choice of sterling M3 has it's criti cs 3 not least those 
who prefer the narrower M1 defini tion 4 or still wider 
measures including, for example, non-bank holdings of 
Treasury Bills and short-term investments in building. 
societies and local authorities. The main criticism is that 
the authorities can not directly control sterling M3 5, 
because changes in sterling M3 result from:-
1. the PSBR less 
2. external and foreign currency finance accruing to the 
public and banking sectors (equal to the current and 
private sector public accounts of the balance of 
payments plus the residual item), less 
3. sales of public sector debt to the non-bank private 
sector, plus 
4. bank lending in sterling to the private sector, less 
5. changes in banks' non-deposit liabilities. 
Thus, the authorities are not in a position to directly 
control the supply of sterling M3 because they cannot control 
bank lending to the private sector. Furthermore, if sales of 
public sector debt are to banks and not non-banks, this will 
not affect sterling M3 • This could partly explain the 
divergencies between sterling M3 and other monetary 
aggregates - during 1980 and 1981 sterling M3 grew faster 
than M11 being boosted in mid-1981 after the abolition of the 
corset. During the eleven months to February 1982J sterling 
M3 had increased by 15.75%. compared with a government target 
of 6-10%(63). It has therefore been suggested6 that sterling 
M3 is only viable as a lead indicator provided other measures 
of the money supply and credit are monitored. 
Richardson is a notable proponent of targeting domestic 
credit expansion (DCE) against sterling M37• This is because 
the difference between the two is basically the foreign. 
component of credit expansion, which is approximately the 
balance of payments position on current account plus net 
private sector capital flows. Thus excessive growth in DCE 
is likely to be associated with a worsening balance of 
payments position both directly (if surplus liquidity leaks 
abroad) and indirectly (if excessive growth undermines 
external confidence). Whitmore has since commented " ••• in 
the sense that monetary creation is a two round process, with 
the spending of a new credit creating a new deposit for 
further potential spending} DCE must rank as a primary 
indicator"(64). Moreover, Coghlan asserts DCE has the added 
advantage of including credit financed through an increase in 
non-deposit liabilities or through other sources outside the 
definitions subj ect to controls(65p.83). 
Until March 1982 the government continued to formulate the 
monetary target in relation to one aggregate, using sterling 
M3 for this purpose} whilst taking account of the growth of 
other aggregates. The March 1982 budget, however, 
represented a major change in U.K. Monetary Policy. 
Llewellyn identified the important policy changes as:(66p.1) 
1. the effective abandoning of the medium term financial 
strategy; 
2. the replacement of the target for £M3 by a weaker 
target for a wide range of money and liquidity 
aggregates8 ; and 
3. the effective switch from "money supply" as the 
immediate target of policy to interest rates and the 
exchange rate. 
4.3. MONETARY CONTROL - MONETARY BASE CONTROL 
In the U.K., given the stance of fiscal policy, the broad 
choice facing the authorities is between controlling the 
quantity of money or the level of interest rates. We have 
identified the traditional approach applied in the U.K. (and 
in most other countries to a varying degree) as using 
interest rates as an instrument of monetary policy to 
influence the money supply via the interest rate effect on 
the demand for both money and bank credi t. The fulcrum for 
the money market operations has been provided by the cash 
ratio, maintained until 1981 solely by the clearing banks. 
Interest rates are therefore an essential instrument of 
monetary policy in this framework9. This is in direct 
contrast to a system of monetary base control, which 
Llewellyn argues " ... requires the authorities to control 
directly the volume of the monetary base in a way consistent 
with any official mone tary targets and allow in teres t rates 
to adjust freely in the money and credit markets to eliminate 
any excess supply or demand for the monetary base, the demand 
for which is a derived demand based on the banks' need for 
reserves to support their total liabilities ll (67p.57>. In the 
U.K. interest rates are not allowed to 'adjust freely in the 
money and credit markets', firmly remaining an instrument of 
monetary policy. We have, however, adopted certain changes 
that could enable more to be learnt about the properties of a 
monetary base control system and which would be consistent 
with a further evolution in this direction(68para4>. 
4.3.1. DEFINITION OF THE MONETARY BASE 
The efficiency of monetary base control will depend upon the 
ability of the central bank to control it's balance sheet. 
Control by this system is achieved through transactions in 
the money markets which influence the assets of the central 
bank. The monetary base may therefore be defined10 with 
reference to the assets or liabilities of the central bank, 
which is analagous to definition by 'source' or 'use': 
1. Sources - the monetary base is defined as the sum of 
the net domestic and foreign assets of the monetary 
authorities broadly defined as net government 
indebtedness with the monetary authorities plus 
advances to discount houses, plus official reserves 
less outstanding official short and medium term 
borrowing from abroad. By definition this approach 
requires the consolidation of the Issue and Banking 
Departments, the Exchange Equalisation Account and the 
Treasury's coin issue. This approach is not popular 
because of the technicalities implied by this 
amalgamation, but more importantly) because movements 
in base money so-defined could result from transactions 
which the central bank does not have to engage in, and 
cannot, therefore, unambiguously control. 
2. Uses - the monetary base may be defined as the sum of 
those liabilities of the monetary authorities which are 
themselves money or are liabilities to other money 
creating institutions. Such liabilities are the basis 
for further money creation, so the terms 'high-powered. 
money' and base money are often used interchangeably. 
By this definition, the effectiveness of monetary base 
control will depend upon the ability of the central 
bank to control the volume of its balance sheet 
liabilities. The precise definition will therefore 
depend upon what liabilities the central bank can 
control or seek particularly to control. A cash based 
defini tion is generally preferred. This is important 
because again under the present arrangements a cash 
ratio is maintained} which is directly related to the 
liabilities of the Bank of England. 
4.3.2. RELEVANCE OF mE MONETARY BASE 
The Green Paper(69p.8) defines a monetary base scheme as 
follows:- the banks keep at least a known proportion of their 
deposits in the form of base money, either because there is a 
mandatory requirement on them to do so or because they can be 
relied upon to do so over a period for prudential reasons. 
The authorities then either:-
1. control the amount of base money in existance and so 
the total growth of the money supply, since the banks' 
balance sheet cannot exceed a specified multiple of the 
base; or 
2. use divergencies of the base money figure from the 
desired trend as a trigger for a change in interest 
rates to correct the divergence. 
Statistically, the relevance of the monetary base to monetary 
control may be shown by the following identities 11 : 
(1) M = C + D 
(2) B = D + R 
M is defined as the sum of currency in circulation with the 
non-bank private sector (C) plus deposi t liabili ties of the 
banks (D). The monetary base (B) is equal to (C) plus the 
banking system's reserves (R). R is defined as vault cash 
and bankers balances. These identi ties may be expressed as 
follows: 
(3) BM = B (C + D) 
(4) (C + R) M = B (C + D) 
(5) CC + .ft) M = B Cc + 1) 
(6) 
(D D) (D) 
M = B [CLn ± ~ ] 
[CID + RID] 
(1) x B 
(2) into (3) 
(4) D 
(5) (C/D+R/D) 
Equation (6) proves that given a minimum cash to deposits 
ratio, the size of the monetary base will impose a ceiling on 
the level of bank deposits and thus, indirectly, on the stock 
of money. If the authori ties control B, by their potential 
power as the source of cash, at a predetermined level, then 
this will lead to fairly predictable movements in M, provided 
the ratios CID and RID are constant. 
This relevance must, however, be qualified: 
1. .c.LJ2 1:> Y.nli.k~l.Y ..t.Q .!Le. con.§tanj, because it may only be 
regarded as reasonably stable where deposits are 
defined to include only non-interest bearing funds. 
When savings balances are included, the interest 
incentive with changing deposit rates must make the 
stability of this relationship questionable over time. 
Technological change (such as the development of cheque 
cards and electronic funds transfer ·systems) will also 
affect the stability of the ratio. 
Research into the Great Depression of 1929-31 in the 
United States has shown that the ratio is unlikely to 
be stable. For two and a half years, beginning November 
1930, there was a sharp rise in the public's holding of 
currency12. Currency holdings increased by 55%, but 
demand deposits actually fell by 33%(70p.260). In 
terms of the Friedman-Schwartz taxonomy of proximate 
determinants of the money stock, the rise in the CID 
ratio was by far the most important source of decline 
in the stock of money during it's four year 
decline(71P.334). In a study by Boughton and Wicker it 
was noted that almost one-third of the rise in the CID 
ratio can be attributed to a shift in yields on demand 
deposi ts and commercial pape r(72). 
2. Bin ~ unlikely 1Q ~ constant. There is no reason why 
the ratio of reserves to deposits should exhibit a 
stable relationship to any particular monetary 
aggregate. 
3. Static equilibrium. The approach fails to outline the 
adjustment process in the monetary base. It is a 
static model only, which will probably be of little use. 
as a guide to day-to-day management of the banking 
system. 
4. £QQL predictability Qf ~ monetary base. The monetary 
base is unpredictable for two reasons: 
a) The authorities are unable to accurately forecast 
movements of currency in the non-bank private 
sector. Daily forecasts are frequently wrong by 
£25-30 million, and are occasionally of the order 
of £100 million. 
b) The unpredictability of factors affecting bankers 
balances. This is a more serious issue and 
concerns daily settlements in the money markets. 
These are highly unpredictable 13 and are 
complicated by the volatility of public sector 
cash flows. There are often unforseen swings in 
the order of several hundred million pounds a day, 
in and out of government balances. The 
predictability of the base might therefore be 
improved if the banking system moved to a next day 
settlement for all uncertain transactions or, more 
likely, if government accounts were moved to the 
commercial banks, so that unexpected flows would 
leave bankers' balances at the Bank of England 
unaffected. 
It should finally be noted that the predictabili ty of 
the base will only be of serious consequence the 
shorter the time horizon chosen. Only on a weekly or 
daily basis will the unpredictability of the base 
become an important factor, increasing the burden 
thrown upon the adjustment mechanism that the 
authorities must use to offset undesired movements. 
This is probably why very few proponents of monetary 
base control advocate a strict regime, as Wood 
remarked: "Who on earth wants day to day control of the 
base"(73). 
5. I~ £~~evance ~ ~h~ ~ i~ questiQngQ~~. Prior to 
August 1981 it is probably fair to say there was not a 
good relationship between changes in the monetary base 
and those in any other monetary aggregates. Table 8 
shows that in the 1970's the monetary base has often 
grown slowly when the money supply has expanded rapidly 
and vice versa. Such a comparison is not, however, 
strictly valid. The quantity of base money has never 
been fixed at a predetermined level or targeted - the 
Bank of England have always provided base money as 
required. In addition the base was only related to the 
one and a half percent cash ratio maintained by 
clearing banks, which was:-
TABLE 8: THE MONETARY BASE AND THE MONEY SUPPLY 
Monetary Base 3 2 Year End Money Supply £M3 
(Seasonally adjusted) 
Total (£M) % Increase Total (£M) % Increase 
1970 4366 14.9 17320 8.1 
1971 4590 5.1 19620 13.3 
1972 5179 12.8 24930 27.1 
1973 5653 9.2 31700 27.2 
1974 6625 17.2 34840 9.9 
1975 7148 7.9 37270 7.0 
1976 7941 11.1 40570 8.9 
1977 9284 16.9 44660 10.1 
1978 10525 13.4 51380 15.0 
1979 104051 (1. 1) 58030 12.9 
1980 112241 7.9 69100 19.1 
SOURCES: 1. T Congdon The Banker February 1980 Table 1 p.32 
2. Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin 
a. March 1981 Table A p.39 
b. Table 11/1 
1 Averages of mongh1y figures and not year end figure. 
2The sterling M3 figures refer to the end of the fourth quarter, not to the 
banking make-up day. They are not fully comparable with the monetary base 
data, but interpretation would probably not be changed by more precise data. 
3Defined as bankers balances with the Bank of England and notes and coin in 
circulation. 
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a) maintained over a period of time rather than for a 
particular day; 
b) related to eligible liabilities rather than 
directly to total deposits as recorded in the 
monetary aggregates; 
c) related to the previous month's liabilities; 
d) defined with reference to previous levels of cash 
held by the clearing banks and the monetary base. . 
It is therefore for many of these reasons that the Bank of 
England have rejected monetary base control in the U.K. A 
fuller discussion and analysis of these issues is given in 
Appendix 1. The importance of this brief discourse was to 
identify the more salient issues of monetary base control 
that would have implications for the monetary supervision of 
the U.K. banking system and how the present arrangements may 
be influenced by these issues. Despite the importance of 
monetary targets the authorities have chosen not to target 
the monetary base, but in the next section it will be shown 
that they are monitoring certain cash reserves maintained by 
the clearing banks with a view to assessing the likely impact 
of a monetary base control system. 
4.4. MONETARY CONTROL - CURRENT ARRANGEMENTS 
The new system was introduced on 20 August 1981. Llewellyn 
defines many of the institutional arrangements as 
representing a 'tidying-up' operation which do not in 
themselves herald a move to monetary base control because it 
is not the intention of the authorities to target the 
monetary base(74p.8). 
4.4.1. CURRENT ARRANGEMENTS DEFINED 14 
1. Reserye assets redefined 15 
The reserve asset ratio as a formal requirement has 
been abolished and for monetary control purposes has 
been replaced by a new cash ratio and eligible bank 
ratio. 
a) Cash ratio. 
The cash ratio is a uniform requirement on g~~. 
insti tutions 16 in the newly defined monetary 
sector, which comprise all recognised banks and 
LDT's, the National Girobank, Trustee Savings 
Banks, those banks in th e Channel Islands and th e 
Isle of Man which opt. to join the scheme and the 
Banking Department of the Bank of England. The 
requirement will be set twice a year as half 
percent of an institution's eligible liabilities 
in the previous six months. This is held in non-
operationalJ non-interest bearing depOSits with 
the Bank of England. 
Eligible liabilities have been redefined to allow 
offsets in respect of:-
(i) funds (other than cash ratio deposits or SDs 
placed wi th the Bank of England) lent by one 
institution in the monetary sector to any 
other; and 
(ii) money at call placed with money brokers and 
gilt-edged jobbers in the Stock Exchange, and 
secured on gilt-edged stocks, Treasury bills. 
Davies states the cash ratio It ••• does not 
constitute in any sense a move towards a so-called 
monetary base system lt (7 4 p.29). The London 
clearing banks now, however, maintain additional 
voluntary operational balances at the Bank of 
England for clearing purposes. It is the 
intention of the authorities to monitor the 
functional demand for these cash balances, as this. 
may establish a relationship between a bank's 
liabilities and it's prudential cash holdings -
which would be consistent with a non-mandatory 
system of monetary base control. To supplement 
this the clearing banks now inform the Bank of 
England on a daily basis as to the size of their 
target balances. 
The uniform cash ratio is not a cash base as 
defined by a monetary base control system as vault 
cash is excluded from the definition. It is a 
mandatory requirement, and is placed on a lagged 
accounting basis, the implications of which are 
discussed in Appendix 1. A more important issue 
is that the fulcrum for money market operations is 
again provided by the cash balances of the London 
clearing banks. The authorities do not 'target' 
these voluntary balances but continue to use them 
as indicators of monetary policy. 
b) Eligible bank ratio. 
Banks whose sterling acceptances are eligible to 
be rediscounted for cash at the Bank of England 
are required to maintain secured money with 
members of the London Discount Market Association 
(LDMA) and/or secured call money with money 
brokers and gilt-edged jobbers, such that:-
(i) the total funds so held normally £Y~LBg~ 6. 
percent of that bank's eligible liabilities, 
and 
(ii) the amount so held in the form of secured 
money with members of the LDMA does not 
normally fall below 4 percent of eligible 
liabilities on ~ ~ax. 
In addition each eligible bank will provide 
monthly returns of it's daily figures and aim to 
meet the daily average ratio over either six or 
twelve month periods, the ratio on any particular 
day in a banking month being calculated on a 
lagged accounting basis as a proportion of 
eligible liabili ties at the last but one make-up 
day. The ratio is however a 'rolling' ratio. 
Thus on a six month period, once the first five 
months have elapsed, the requirement effectively 
becomes a more rigid six monthly one. 
These requirements are not,placed directly for 
monetary control reasons, rather they are linked 
to the Bank of England's new methods of 
intervention to implement monetary policy. 
2. Special ~posits 
The SD scheme remains, applying to all institutions 
with eligible liabilities of £10 million or more. 
3. ~D~~ Qf MQnetary Policy 
The prime obj ective of monetary control is now to 
offset daily cash flows between the Bank of England and 
the money markets by retaining control of short-term 
interest rates. Thus certain institutional changes 
have been made to enable the Bank of England to place 
greater emphasis on open market operations rather than 
discount window lending. This move was foreshadowed in 
the 1980 paper(76l, in which it was decided that these 
operations should continue to be conducted in the bill 
.markets primarily through members of the LDMA. This is 
the rationale behind extending eligibility - to ensure 
an adequate supply of bills for these operations, the 
criteria for eligibility was extended. There was an 
initial increase to 96 banks from 56 in August 1981, 
but by August 1982 this was further enlarged to cover 
114 eligible banks. 
On January 2nd, 1981 the reserve asset ratio had been 
reduced from twelve and a half percent to ten percent. 
This had the desired effect of releasing bills 
previously held as reserve assets enabling subsequent 
market shortages to be relieved by the banks selling 
these bills to the Bank of England rather than using 
the discount window facility. For ~onetary control 
reasons, once the criteria for ensuring a sufficient 
supply of bills had been determined, the reserve asset 
ratio could be replaced. Together with the funds with 
the LDMA and gilt-edged jobbers, these arrangements 
should ensure sufficiently large markets in Treasury 
bills, local authority and commercial bills. By August 
1982 the volume of acceptances in the markets had more 
than doubled since August 1981 to £12.3 billion(77). 
In January 1982, Bank of England purchases of. 
commercial bills alone were estimated at £1 
billion(78). 
The Bank of England will provide reserves against the 
offer of eligible bills, but has retained the right to 
choose the the terms of assistance. The Bank of 
England now no longer sets MLR, though the rate charged 
on such lending is still above comparable market rates. 
It is argued that this is " ... consistent wi th the aim 
of giving the financial markets more influence over the 
structure of interest rates"(79). However, the Bank of 
England now operate in four bill bands, operating in 
band 1 with an unpublished interest rate range:-
a) band 1 1-14 days 
b) band 2 15-33 days 
c) band 3 34-63 days 
d) band 4 64-91 days 
Interest rates in band 1 are largely guided by the 
level of sterling M3' but a note is also taken of other 
monetary aggregates (Section 4.2), pressures in the 
foreign exchange markets and other relevant 
information. Davies stated the unpublished band does 
not represent a major change because(80):-
a) the Bank of England continue to publish daily 
intervention rates; 
b) evidence has suggested the band is in fact very 
narrow and hence this will constrict the role of 
market forces again. A wide band would allow 
greater volatllity of interest rates which it is 
unlikely the authorities would accept; 
c) the discount window facility has been retained and 
it will therefore always be possible for the Bank 
of England to directly influence short-term rates. 
The current situation is one where the Bank of England 
no longer deliberately over-issues the weekly Treasury 
bill tender, though it still aims to keep the money 
markets short of cash each morning so as to offset any 
net financial flows on terms of it's own choosing. 
Since MLR was suspended, these terms are not known in 
band 1. Llewellyn(81) concludes that the Bank of 
England is now in command of interest rates at the very 
short end, as it is able to determine the net flow of 
funds between the money markets and the Bank of 
England, though it does not seek to directly influence 
period rates through it's market interventions. 
4.4.2. APPRAISAL OF CURREIT ARRAIGEHEHTS 
The government assessed the new monetary control procedures 
as follows: 
"The main purpose of this change was to allow 
market forces a greater influence on the structure 
of interest rates, and to allow interest rates to 
be adjusted more promptly in response to changing 
economic conditions. These objectives have been 
met. The new arrangements have coped successfully 
with some severe swings both in the international 
markets and in the money markets at home"(82). 
This interpretation is, however, questionable on severaL 
issues. We are concerned with the efficiency of monetary 
control and it's impact on the U.K. banking system. This 
section will appraise the current system in terms of the 
conduct of monetary policy but more importantly it's impact, 
sometimes unfairly, on different groups of banks. 
1. Conduct Qf Monetary Policy 
Broadly speaking the control mechanisms of monetary policy 
have remained unchanged (though the overall strategy of U.K. 
monetary policy is radically changing). The Bank of England 
continue to use interest rates to pursue monetary objectives 
though a major priority of policy is now to lower interest 
rates, rather than using interest rates as an instrument for 
securing the money supply target. Interest rates thereby 
largely remain a function of the Bank of England's own 
operations in the money markets. Thus the Bank of England 
continues to affect the level of interest rates : market 
forces may influence the term structure of these rates. A 
more flexible interest rate policy was considered but in the 
final analysis the Bank of England have maintained their 
close control over short-term rates, because it would 
represent a " ••• radical departure in official United Kingdom 
thinking were the bank to permit the volatility in short-term 
interest rates that the Federal Reserve has allowed H.(83) 
This crucial point was illustrated as early as 14 September 
1981. The discount window facility was invoked for £79 
million at thirteen and three-quarter percent. Llewellyn 
argued this was significant in three respects:(84) 
1. The Bank of England will resort to direct assistance 
via the discount houses, rather than through bill 
purchases when it wishes to indicate it's view on 
interest rates. 
2. In no meaningful sense of the term will the Bank allow 
'market forces' to always determine interest rates. 
3. The influence of the Bank is such that a small amount 
of assistance (£79 million is almost trivial in money 
market terms) given in a particular way can have a 
decisive impact on market rates. 
(On September 16, 1981 base rates were raised to 14%). 
However, in the context of a more flexible interest rate 
policy, it is to be expected that bank base rates will tend 
to change more frequently than in the past. Base rates 
remain sensitive to the 7 day inter-bank rate which is 
directly influenced by short-term rates. The variability of 
these rates was aggravated by the suspension of MLR since 
although there was not a formal link between MLR and base 
rate, for these reasons they tended to move in line. It is 
therefore possible that " ... banks may have to consider more 
frequent, if perhaps smaller. changes in their base rates". 
Table 9 overleaf demonstrates this trend after August 1981 
when the new arrangements were implemented. 
Finally, it should be noted that the new control arrangements 
mean that the banking system is now subj ect to a degree of 
uncertainty. The suspension of MLR means there are no clear 
signals as to the terms on which the banks may borrow from 
the Bank of England via the discount houses. The unpublished 
rates within band 1 further complicate the issue because 
there is no clear indication as to the spread of intervention 
rates within that band. 
2. Impact Q.Q ..the b .. .nki.ng .l>Y.sJ&1n 
The current arrangements affect three distinct classes of 
banks in the U.K., imposing constraints on the clearing 
banks, eligible banks and the banking system as a whole. The 
clearing banks have never been particularly large holders or 
accepters of bills - thus it is felt that they are being 
required to underwrite a system designed for the convenience 
of the Bank of England and the discount houses(85). 
Eligible banks can command finer rates on their bills but 
offsetting this is the requirement to hold a tranche of low-
yielding assets in their balance sheets(86p.21). Except in 
exceptional circumstances, this mandatory level of liquid 
assets must always be held. This was identified by 
Barge(87P.72) as offering two disadvantages vis-a-vis the 
• 
TABLE 9 LailDON CLEAHING DAUK Oi\SB Rl~t?ES SINCj~ ,JULY 1980 
Date of ChailfjC 
1980 
1901 
July 4 
Kovember 2, 
Harch 11 
Ne" Rate (%) 
16 
14 
12 
-------August 1981----------------------- .... -Jl1LR suspcnCed-------
1982 
September 16 14 
October. 1 
October 14 
November ~. 
December 3 
Ja'1uary 22 
February. 25 
March 12 
June 8 
July 16 
P.uqust 6 
AU<Just 17 
Septewbe!:" 3 
October 8 
October 22 
November 5 
November 26 
16 
15~ 
1!> 
14~ 
14 
13'; 
13 
12~ 
12 
11~ 
11 
9 
9.10 
I 
I ~--------------------------~----------------------------
SOURCE: Bank of England Quarterlv Bulletin, Table 13/11 
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uneligible bank - return on assets could be smaller and 
balance sheet footings higher. This is demonstrated in Table 
10 by comparing the possible turn on lending for an eligible 
bank and non-eligible bank. 
The non-eligible bank has chosen to keep only 1 per cent of 
eligible liabilities with the LDMA against the 7 per cent of 
the eligible bank 14 • Ceteris paribus, the non-eligible 
bank's 1 per cent can be realised whilst the eligible bank's 
holding has to be maintained at a minimum. Therefore with a 
balance sheet approximately 5.6 per cent smaller than that 
of the eligible bank, the non-eligible bank's profit is 
approximately 6.5 per cent better. This therefore must be 
compared to the advantage of being able to issue 'eligible' 
bank bills to assess the profitability implications, though 
---
in the final analysis this can represent a constraint on a 
bank's balance sheet. In the ordinary course of business it 
is not clear that banks would wish to maintain such a level 
of liquid assets in this form - and because the requirement 
is expressed as a minimum, the banks will in practice be 
forced to hold such assets in excess of the stated minimum 
to ensure that this level is not breached. The minimum 
requirement also has prudential implications because whilst 
such liquid assets are desirable for prudential reasons, 
they cannot be used in the day-to-day management of an 
eligi ble bank. 
The most important impact on the banking system is, however, 
that the Bank of England have refused to deal directly wi th 
the system, because it n ... would involve predominantly the 
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'):'ABLE 10 
• 
Possible Turn On Lending In An Eligible Bank And Non-Eligible Bank 
Eligible Bank i Non-Eligible Bank 
1) Assets Income 1) Assets Income 
---
Loans 100 @ 15% = 15.00 Loans 100 @ 15% = 15.00 
Liquid assets 7 @ 14% = 0.98 Liquid assets 1 @ 14% = 0.14 
---
15.98 15.14 
"'"' 
.' 2) Less Liabilities 2) Less Liabilities 
Deposits 107 @ 14 ~% = 15.42 Deposits 101 @ 14 ~% = 14.65 
'" --- Cl' 
3) Profit/Turn = 0.46 3) Profi t/Tur.n = 0.49 
--
Source: J. Barge, The Banker, November 1981, p.22. 
clearing banks, by virtue of their central function in the 
settlement of daily flows between the banking system and the 
Bank ... " which the Bank of England feel would " ••• greatly 
reduce the scope for market forces to determine interest 
rates,,(88p.89). Instead shortages are now offset by bill 
purchases and lending, as shown in Table 11. The important 
trend to note is the increased turnover in commercial bills 
in the last two years and the marked decline of Treasury 
bills in that period. 
This system has four principal weaknesses which also hinder 
the operations of the banking system. In particular there 
are problems concerning shortages, information, intervention 
techniques and the discount market. 
a) Shortages 
There are no satisfactory methods for relieving 
shortages beyond the capaci ty of the discount market. 
The Bank of England's techniques for estimating 
shortages are inadequate in many respects - the 
position of the discount market for instance, is 
vulnerable as banks can also adjust their books through 
the inter-bank market. This may only affect one bank 
and not the system as a whole, but then there is the 
direct threat to one bank in the system that it may be 
held short of cash. A further irritant occurs when 
money is short as upward pressure on overnight inter-
bank rates causes commercial borrowers to switch into 
their overdraft faCilities, thereby throwing the whole 
shortage onto the clearing banks. 
'; 
; 
i 
) 
, 
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i 
I 
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'fABLE 11; OI'EP-ATlON TO OFFSET lIAllKET SIlORTAGES (£H) 
Year Beginning PURCHASES 01'1; 
1 Narch Treasury LA C(·llt."r.~rcial 
Bills Bills Bi11s2 
1971 5140 327 774 
1972 52,5 506 "09 
1973 4216 776 1503 
1974 5476 840 437 
1975 9364 1125 200 
1976 19389 1268 697 
1977 1,740 1392 47 
1978 16049 1509 2503 
1979 16337 2529 38/,6 
1980 11876 2874 158G3 
1981 3810 4349 39771 
LENDING 
650 
1495 
2035 
2823 
3868 
29519 
21663 
9737 
18217 
21173 
1,640 
.L--. 
SOURCE: Bank of EllZ]Wld QU3rterly Bullet"i.n H.3.~ch 1~1,\~2 r.BS 
1 Includes purchases for lZ!ter resale to the market <lnd 
ImTchc:.ser; by both Issue and Banking Departl:~nts. 
2Almost E'.xclusively cli.&ible bank bills . 
b) Interyention techniques 
(i) Intervention times - the crux of this problem is 
that intervention at 2.30p.m. often comes too late 
to ensure orderly market conditions. There is 
often a period of uncertainty beforehand because 
the market does not have the confidence the 
shortage will be relieved at 2.30p.m. After 
2.30p.m. but before the close of the town clearing 
the bank will only rarely deal, causing 
considerable uncertainty as to how the shortage 
will be relieved after 2.30p.m. Shortages after 
the close of the town clearing could now result in 
either a bank failing to meet it's target cash 
balance or the clearing banks going into debit on 
their operational accounts. 
(ii) Intervention in the bill markets - purchasing 
bills is an insufficiently flexible means of 
providing relief because Seccombes 15 often have 
difficulty in locating bills of suitable 
maturities of the right amounts. Conversely the 
Bank will not sell bills to the banks to soak up a 
surplus until all the discount houses have squared 
their books. 
c) Discount Market 
The current proposals have maintained the rather unique 
status of the London Discount Market. This is a 
problem for the banking system to the extent that 
methods of monetary control allow the discount houses 
an unwarranted competitive advantage over the banks -
for instance the special status of call money imposes a 
direct profitability constraint on eligible banks 
whilst artificially reducing the costs of discount 
houses. 
The Bank of England have maintained the special role of 
the discount market for good reasons though commercial 
bankers would perhaps question this 15. It was noted 
that there is no real reason why banks in the ordinary 
course of business would lend such sums of money to the 
LDMA. Their role as efficient secondary markets in 
short-term paper is a valuable one, but one which could 
be equally well performed by the banks (though possibly 
at greater expense); the same could apply to their 
lesser role in the bond markets. The 'competitive' 
nature of the discount market might also be questioned 
as more than 50 percent of the market is dominated by 
the two houses of Union Discount and Gerard National. 
Finally their business can be very sensitive to 
official policy - in January 1982, Smith St. Aubyn 
announced huge losses on gilt-edged securities; a few 
years earlier Clive Discount experienced 
proportionately similar losses. 19 
The Bank of England have maintained their policy of refusing 
to deal directly with the banking system, yet in the foreign 
exchange markets the Bank of England has efficiently dealt 
with commercial banks for years. The parallel has become 
more real than apparent since the abolition of U.K. exchange 
control, which has effectively combined the sterling and 
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foreign exchange markets. The medium for monetary control 
remains the discount market and not the inter-bank market. 
To this extent it remains inadequate for dealing with 
shortages because invariably the costs of adjustment are 
passed onto the banking system. 
4.5. MONETARY CONTROL - SUMMARY 
The present monetary controls on the U.K. banking system have 
been discussed in the context of the changing emphasis of 
U.K. monetary policy. Gangdon views the practical effect of 
these proposals as having removed much of the regulation from 
bank balance sheets to the extent that they have " ••• left the 
British banking system relatively little burdened by central 
bank superintendence of it's assets,,(89p.29). The precise 
date, however, at which this 'new freedom' began is 
questionable - August 1981 witnessed the abolition of the 
reserve asset ratio though October 1979 was important because 
it rendered the corset ineffective as a means of controlling 
bank credit. 
It has been shown how the new system attempted to tidy-up 
monetary control by imposing definite targets and controls. 
The key role of sterling M3 to March 1982 required the 
monetary authorities to maintain close control of bank 
eligible liabilities. This has been coupled with an 
increasing emphasis on interest rates at the expense of 
monetary aggregates. The Bank of England have redefined 
monetary control procedures to allow them greater flexibility 
and increasing emphasis on money market operations. This 
allows the Bank of England greater control of short-term 
interest rates which has recently become central to monetary 
policy. The present system also allows the authorities the 
opportuni ty to monitor the behaviour of the voluntary 
operational cash balances of the clearing banks. 
It is clear that the present monetary controls in no way 
represent a move towards monetary base control but rather a 
tidying-up of the previous arrangements. This modification 
procedure has generally relaxed bank balance sheet controls, 
though the overall trend of monetary control may occasionally 
impose severe penalties on certain banks in the settlement of 
daily cash flows. 
NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR 
1. Sterling M3 can be broadly defined as all notes and 
coins plus all deposits in both the public and private 
sectors. 
2. 'Monetary Control', Green Paper, HMSO, Cmnd.7858, 
published March 1980. 
3. See for example, J. Whitmore, 'Search for Sound Money', 
.Ih.e Times, 25 February. 1981. 
4. M1 can be broadly defined as notes and coin held by the 
public plus private sector sterling sight deposits. 
5. For a comprehensive discussion see W. Greenwell & Co .. 
'Special Monetary Bulletin - Monetary Base Control', 21 
April, 1980, Broad Street, London. 
6. See: a) D. Lomax, 'Monetary Policy', National 
Westminster Quarterly Bulletin. November 
1980, pp.2-22. 
b) D.E. Fair, 'Monetary Control', Three Banks 
Review, March 1981, Vol.129, pp.17-34. 
c) S. Brittan, 'Where next on monetary control', 
Financial Times, 8 January 1981. 
7. See. G. Richardson 'A view from the Governor', .Ih.§ 
Banker, February 1977. 
8. The wider range of money and liquidity aggregates now 
include Ml, sterling M3 and PSL2' PSL stands for 
private sector liquidity and in this definition 
encompasses the private sector components of sterling 
M3~ other money market instruments such as deposits 
with local authorities, commercial bills and 
certificates of tax deposi~ plus savings deposits and 
securities (mainly held with building societies). 
9. See for example, G. Richardson, 'The First Mais 
Lecture', City University, London, 9 February 1978. 
10. See for example. 'The Reform of Monetary Control in the 
United Kingdom', Annual Monetary Review, Vol.l. October 
1979, p.38. 
11. See for example, 'Monetary Base Control'~ Bank.Q..f. 
Engkand Quarterly Bulletin, June 1979. 
12. Demand deposits were interest bearing at that time. 
13. The only known settlements in the money markets are 
Treasury bills, foreign exchange (two days ahead) and 
gilt-edged settlements. 
14. The changes were principally outlined in the following 
papers:-
(a) Methods of Monetary Control - Background note 
November 1980. 
(b) Monetary Control: Next Steps, March 1981. 
(c) Monetary Control: Provisions, August 1981. 
15. The prudential liquidity afforded by the reserve as se t 
ratio is being reassessed by the current liquidity 
proposals, as discussed in Chapter 6. 
16. Institutions with average eligible liabilities of less 
than £10 million will be exempt from this requirement. 
17. Whilst it is possible for an eligible bank's holding to 
fall to 4 per cent, it has to maintain a rolling 
average of 6 per cent - for general purposes it can be 
claimed the 6 per cent is fixed. 
18. Seccombe, Marshall and Campion plc are a member of the 
LDMA and the Bank of England's broker. 
19. For a further discussion see B. Riley, 'Can the 
discount houses cope with the Bank's new regime?', .:rM 
Banker, February 1982, pp.29-33. 
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5.1. INTRODUCTION 
Prudential supervision of bank balance sheets is chiefly 
concerned with capital adequacy and liquidity. Prudential 
supervision is not designed to impose severe constraints on 
bank balance sheets, because it is expected that a commercial 
bank will take all 'reasonable precautions' to ensure that it 
does not default on its obligations. The debate) however) 
arises where bank supervisors impose rigid prudential 
controls and/or disagree with the validity of a bank's ( 
internal controls. It is the differing views on the 
assessment of 'reasonable' and definitions of 'precaution' 
that have caused the current concern over the methods 
implemented to maintain capital adequacy and liquidity. 
Liquidity is discussed in the next chapter. 
The topic of bank capi tal adequacy has become a focal point 
in the banking industry. Capital adequacy and capital 
aquisition have become major topics of study and controversy 
by banking personnel and regulatory authorities(90p.79). 
This is largely due to the peculiar nature of bank capital: 
"Commercial and industrial companies require 
capital initially to finance their operations and 
secondly to provide a bail-out for creditors or to 
cover possible losses. From the standpoint of a 
bank precisely the opposite is the case - capital 
funds should provide protection for depOSitors in 
situations of temporary difficulty and also 
provide funds to finance fixed assets,,(91p.8) 
The link with asset structure is critically important to 
maintain confidence but also to provide liquidity if required 
for 
The 
deposi tors and other credi tors on the liabili ties side. 
purpose of bank capital is mUlti-fOld.67s a protection 
for depositors_ RObins~n)argues it is analagous to a guarantee 
fund (92p.43 3), wh il Sbrgl er and Wolkow i tz state capital can 
be a prudent source 
-financed is fixed and 
---~ 
of funding It ••• when the asset being 
10ng-te~~';.(93P.17>. ~1e function of 
bank capital and its importance to the balance sheet was 
recognised by Apilado and Gies who defined bank capital 
•• • "'0 
_ ...... , .. . 
adequacy as It ••• perhaps the single most important i.ndexo.f a 
bank's financial condition to the regulatory 
-------, .. 
authorities lt (94p.24). 
Capital adequacy is a dynamic concept. It is influenced by 
prevailing banking and economic conditions; by the quality 
and liquidity of a bank's assets; and the quality of bank 
management. In the final analysis it may therefore be 
It ••• less important in practice than it is in 
theorylt(95p.109). The basic objective of commercial banks 
remains wealth maximisation, generally defined as the 
maximisation of the present value of future cash flows 
accruing to the ordinary shareholders(96p.92). Thus it may 
b e ~t:.:.h:.:e:.-.:;:n.::.e;:=e;:=d,--,f,,-,oL-.a..?_e_qu ate pr of i ~l3.~!:.~i~L~~a t de t e r m i n e s 
capital adequacy. Adequate profitability will meet the basic 
_.---_.- -'-- - ---
objective but can also attract new capital by providing a 
return (dividend plus capital gain) comparable to other forms 
of marketable investment - in addition to providing reserves 
for contingencies and losses that may occur. 
\ 
Section 5.2. will be concerned with an examination of the 
issues influencing bank capital adequacy. This will be 
followed by a discussion of the various regulatory approaches 
in 5.3. to this problem. The current position in the U.K. 
will be analysed in Section 5.4. We will conclude that whilst 
it may not be possible to accurately appraise bank capital 
adequacy, the U.K. approach provides an important framework 
within which the balance sheets of U.K. banks may well be 
constrained by the new proposals. 
5.2. BANK CAPITAL ADEQUACY 
The debate over bank capital adequacy results from the 
disagreement between bank supervisors and commercial bankers 
concerning the definition of bank capital and the adequacy of 
that capital. These definitions are largely based on the 
functions of bank capital that are perceived by each group. 
5.2.1. FUNCTIONS OF BANK CAPITAL 
The Bank of England identified the following as the more 
important purposes for which capital is required(97para.15): 
1. To provide a cushion to absorb losses. 
2. To demonstrate to potential depositors the willingness 
of the shareholders to put their own funds at risk on a 
permanent basis. 
3. To provide resources free of fixed financing costs. 
4. To be a sui table form of finance for the general 
infrastructure of the business. 
The first two purposes are the important functions as capital 
can provide a cushion against which losses may be sustained. 
but also ensure that public confidence is maintained in the 
U.K. banking system. These functions do not however fully 
state the case. Okidegbe(9 8) has specifically defined the 
functions of bank capital:- to protect depositors, absorb 
temporary and unexpected losses, maintain or inspire public 
confidence and finally to constrain the growth of bank 
assets. This framework will provide a more practical base 
from which to assess the relevant issues. 
In a fractional reserve system the confidence of depositors, 
shareholders and the public in general is vital to the 
existence of the banking industry. Thus, the primary 
function of bank capital is to " ... provide the confidence 
necessary to keep a bank open so that it may be able to 
absorb losses out of future earnings rather than out of 
capi tal funds th emsel ves,,(9 9p.5). Orgl er and Wolkowi tz argue 
the function of absorbing losses is instrumental in avoiding 
failure, " ... thus contributing to the public's confidence in 
the banking industry,,(100p.16). The crucial pOint is not 
that capital should provide a cushion to absorb losses, but 
that it should be adequate to absorb losses with enough 
margin to inspire continuing confidence in the bank as a 
going-concern. This was defined by Robinson and Pettaway as 
being able to absorb short and immediate term losses, 
resulting from events that management cannot be expected to 
anticipate, with " ... a margin of safety that, preferably, 
would allow a bank to continue its operations without loss of 
momentum and, at least, would buy time in which a bank would 
re-establish its operational momentum"(101p.vii). Hempel 
states that in the U.S., "Even the staggering losses of the 
1930's were ultimately absorbed out of earnings when banks 
were not forced into liquidation ll (102p.3). 
Capital adequacy is therefore concerned with the ultimate 
solvency of a bank. Capital must ~e adequate to inspire 
sufficient confidence in that bank on the part of depositors 
and supervisors so that it will not be fqrced into 
liquidation(103p.68). To this could be added the confidence 
of creditors and bond holders. Capital must be sufficient to 
cover any possible decline in the value of assets in order to 
maintain public confidence. 1 
Bank capital is directly concerned with the quality of bank 
assets. Reed et.al. stated the " ... amount of capital funds a 
bank needs is related to the risk it assumes. If a bank 
assumes greater risk in its loan portfolio, for example, it 
should have more capital funds than if it were more 
conservative in its lending policy"(104p.172). Langley 
agrees the level of assets is " ... of less importance than the 
quality of those assets"(105p.177). In this respect Watson 
argued " ... a strong well-managed bank can operate on a very 
thin capital base"(106p.171). Peacock would argue this is 
probably over-optimistic, but agreed that " ... large banks 
with high (and high quality) earnings can probably afford to 
maintain lower capital ratios than their slowly growing 
counterparts ll (107p.669). 
Capital adequacy~ however, should only be determined under 
'normal' conditions. There is wide agreement that 
" ... substantial capital positions do not prevent banks from 
failing in a period of widespread economic 
disruption ll (108p.22). Gardener typified the view that 
individual banks should not be required to generate internal 
prudential resources for situations in which the central 
bank's support role would, or should, come into 
effect(109p.6). This is the rationale behind the Vojta 
proposition that capital should protect depositors only in 
conditions short of total economic collapse(110p.16). This 
is important because many assessments of capital adequacy 
have adopted a 'disaster valuation' or worst-case approach -
yet in such cases the central bank should always support the 
banking system. This was drama tically demonstrated in the 
'Lifeboat Operation' during the fringe banking crisis. In 
the U.S., Burns likewise argued that the " ... banking system 
can be and will be supplied with funds in whatever amount is 
necessary to forestall a credit crunch"(111p.263). 
Nevertheless bank capital is also an important source of 
finance. Voj ta( 112p.29) has stated that it is a prime 
function of bank capital to permit the acquisition of the 
institutional structure necessary to perform the 
intermediation function and provide related services. 
Conversely capital should constrain the growth of bank assets 
where they are not supported by sufficient earnings to cover 
the risk associated with the required assets and 
liabilities. 2 Should earnings however keep pace with the 
growth of assets, net income will become an additional source 
of capital and no constraint on the growth of assets will 
take place. 
Thus bank capital adequacy is concerned with the quality of 
the asset structure, against which unexpected losses can be 
wri tten-off wi thout causing that bank to become insol vent. 
In this respect earnings and capital can be surrogates but in 
total economic disaster only central bank liquidity can 
really support the banking system. Thus the prime function 
of bank capital is to maintain the confidence of depositors, 
shareholders and supervisors in that bank as a going-concern. 
Two final points can be made with respect to depositors. 
Firstly, the protection of depositors (instead of all 
creditors) is a very important function of capital. Table 12 
overleaf shows that the percentage of assets financed by 
depositors has remained close to 90% for the London Clearing 
Banks since 1975. 
Secondly, in the U.K. a deposit protection scheme was 
established under the Banking Act. Part II of the Act 
provides that depositors with a failed institution will 
receive 75 per cent of their protected deposits to a maximum 
of £10,000. A Deposit Protection Fund has been established 
which is financed by contributions from recognised banks and 
LDT's. The approach stands somewhere between the approach 
adopted in Germany (which has no paid-up component and relies 
entirely, on guarantees) and the UiS. system operated by the 
FDIC (which involves a very sUbstantial physical 
fund)(113p.74). The extent to which partial deposit 
protection in the U.K. will maintain depositors' confidence 
is not however clear. Revell argues there is still 
" ••• surely a sufficient danger for a small depositor to 
continue to worry about the safety of his deposit and to 
. . ... _... . .... ~ 
TABLE 12: PROPORTION OF TOTAL ASSETS FINANCED BY DEPOSITS FOR THE BIG FIVE, 1975-81 
BANK (Group) YEAR (as a %) 
I 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 19S0 1981 
-
Barclays 88.8 89.3 87.6 87.3 86.7 8' '"I 0._ 87.9 
Lloyds 91. 8 , 91. 2 91.6 91.6 91.7 91.2 n.s 
" Hidland 88.9 88.2 87.& 88.9 89.3 90.4 92.0 
Nation~l Westminster 90.3 90.1 91.7 91.1 91.7 92.0 91.7 
Williams a~d Glyns 89.9 91.0 89.1 as.s 86.4 87.0 88.3 
SOURCE: Re.ports and Annual Accounts 
.. __ ._-._ ... _----_. __ .-
create the conditions for a run at the slightest hint of 
trouble n (l14p.32). 
The determination of bank capital adequacy should therefore 
be based on normal operating conditions, taking into account 
the probable support of the Bank of England and partial 
deposit insurance. It will be adequate where it n ••• reduces 
the chances of future insolvency of an institution to some 
predetermined level n (l15p.20), where that level is 
commensurate with maintaining sufficient confidence in that 
institution as a going-concern. 
5.2.2. DEFIRITION OF BUK CAPITAL 
The Bank of England(l16) define bank capital as share capital, 
loan capital, minority interests, reserves and provisions. To 
this capital base, certain deductions are made depending on 
the actual measure of capital adequacy required. The exact 
definitions are discussed in Appendix 7. We should, however, 
note the stringent condi tions applied to loan capi ta1 3• The 
bank regulators case against including loan capi tal in 
capital for capital adequacy purposes was defined by 
Leavitt(117p.48):_ losses cannot be charged against debt 
capital in order to maintain the bank as a going-concern; 
debt places the bank in a position of having to meet fixed 
annual charges for interest and possible redemption payments 
which must be met regardless of earnings; debt would impair 
future operating flexibility (restrictive covenants would 
limit alternatives concerning payments of dividends, mergers 
and transfers of assets); debt already outstanding would 
limit the issuance of additional debt when 
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it might be most needed; and finally acceleration clauses 
would very likely be triggered when an insti tution is most 
vulnerable to collapse. 
These risks and disadvantages may not, however, be 
insurmountable: nA well-run bank in good condition should be 
able to manage the interest coverage and repayment of a 
reasonable amount of long-term debt n(118p.81). Nadler(119) 
argues that debt capital does not give a bank the same solid 
underpinnings as equity capital, though in liquida tion debt 
capital may offer as much protection to depositors. Summers 
noted that unexpected losses could inhibit debt payments 
which could force a bank into liquidation and thus debt 
capital is not n ••. part of the pool of funds against which 
losse s can be charged n( 120p. 7l. 
The counter argument was given by Reed et.al.: nSubordinated 
capital notes issues when interest rates are relatively low 
may provide low cost funds that can be invested profitably 
(at higher rates) for many years. These may also be 
considered as capital funds in calculating loan limits and in 
providing a buffer for the protection of 
depositors."(121p.159) Subordinated capital debt can provide 
long-term and permanent additions to a bank's capital 
structure. and where it is fully subordinated to claims of 
depositors it will serve the same protective function as 
equity from the viewpoint of depositors. Cooke encourages 
the continuing trend of raising subordinate debt capital and 
n ••• for supervisors to accept this as providing some 
strengthening to the capital base. n(122p.22). 
The practical banker's approach was recently represented by 
Howard and Hoffman of Citibank(123). They have put forward 
strong arguments in favour of a bank being strengthened by 
the addi tional liquidity of long-term debt even though 
conventional accounting ratios make it look worse: 
-In analytical terms. a debt issue can be included 
as a component of capital if. during its life. the 
assets aquired by the debt and the shorter-term 
liabilities it supports. contribute to retained 
earnings an amount equaZ to or greater than the 
principaZ amount of the debt·'.(124p.37) 
Citibank distinguish between funding debt and capital debt. 
The former provides the day-to-day borrowings to finance the 
bank's operations and provide liquidity, whilst capital debt 
is long-term borrowing that can be leveraged, thereby serving 
as a supplement to capital. This is analysed in terms of a 
'debt-earn-back' test in Appendix 2. It is concluded that 
under reasonable assumptions, capital debt can legitimately 
be considered for capital adequacy purposes where its 
remaining maturity is at least equal to its earn-back period. 
5.2.3. BARK CAPITAL ADEQUACY - CONSTRAIUTS 
Constraints may be imposed on the adequacy of bank capital as 
a result of conceptual differences between bank supervisors 
and bank management; infla tion; asset growth; and the 
problems associated with external and internal financing. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Bank capital adequacy has been described by Nadler(125p.39) 
as a 'tug of war' between bank supervisors and commercial 
bankers. Regulators generally prefer more capital since it 
serves as a protection for depositors. The banks however, 
prefer to be highly geared. The commercial banker has to 
maintain adequate profitability, which can be done with 
modest returns on assets provided a bank can maintain low 
ratios of capital to deposits and capital to assets. 
Thus.~here higher capital ratios are imposed, a bank will 
need to increase its net return on assets to maintain its 
profitability. This could push banks away from traditional 
areas, leading to a decline in the return on invested capital 
(and subsequently to lower dividends) unless there was also a 
proportionately larger increase in profitability. This may 
in turn cause investors to find bank stocks increasingly 
unattractive. The commercial banker could further argue(126) 
that higher capital ratios remove the importance of capital 
adequacy as a management decision, and tends to ignore the 
importance of liquidity and day-to-day management. The 
latter is important as constantly available liquidity reduces 
the need to maintain capital reserves. In an extreme case, 
high capital ratios could cause problems where inflexible 
laws are designed for the weakest participant in the banking 
system. 
Nevertheless regulatory concern has resulted from the secular 
decline of capital ratios and the constraints imposed on 
maintaining bank capital adequacy by several factors such as 
the rapid expansion of business, the erosion of margins and 
inflation which constrains real profitabili ty( 121p.241). 
Bank supervisors are concerned that bank capital has not 
increased in-line with assets and liabilities, whilst the 
real value of that base has fallen. 
1. INFLATION 
Fairlamb(128p.109) suggested that inflation has been the 
biggest single factor in the decade-long process of gradual 
deterioration in the capital base. The recent DEeD study by 
Revell also sUbstantiates this conclusion. Broadly speaking 
inflation can erode a bank's capital ratio in two ways:-
a) When nominal assets rise at a slower rate than nominal 
deposits. 
Even assuming that nominal deposits keep pace with 
inflation - that customers need greater balances to 
cope with higher prices - this only enables those 
assets funded by deposits to maintain their real value. 
The real value of existing capital will suffer. 
b) Where domestic inflation is higher than that of a 
country's main trading partners. (129p.18) 
This has the effect of weakening the exchange rate. As 
the value of sterling falls, a UK bank's currency 
assets and liabilities rise in value in terms of 
sterling. As the sterling value of currency balances 
rises, the ratio of capital to deposits falls. 
A basic model of the effect of purely inflationary growth in 
deposits on capital ratios has been constructed by 
TABLE 13:THE -LONDON CLEARING BANK GROUPS - % GROWTH OF ASSETS AND CAPITAL 
, 
BANK ITEl! YEAR 
1975 1976 1977 1978(1) 1979 1980 1981 
1. BARCLAYS Assets 15.0 18.4 14.3 8.2 27.0 22.3 31.4 
Capi tal (3) 13.0 18.2 11.6 33.3 29.3 13 .4 13.8 
2. LLOYDS Assets 10.5 19.2 14.8 9.1 18.3 13.8 39.2 
Capital 9.3 26.9 9.6 30.9 17.6 14.7 22.8 
3. MIDLAND Assets 4.3 14.3 13.0 16.2 29.8 25.4 61.8 (2) 
Capital 25.1 10.5 10.6 43.0 27.9 10.6 7.4 
4. NATIONAL Assets 7.9 16.4 12.4 15.7 30.4 19.4 25.3 
WESTMINSTER Capital 4.4 8.6 9.9 29.3 17.1 16.8 22.3 
5. WILLIAMS & GLYN'S Assets 7.7 7.8 2.1 9.8 11.7 13.3 36.7 
Capital 5.4 11.4 7.0 8.5 39.3 14.8 19.1 
Source: Reports and Annual Accounts 
Notes: 
1. The increase in capital bases in 1978 generally resulted from accounting adjustments in 
respect of a change of accounting policies relating to the treatment of deferred taxation. 
2. Relates largely to the purchase of an interest in Crocker National Corporation in October 
1981, comprising total assets of £10,884.5 million. 
3. The capital base is defined as share capital (ordinary and preference) plus total reserves. 
Revell,(130p.85) and is given in Appendix 3. The simulation 
modelled a highly simplified bank under reasonable 
assumptions with inflation at 20 per cent. It clearly shows 
that capital ratios would not be maintained under such 
condi tions, and that there is a clear difference be'tween an 
inflationary growth in deposits and real growth in terms of 
the effects on the operating account and capital ratios. 
2. ASSET GROWTH 
In the last decade the growth of bank assets has been greater 
than the growth of bank capital. This trend is shown by 
Table 13 of the London clearing banks since 1975. From 1975 
to 1977 the growth in assets was always greater than the 
growth in capital. The capital figures for 1978 and 1979 are 
significantly distorted by changing accounting policies and 
reserve revaluation, but by 1981 the trends appear again. 
The important constituent of the growth in assets has been 
the increase in advances, particularly in currencies between 
1979-1981 as is shown in Table 14. 
In the U.S. it was noted as early as 1966 that the growth of 
banking had persistantly outrun the ability of banks to 
generate capital internally(131). Burns(132) reported that 
the quest for profi ts and growth had caused the attenua tion 
of the US banking system's equity capital base, heavy loan 
commitments in relation to resources and some deterioration 
in the quality of assets. Summers(133p.3) suggested that a 
return to the rapid asset growth that characterised the early 
1970's would again be likely to put downward pressure on 
capital/asset ratios. Table 15 shows that throughout the 
TA];L~ 14: LONDON CLEARING BANK C[(OUPS - CRO\iTH 1 IN ADVAl~CES2 1975-81 (rH) 
-
BANK GROUP YeAR 
1975 1976 1977 1Y78 1979 1980 1981 
BARCLAYS 10568.7 12717.3 14857 13503: 8 15364 18662 26807 
% grm.,.t11 10.6 20.3 16.8 (9.1) 13.8 21.5 ~3.6_ 
--
LWYDS 6157.6 7790. "f 8784.2 9778.2 12224.1 14306.2 20308.4 
% growth 1.2 26.5 12.8 I 11.3 25.0 17.0 42.0 • 
---
-_._--
MIDLAND 6040.7 6955.2 80:)3.3 9467.3 12314.9 15976.5 27597.2 
% grovith 8.3 15.1 15.1 18.3 30.1 30.0 72.7 
- -
1.!ATIONAL l:ESTlllNSTER I 9057 10615 12042 ll,068 18115 22319 30112 
" 1_: gl~"th 5.2 17.2 13.4 16.8 50.4 23.2 34.9 
--
llIl.LIAilS t· GLYNS Ill,S. 7 1287.5 1142,l, 1245.7 1477.2 1588.6 2163.5 
% eru'I,fth 7.7 7.8 2.1 9.8 11. 7 13.3 36.7 
,-
SODRCE: Reports and Annual ACC01llltS. 
lPer cent erm .. th is th"lt from previC'us year. 
2 Defined :lS IU2rket lO':lr:~ to U.K. r~sidents,. excluding money at call and short noti~e. 
, 
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TABLE 15: THE WORLD'S 20 LARGEST BANKS - CAPITAL/ASSET 
RA.TI0S IN 1971, 1976 and 19801 
BANK YEAR 
1971 1976 
Citicorp 4.8 4.2 
Bank America 4.0 3.4 
Credit Agrico1e - 4.9 
BNP 
- 0.9 
Credit Lyonnais 1.2 0.9 
SocGen 1.4 1.2 
Barc1ays Group 6.8 4.7 
Deutshe Bank 3.7 3.4 
Nat. West. 5.8 5.5 
Dai - Ichi Kangyo - 4.4 
Chase Manhattan Corp 4.8 3.7 
Fuji Bank 4.0 3.0 
Sumitomo Bank 6.3 4.8 
Sanwa Bank 5.8 4.4 
Dresdner Bank 3.2 3.2 
Mitsubishi Bank 3.9 3.1 
Midland Group 6.3 5.7 
West LB 2.8 2.6 
Norinchukin Bank 1.2 0.9 
Manufactures Hanover Corp. 5.0 3.6 
SOURCE: D Fair1amb The Banker September 1981 p.105 
1980 
3.6 
3.7 
5.8 
1.4 
1.1 
1.6 
5.4 
3.1 
5.3 
3.5 
3.6 
3.8 
3.6 
3.6 
2.8 
4.0 
5.3 
3.0 
0.4 
3.2 
1In the case of Japanese banks figures refer to the year end 
(31 March) of that year with the exception of 1980 which 
refers to the 30 Septemher half-year. Other ~anks are 
31 Decemher year-end figures; 
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1970's fifteen of the world's twenty largest banks' 
capital/asset ratio fell. 
3. DIFFICOLTIES OF EXTERNAL FIRAHCIIG 
A commercial bank may increase its capital base through 
external funding by equity, preference and loan stock issues. 
The London Clearing Banks have expanded their capital base 
during the last decade, but retained profits and not external 
funding have been the vital source of this growth. The major 
forms of external finance have been rights or scrip issues, 
and loan stocks 4• These are detailed in Appendix 4, but it 
is only Midland Bank that has been particularly active in 
these markets. Apart from limited rights issues in the 
U.K., it is usually only loan stocks that have been raised 
on the capital markets. The preferred funding method 
recently has been the floating rate capital notes of medium 
maturity (around 10 years) issued in the Euromarkets. These 
floating rate notes have enabled the banks to raise loan 
finance without. becoming tied to a fixed interest 
liability(134s.4.1). 
The major problem of external funding is that bank stocks are 
frequently quoted in the financial markets below their book 
values. Investments should yield a profitable return for the 
bank but they must also offer an attractive return to the 
bondholder or shareholder( 135p.20). This has not been so in 
the bank capital markets. A recent study by 
Mercaldo(136p.267> revealed that key money centre banks were 
trading (as a percentage of book value) at below 82S, the 
U.K. Clearing Banks at 61.8S and the four largest West German 
banks at an average of 87.9S. Table 16 shows a basic 
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assessment for the London Clearing Banks in 1981, 
illustra ting they were again trading well below their book 
values. 
Table 1Q Share prices gng QQQk value fQL London Clearing 
Banks llli 
Bank Market Value (p) Shareholders Total Book value 
High Low Funds £m Shares m per share 
1. Barclays 394 
2. Lloyds 453 
3. Midland 350 
4. Na tional 
Westminster 423 
313 
295 
295 
338 
2267 
1713 
1448.3 
2220 
282.1 
174.8 
164.8 
236.0 
(p) 
804 
908 
879 
941 
Source: Grievson. Grant & Co. and R~Q9rt~ gn~ AunYal Accounts 
In addition to the low market prices. McCarthy and Handorf 
have argued that substantial flotation costs, non-
deductability of dividend payments for tax purposes, and 
immediate dilution of the earnings per share for existing 
shareholders have all contributed to the lack of significant 
stock issues.(137p.52) The latter point was taken as 
significant by Hempel(138pp.58-60) who developed a basic 
model to evaluate the financial effects of raising external 
capital. The model assumes that in reaching external 
financing decisions the primary objective of a bank is to 
minimise the immediate dilution of earnings per share and to 
.. 
• 
TABLE 17 EARNINGS PEa COHt·fClN SlIf.aE UlillER A!.TfaNATIVE FOIUIS OF FINANCING (8) 
Earnings on Existing Prc&cnt Additional Additiol1a.l Additional 
Assets Cnpital Capital financed Capital financed C .... :tpital financed 
\-1i th Common Stock Hi. th 8% Prcfcr- with 8% Subord-
euce Stock inat.l!u Debt. 
EC'lrniuB-s on Assets 1,300,000 1,313,000 1,313 ,000 1,313,000 
Less interest -. 
-
- 80,000 
-. 
Net income before 1,300,000 1,313,000 1,313,000 1,233,000 taxes 
Taxe~ (0 30%) 390,000 393,900 393,900 369,900 
Net income. after 910,000 919,100 919,100 863,100 taxes 
Preference Dividends - - 80,000 -
Net for Common Stock 910,000 919,100 839,1.00 863,100 
--
NumLcr of Shc::rcs 200,000 220,000 200,000 200,000 
Ear.nings per share 4.55 4.18 4.20 4.31 
Co.. 
-'- -
Source: G.B. Hernpcl, !i!!!lL~aDit<ll Determining Rr.d l>l(>cting Your Brink's Capital N~e~12, 
I'i£urc 5. L .. -
Notes: 
1. Earnings on total ass(~ts are 1.3% after all opcrad.r.g cxp(~nscs but before. tm~es. 
2. Initially capital funds .:ll~e $8 million and assets $100 nilUnn. Capital c('~rrif,eS 
200,000 shares of $10 per value stock and $6 million in slIrplus, undivided p~ofits 
and re5erve·0;;:. 
3. The: bank is not subject to regulatory capital constraints. 
4. The bank required to raise an additional $1 million of cc":lpi.tal (uhich will increase 
assets immediately by ~:l million) by:-
a) selling 20,000 shares of common stock at $50 per. share, or 
b) selling non-convertible, preferred stock \.,.'ith a 8 percent dividend rate, or 
c) selling non-COl1ver l ib le subordinated debentures ldth an 8 percent coupon. 
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maximise earnings per share over a longer period. The 
results are tabulated overleaf. 
Table 17 shows the immediate dilution of earnings per share 
under the various forms of external financing. The 
simulation can be repeated to show the effect where the 
banks' existing assets are increased; again the highest 
earnings per share would result if no additional capital were 
raised, but, where this is not so, the use of subordinated 
debt again offers the most favourable alternative. 
Thus the problems associated with external funding will 
impose constraints on bank capital adequacy. Capital is 
frequently unprofitable to issue and requires stringent 
disclosure requirements, particularly from the Securities and 
Exchange Commission in the U.S. Loan stocks have an 
advantage in that interest is tax deductable and the dilution 
of earnings per share is not quite so pronounced. In the 
last section, however, we noted that loan stocks are not 
wholly accepted by bank supervisors for bank capital adequacy 
purposes. 
4. PROBLEMS OF INTERNAL FUNDING 
It is generally concluded that external financing is not an 
adequate or reliable method of maintaining a bank's capital 
base. The alternative is to supplement capital by additions 
to reserves. The reserves of the London Clearing Banks have 
expanded substantially since 1971 as a result of profit 
retentions, property revaluations and changing deferred 
taxation policies under SSAP 15 (from 1978 the banks were 
'i }, 
. ; 
i 
I 
j 
'". 1 , 
. !' 
I 
I 
I 
j 
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~'ABLE 18: TOTAl. CAPITAL AWl RP-SERVES BIG FOUR LONllO)! CLEARING BANI~S 1975-1981 
CAPITAL ([J.O YEAR 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
Shareholders runds (1) 2763 3189 3523 4672 5146 6551 
Total Capital llase(2) 3380 4111 4571 6498 7889 9283 
CapitRl increase, 322 731 460 1927 1391 1394 
represented by: 
l. RetaincJ profits 127 238 306 550 890 £61 
2. Loan capital 80 290 164 132 108 231 
3. Reserve revaluations (3) 21 5 9 200 (6) 
4. Rights issues 53 142 - 99 - -
5. Other (3) 65 40 (15) 1137 (4) 193 308 
-
% contribution of retained profits 1,0 33 67 29 64 62 to capital increase 
Source.: r~f'Ports and An,,!ll1al i\ccounts 
Share and preference capital plus reserves 
1 
7648 
2005 
272~ 
793 
826 
247 
856 
29 
(1) 
(2) Shareholders funds plus loan capital and minority interests. From 1978 this item 
also includes general provisions arId amounts of defc.rn:d tax for whicb no bc::lance 
sheet provision has been made. 
(3) 
(4) 
Principally inclUding minority interests) goodwill and defp-rrcd tax for Hhich no 
balance sheet pH'vision has been made. 
AdjuRtmcnts in respect of a. change in accounting policie.s' related to deferred 
taxation. 
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allowed to credit large deferred tax provisions to reserves). 
Table 18 illustrates these trends for the London Clearing 
Banks since 1975. 
The crucial importance of retained earnings to the capital 
base is seen in 1977, 1979 and 1980. The value for 1978 is 
distorted by the change in accounting policies relating to 
deferred taxation. The conclusion is that the growth of the 
capi tal base remai ns highly dependent on retai ned earnings. 
though loan stocks are becoming increasingly popular. 
Surpluses arising from property revaluations, exchange rate 
adjustments and deferred taxation provisions have influenced 
the capital growth of the London Clearing Banks, but these 
are not usually considered as reliable forms of internal 
funding for the capital base. 
Profit retentions therefore have important implications for 
capital adequacy. Thus a bank is highly dependent on current 
profitability and its dividend policy. Current profitability 
has fallen in absolute terms since 1979 and this trend can be 
expected in 1982. To maintain public confidence, however, 
banks aim to offer attractive returns to shareholders through 
dividend payouts, potentially squeezing retained 
profitability further. Lloyds Bank raised their dividend per 
share from 10p in 1978. through 17p in 1980 to 21p in 1981. 
The National Westminster likewise offered 13p, 21p and 25p 
respectively. Thus ... the difficulties and uncertainties of 
internal funding may also impose serious constraints on a 
bank's capital adequacy. 
This section has described some of the more pertinent 
constraints to bank capital adequacy. Capital ratios may 
have been allowed to fall where they were felt to be too high 
initially, but there are other factors. The real value of 
the capital base has been eroded, profitability has fallen 
(potentially squeezing distributed and retained funds) and 
equity issues have proven harder to float successfully. Thus 
inflation, asset growth, problems of raising external and 
internal. funds have all constrained bank capital ratios -
making the 'tug of war' between supervisors and bankers all 
too real. 
5.3. BANK CAPITAL ADEQUACY - MEASUREHENT 
The measurement of capital adequacy is largely a description 
of the regulatory approaches applied in the US since the 
1930's •. The US banking system is one of the most regulated 
systems in the world as a result of the banking collapses in 
the 1930's. Bank capital assessment has traditionally relied 
on 'formula' approaches. Originally capital was related to 
deposits, as it was emphasised capital should protect 
depositors' funds. The emphasis changed to capital/asset 
ratios, concentrating on the risk inherent in a bank's 
asse ts. In addition notice was gradually taken of 
qualitative factors. Finally we shall review an approach 
offered by Voj ta. 
5.3.1. CAPITAL CONCEPTS 
Capital assessments have largely concentrated on relating 
capital to deposits, 
judgements. 5 
assets and risk assets and qualitative 
• 
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1. ~~ital/depos~ 
This has proved to be one of the more popular ratios 
used by bank supervisors. It was incorporated into 
Californian law as early as 1909. A ratio of 1: 10 
became an accepted rule of thumb in the early 20th 
century. In 1914 the Annual Repor t of the Comptroller 
of Currency suggested this should be a minimum - a 
commercial bank should not be permitted to hold 
deposits in excess of ten times its capital and 
surplus. After the 1933 'bank holiday', banks whose 
capital base was less than 10 per cent of deposits were 
not allowed to re-open. 
The ratio has since developed as a 'free capital' 
gearing ratio - that is capital less infrastructure to 
deposits. Again a 1:10 ratio became a yardstick. 
2. .Qmljtal/ assets 
The emphasis changed to capital/assets ratios after 
World War 11. The massive funding programme of the 
American government during the war encouraged many bank 
~nalysts to believe the risk of holding U.S. Government 
securities was greater than the risk of being unable to 
repay depositors. Prudential regulation became 
directed at asset depreciation rather than deposit 
withdrawal. Thus both the FDC and FRS instituted a 
capital/asset ratio, the latter stipulating a capital 
base greater than 7 percent of assets. 
3. Capital/Risk Assets 
The risk asset ratios were developed to distinguish the 
risks inherent in different classes of assets. 
Originally assets were split in two - risk assets and 
non-risk assets. The latter were defined as assets for 
which there was no reasonable doubt they would be 
repaid on time and in full. A capital/risk assets 
ratio of 1:5 was used and developed to incorporate 
'near riskless' assets. 
There are, however two approaches which were designed 
in the 1950's that have significantly influenced bank 
capital adequacy assessment. The watershed of 
prudential supervision was the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York approach6 • This and subsequent approaches 
recognised that losses will occur from a variety of 
different sources of assets and that the sum total of 
these risks will determine the total capital cover 
required. The approach was based on a supervisory 
formula developed by Howard D. Crosse, which was a 
detailed risk assets scheme. Assets were grouped into 
six risk categories, each of which was covered by a 
specific capital requirement. The formulas included an 
element of qualitative assessment as the bank 
supervisor would determine how much more capital an 
individual bank might require because of its peculiar 
circumstances. The basic formula and capital 
requirements are given in Appendix 5. 
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The principle of risk asset graduation was continued by 
Board of Governors of the FRS in 1956 wi th their Form 
for Analysing Banking Capital (the ABC formula). As 
with the previous approach. the capital margins seemed 
arbitrary but Form ABC had four important features - a 
liquidity calculation which incorporated the 'disaster 
valuation' approach; graduated capital margins 
according to the size of the bank's loan and non-
government securities portfolio; a requirement against 
trust department operations and a disaster contingency 
based on the experiences of the 1930's. Broadly 
speaking the approach required more capital for less 
liquid banks, the details of which are given in 
Appendix 6. 
4. Qualitative AssessID~ 
The problems of assessing capital adequacy were 
generally acknowledged to imply a considerable amount 
of judgement in addition to the quantitative 
techniques. In the late 1960's and early 1970's the 
acc had moved away from the traditional formula 
approaches adopted by the FRS. The acc abandoned the 
use of formal ratios is 1962, considering them too 
arbitrary and not taking account of other important 
factors. Instead the acc appraised a bank in relation 
to the quality of its management and its asset and 
deposit position as a going-concern under normal 
conditions with due allowance for a reasonable margin 
of safety. Specifically the following were 
considered(139):-
(i) 
(ii) 
( iii) 
(iv) 
( v) 
(vi) 
( vii) 
(viii) 
Quality of management 
Liquidity of Assets 
History of earnings and retention thereof 
Quality and character of ownership 
Burden of meeting occupancy expenses 
Potential volatility of deposit structure 
Quality of operating procedures 
Bank's capacity to meet present and future 
financial needs of its trade area, 
conSidering the competition it faces. 
This was the most significant approach to qualitative 
assessment, though today the OCC use a combination of 
both methods. 
5.3.2. THE VOJTA APPROACH(140) 
In 1972 George Vojta of First National City Bank (now 
Citibank) constructed a measure of capital adequacy in which 
the key element was current earnings. The approach was 
impliCitly based on two functions of capital, defined by 
Vojta(141p.16) as allowing the acquisition of the 
institutional structure necessary to perform the 
intermediation function and related services, and secondly to 
provide protection - in condi tions short of total economic 
collapse - against unanticipated adverSity leading to loss in 
excess of normal expenditure. The latter function was based 
on the recognition of six generic banking risks. 
Vojta proposed two tests to determine capital adequacy - an 
earnings test and the 'rule of 20' test. The earnings test 
would show the degree to which current earnings would cover 
anticipated losses, on the assumption that stable business 
conditions prevail. The second test was designed to measure 
the extent to which capital funds would cover unexpected 
losses by a prudent margin (a factor of two). The following 
definitions were applied: 
1. Current earnings - earnings after taxes, accounting 
provision for losses, other charges to reserves and net 
of dividend payments. 
2. Anticipated losses - estimated as a continuation of 
'normal', historical loss experience. 
3. Actual loss - based on a 5 year moving average of total 
charges to loan and other contingency reserves 
expressed as a percentage of total risk assets net of 
cash and due from banks. modified by a variable 
representing management expectations concerning 
departures from the historical mean as indicated by 
future business plans. as well as known factors in the 
environment. 
4. Capi tal funds - capital surplus. undivided prof it and 
all reserves except depreciation and amortisations. 
5. Unexpected loss - expressed as a derivation from 
average historical loss expectations. 
Based on these definitions, Vojta proposed that annualised 
current earnings should be equal to at least twice the amount 
of actual loss anticipated by management and secondly that 
capital funds should be greater than twenty times the average 
value of historical loss experience. Both tests operated 
subject to the constraint that total capital must not be less 
than 5 percent and not greater than 20 percent of average 
total assets (net of cash and due from banks). The second 
test was applied only provided the bank had satisfied the 
earnings test, that its management was rated as superior by 
the bank supervisor and that It ••• known adverse contingent 
claims on capital in the form of loans classified 
substandard, doubtful or loss, and other known potential 
write-offs are not in excess of 50 per cent of total capital 
funds lt .(142P.20) 
The Vojta approach has not yet been formally incorporated 
into a supervisor's assessment of bank capital adequacy. 
Nevertheless, it is a significant contribution to the current 
controversy over bank capital adequacy. It is a more 
sophisticated testing mechanism which, for the first time, 
explicitly considered current earnings in the determination 
of bank capital adequacy. This approach has moved away from 
traditional assessments in which holdings of particular 
assets were used as proxies for the losses to be expected on 
them; instead it encompasses a direct relationship between 
expected losses and current earnings together with net worth. 
In addition, the assessment is made in conditions just before 
a total financial collapse as opposed to a 'disaster 
valuation' approach. The principle criticism of the approach 
is that it relies on historical data • 
...... " 
Bank capital adequacy has traditionally been assessed with 
specific reference to quantitative ratios. The approach 
adopted by bank supervisors and regulators has been heavily 
influenced by the experiences of the US banking system. 
Assessments, however, must necessarily take account of 
qUalitative factors. In the final analysis the Vojta and 
U.K. approaches may be preferable because they include 
specific recognition of the importance of judgement. and 
qualitative factors based on selected ratio analysis. The 
following section will discuss the current position in the. 
U.K. 
5.4. CURRERT ARRARGEHERTS DEFIRED7 
5.4.1. INTRODUCTION 
The UK approach is characterised by Cooke: "There can be no 
certainty, no dogma about capital adequacy.,,(143p.21) 
Traditionally, the clearing banks maintained a capital to 
deposits ratio of 8 per cent, though the Bank of England also 
measured a free capital ratio. The latter was more 
consistent with assessing capital adequacy in terms of the 
assets which are likely to be a source of losses, which 
ultimately reduce profits and additions to reserves. 
Shaw(144p.14) argues this approach also prevented the 
clearing banks from artificially raising their capital base 
during inflationary periods by becoming geared investors in 
property and trade investments. 
In direct contrast to the U.S., the Bank of England have. not 
attempted to implement a formalised system of capital 
adequacy assessment, but rather have attempted to encourage 
the growth of sound banking business in the U.K. whil st 
limiting the possibility of a recurrence of the difficulties 
highlighted by the fringe banking crisis. Thus. the Bank of 
England have traditionally taken the view that formalised and 
rigid ratios were counter-productive. 
The evolution of the pj-esent system has been highlighted by 
two discussion papers - 'The Capital and Liquidity Adequacy 
of Banks,(145) and 'The Measurement of Capital,(146), issued 
in 1975 and 1980 respectively. The 1975 paper was the 
outcome of a Working Party established in 1974 by the Bank of 
England and the London and Scottish Clearing Banks to discuss 
the subjects of capital adequacy and liquidity. The terms of 
reference for the Working Party were twofold:-(para.2) 
1. to consider the purposes for which capital and reserves 
were required; to develop principles for assessing 
their adequacy for such purposes and to examine the 
roles of the different components of capital; and 
2. to examine the traditional approaches to liquidity in 
the light of recent changes which had affected the 
liabilities of bank balance sheets. 
The relevant conclusions of the Working Party are noted in 
Appendix 7. as the 1980 paper incorporates many of these 
principles. A further discussion paper was circulated in 
1979 from which many of the present proposals were drafted. 
The following facets of the present system should be noted: 
1. It is flexible, taking account of the particular 
character of each institution. 
2. It is concerned with the maintenance of confidence in 
the system as a whole as well as the interests of 
individual depositors. 
3. The approach is essentially concerned with the capital 
needs of a continuing business. 
4. Precise numerical guidelines for the capital needs of 
all institutions or for groups of institutions are 
considered to remain inappropriate. 
5. Current earnings are stressed as being essential as a 
first defence against loss~ but also a source of fresh 
capital to allow the busines to grow or even to 
maintain the scope of its operations during a period of 
inflation. 
6. In the case of UK incorporated deposit-taking 
businesses, account is taken of their world-wide 
operations on a consolidated group basis. 
7. Qualitative judgements will be incorporated into the 
analysis depending on the nature of business of that 
institution. 
5.4.2. THE MEASUREMENT OF CAPITAL. SEPTEMBER 1980 
We have previously noted that the paper identified the two 
most important objectives of capital adequacy as ensuring 
that the capital position of an institution is regarded as 
acceptable by its depositors and other creditors, and 
secondly to test the adequacy of capi tal in relation to the 
risk of losses which may be sustained. To this end the Bank 
of England have constructed two ratios - the first objective 
is broadly met by relating current liabilities to capital 
resources (the free resources or gearing ratio) and the 
second objective by a more complex risk asset ratio. The 
exact details and definitions are given in Appendix 7, 
together with a summary of the method of calculation. 
The gearing ratio relates shareholders' funds (less equipment 
and fixed assets) to total non-capital liabilities. The 
latter are defined as all non-capital liabilities not 
including contingent liabilities which are incorporated 
within the balance sheet. 8 Past practice had been to take 
account only of deposit liabilities, though to this the Bank 
of England had traditionally added acceptances. By 
definition the gearing ratio should be constructed as far as. 
possible from publicly available information to enable 
depositors and other creditors to form a judgement about the 
capital adequacy of that institution. 
The risk assets ratio is, however, the important ratio for 
the purpose of bank supervision. Risk assets are related to 
a capital base which is the same as is used for the gearing 
ratio except that premises and fixed assets are not deducted. 
Instead they are treated like other balance sheet assets. 
When calculating the risk measure, the Bank of England will 
take into consideration any genuine hidden values in the 
balance sheet and any over-statement of assets in relation to 
their market values. 
The risk asset classification incorporates seven classes of 
risk asset (Form ABC has six classes) each of which are 
allocated a certain capital cover. This ratio therefore 
contains certain information which it is likely will only be 
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available to the Bank of England and bank itself. The ratio 
is constructed by multiplying each balance sheet asset by its 
risk weight to produce an adjusted total of risk assets. The 
'weights' attempt to reflect the relative risk of loss 
arising from credit or investment risk inherent in a 
particular class of asset. The risk asset ratio is the 
proportion of the adjusted asset total which is represented 
by the modified capital base. 
These two ratiOS are, however, only the first stage in the 
assessment of bank capital adequacy. Final assessment will 
also take into account the particular circumstances of each 
institution. Thus the large institution with a well 
diversified spread of high quality lending will inherently be 
less exposed to risk, and therefore requires relativelY less 
capital cover against its assets than the small specialist 
institution with a narrower customer base. 
5.4.3. APPRAISAL OF CORRENT ARRANGEHENTS 
The problems of assessing capital adequacy derive from the 
lack of definition of bank capital adequacy - or more 
precisely at what stage does a bank become inadequately 
capitalised. The current situation is one in which certain 
guidelines have been established by the Bank of England 
though the final judgement also takes into account 
qualitative factors through regular discussions. 
1. Ratio Analysis 
nAIl in all, there is an overwhelming agreement among the 
students of banking regarding the lack of representativeness 
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of these (capital) ratios".(147p.25) Gardener has argued 
that " ... the nature of banking risks is such that 
conventional ratio-based schemes are inadequate and 
misleading indicators of bank prudential strength,,(148pp.59-
60) There could be a danger where a minimum ratio became 
established (though precise values have not been published) 
that a bank might capitalise to its lowest level - and 
thereby operate at the highest risk available. 
Barge(148p.18) has raised a more practical consideration. 
Should a minimum gearing ratio become established then this 
will automatically establish a level of profitability - the 
stock markets for instance have long regarded a free 
resources ratio of less than 2% as a signal for a bank to 
issue equity.(149) The argument is illustrated by reference 
to a bank's dividend policy. If a 10% dividend is required 
to maintain shareholder's confidence then this implies a pre-
tax return on capital of approximately 21%. Thus, where a 
gearing ratio of 1:20 is maintained, a return on assets of 
0.95% will be needed to maintain that dividend. The example 
is simplistic, but demonstrates that once a gearing ratio is 
established, a minimum level of profit may be implied. The 
implication may be more real than apparent. A recent 
study(150p. 26 7) concluded that banks in certain industrial 
countries had earned only meagre returns on assets. Selected 
large banks only earned between 0.38 and 0.64 on average in 
Canada, 0.44 to 0.64 in the U.S., 0.20 to 0.33 in West 
Germany and 0.67 to 1.01 in the U.K. 
2. Capital Base 
The Bank of England define the capital base as share capital, 
loan capital, minority interests, reserves and provisions 
subject to certain criteria. The arguments relating to loan 
stocks have been discussed and the Bank of England have 
accordingly laid down stringent conditions for the inclusion 
of loan capital in the capital base. These conditions may be 
subject to further modification, but banks in the U.K., and 
certainly the Clearing Banks, may find they do not have 
sufficient flexibility within their balance sheets to 
incorporate most of their debt issues within the capital base 
for the purposes of capi tal adequacy assessment. The other 
components of the capital base will be discussed but it is 
prudent to begin with a general criticism on market 
evaluation. 
Bank capital is defined in terms of book value yet there is 
currently an appreciable difference between book value and 
market value. Thus, increased recognition of market value 
might be more viable in today's fluctuating stock markets. 
According to Anderson(151p.19) the market's evaluation is an 
important element that should be followed carefully by the 
regulatory authorities. It is suggested it should be " ••• one 
of the most important parameters followed by the regulatory 
authori ties"( 152p.23). The Bank of England disagree for two 
reasons(153p.22) - the perception in the market of capital 
inadequacy is likely to occur at a time when a bank can no 
longer remedy the situation and secondly, banks might expand 
business well beyond the limits of what bank supervisors 
consider acceptable wi thout provoking any market reaction. 
The crux of these arguments therefore concerns the 
information disclosure of banks. In the U.K., Bank of 
England assessments are often based on confidential returns 
whilst the poor disclosure of financial information by 
British banks must seriously hinder the market's evaluation. 
The actual constitution of the capital base may be subjected 
to more specific appraisal. 
Share ca pi tal is defined to excl ude the amount not paid up on 
issued shares and authorised but unissued shares. The 
latter is an acceptable deduction but the former, although 
quite rare, could represent a valuable source of funds to the 
bank. Shareholders are contractually obliged to pay in full 
to the agreed purchase price if called upon to do so. 
Minority interests have been included in the capital base to 
enable the assessment of group capital adequacy. The 
treatment of minority interests is not, however, clearly 
defined. Where they contribute significantly to the capital 
base the position will be 'examined carefully'. The public 
are therefore unlikely to be able to calculate the correct 
gearing ratio where minority interests are significant. 
This criticism can be extended to the treatment of inner 
reserves and general bad debt provisions. The inclusion of 
inner reserves is only really of consequence to some merchant 
banks but bad debt provisions are generally only disclosed by 
the major commercial banks. Thus, the gearing ratio does not 
in several respects accord with its objective of being a 
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publicly calculable ratio. Further, it is unlikely that a 
depositor or other creditor will be satisfied by the gearing 
ratio if they thought that the risk asset ratio, or risk of 
loss which a bank was running could be significant in 
relation to its capital.(154p.1/2) 
The treatment of provisions now differs from the approach 
adopted in 1975. The Bank of England have now drawn the 
distinction between certain and uncertain loss. Thus amounts 
set aside to cover possible or probable loss that have 
already been identified provide no protection against future 
unexpected losses. Specific provisions against advancesJ 
interest suspended, provisions for deferred and current tax 
are therefore excluded. This might give rise to two 
problems. A bank could maintain its capital ratio by 
increasing its general bad debt provisions at the expense of 
specific provisions. Conversely the more prudent institution 
will be 'penalised' to the extent it specifically identifies 
bad debts and has smaller general provisions. Secondly, 
general provisions are not a uniform category. To be 
included in the definition of the capital base, all items 
within general provisions must be able to absorb future 
losses. 
A similar controversy concerns the application of provisions 
for deferred taxation. The accounting standard SSAP 15, 
issued October 1978,(155) redefined deferred taxation 
accounts to include only amounts on which it is probable that 
there will be a potential tax liability in the foreseeable 
future. Provisions for deferred and current taxation will be 
concerned with expected losses, present or future. The 
controversy concerns the apparent vagueness of the accounting 
standard - the probability of the tax becoming payable is 
open to debate. In the U.K. the clearing banks realised 
virtually all their deferred tax from leasing activities, yet 
Lloyds Bank recognised no future liability in their accounts 
whilst Barclays, Midland and National Westminster set aside 
differing proportions of potential future liabilities. As a 
result, until the standard is more precisely defined 9 , the 
Bank of England will continue to monitor the treatment of tax 
provisions. However, the treatment is imprecise and again it 
is possible the. prudent or cautious bank could be 
inadvertently penalised by these defini tions. The present 
stance is that where maturing tax payments are likely to 
exceed the provisions created, then the Bank of England will 
make a suitable deduction from the capital base. 
3. Risk Analysis 
The risk asset ratio attempted to focus on the quality of a 
banks' assets. The 1980 paper offered a 'detailed 
differentiation' yet the risk analysis was considerably 
simpler than the Voj ta approach. The Bank of England based 
their analysis on three types of banking risk:-
(a) Credit risk - the risk that claims on others may not be 
redeemable at the due date at their full book value. 
(b) Investment risk - the risk that marketable claims on 
others, or directly held assets, may depreciate below 
their book value. 
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(c) Forced sale risk - defined as a further element within 
investment risk, it is the risk that actual and 
additional losses may be sustained because of the need 
to make untimely sales of assets which, depending on 
the narrowness of the market, may yield less than their 
quoted value. 
The existance of other risks is recognised but these are 
assessed within a qualitative judgement of the risk asset 
ratio, rather than by encompassing them with the ratio 
analysis. Nevertheless, considerable attention 10 has been 
given to the identification of banking risks and it may be 
argued the Bank of England have not given sufficient 
weighting to all the pertinant banking risks. 
appropriate classification would be as follows: 
(a) Credit ~ 
A more 
Credit risk is the risk of default or delay in 
repayment of a bankts assets.. Credit risk is present 
in all bank assets with the exception of fixed assets 
and U.K. Government securities. Taking credit risk is 
a principal function of banks. Credit risk will 
primarily affect the loan portfolio but may also occur 
in non-gilt edged investments, foreign exchange 
transactions and equity participations. 
(b) Liquidity BiAk 
Liquidity risk arises from the possibility a bank will 
be unable to meet cash demands on time. This may occur 
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where the maturities of assets and liabilities are not 
matched, or when the bank is forced to sell 
creditworthy assets or switch liabilities in adverse 
market conditions. Identifying and managing liquidity 
risk is therefore ultimately concerned with the 
difference between daily cash flows. 
(c) Investment Rllk 
Investment risk concerns the depreciation of marketable 
securities for reasons other than default or delayed 
payment. Depreciation may occur through changing 
interest rates or varying economic condi tions. 
Investment risk will only be realised when a marketable 
asset is sold below its book value. If the investment 
is not sold, no such risk will occur. The realisation 
of investment risk is therefore a management decision, 
but where it is the intention of the bank to hold such 
an investment, it would then become a residual risk. 
(d) Interest ~ Risk 
Interest rate risk will occur when the cost of 
liabilities rise faster, or exceed the earnings on 
assets. Such risks may occur where fixed rate loans 
are funded by variable rate deposits; or where variable 
rate loans are funded by variable rate deposits if the 
periods are different. For instance, if a variable 
rate loan wi th a six month 'roll-over' is matched by a 
variable rate deposit with a three month 'roll-over', 
the bank will be at risk if interest rates rise as the 
deposit rate will be adjusted upwards after three 
months while the loan rate will not be altered for six 
months. 
(e) Earnings ~ 
Earnings risk may result from changes in interest 
rates, asset prices or operating expenses. 
In addition the Bank of England should consider more fully 
the general risks of banking, such as operational and 
contingent liability risk. Operational risk is the risk of 
loss arising from operational error and mistake whilst the 
latter is present where a bank would be required to fulfill 
its obligations as a guarantor. Banks can insure against 
certain such risks as fraud and dishonesty, forgery, 
defective signatures on documents, theft or damage, robbery 
and negligence - but a risk will be present to the extent 
that actual losses may exceed the insurable cover. 
This list is a considerably more detailed approach than that 
currently modelled by the Bank of England, who argue that to 
encompass all these elements would involve the construction 
of a model whose appearance of accuracy could be dangerously 
misleading(156para.30). On the other hand the Vojta model 
incorporated six risks, and generally the nature of banking 
risks would seem to warrant a more specific treatment than at 
present. In the final analysis this must be to the detriment 
of the present system because it fails to explicitly 
recognise that banks have a portfolio of risks through which 
they can achieve economies of scale. Revell( 157p.80) states 
there is a special relationship between risk and the 
operations of financial institutions, because a large part of 
the function of these insti tutions is to reduce the risk of 
financial transactions for both the savers (who place funds 
with them) and the borrowers (who have use of these funds). 
Banks are thereby able to achieve diversified portfolios that 
are far less risky than individual portfolios. 
The impression is therefore that the risk weightings, 
narrowly defined to reflect only three specific risks, are 
somewhat arbitrary. The risk weights vary from zero to a 
value of two. Commercial advances were taken as a benchmark 
to which a weight of unity is ascribed. There is, however, a 
vast difference in the risk quality of the commercial loans 
undertaken by banks and the failure of the Bank of England to 
make allowance for this disparity remains a major criticism 
of their risk appraisal. The 1972 EEC Draft Directive(158) 
recognised these issues by classifying loans into above 
normal, normal and below normal risk categories. The 
significance of the Bank of England stance is further 
exagerrated because commercial advances are the largest 
category of bank assets. Thus, they have a heavy weighting 
in the overall volume of adjusted risk assets which 
significantly influences a bank's risk asset ratio. It must 
be concluded therefore that the efficacy of the risk asset 
ratio is severely weakened by its own limitations. 
4. Practical Application 
The practical application of the capital ratios should be 
considered because it was necessary that the gearing ratio be 
calculable from publicly available information, and secondly 
because depositors and creditors would also wish to establish 
a rudimentary measure of the risk inherent in a given bank's 
balance sheet. Table 19 overleaf gives the gearing and risk 
asset ratios for the London Clearing Banks since 1975, 
calculated from publicly available information. 
The computations are given in Appendix 8 for each group. It 
is acknowledged the figures are only as accurate as the 
limi ted information available, but the trends are the 
important feature in this case. The ratios must be heavily 
qualified as they are based on the published reports and 
accounts for the banks for one day of the year. The figures 
do, however, give an indication of the interaction between 
risk and reward. Broadly speaking the higher the risk asset 
ratio, the lower is the risk taking by the bank - or 
conversely the banks with lower ratios should benefit in 
times of high profi tabili ty as they take the greatest risk. 
This trend is illustrated by the falling ratios of Barclays 
and Lloyds from 1979 to 1981 reflecting the increasing risk 
associated with their large scale international operations. 
The Midland's ratios fell sharply in 1981 reflecting the 
major aquisition of the American bank Crocker National. 
Both ratios were substantially increased in 1978 in nearly 
all cases as a result of changing accounting policies. Since 
then the downward trend has continued. Midland, however, 
ha~e benefited in 1978 and 1979 from sales of subsidiaries 
and a rights issue. The revaluation of properties can also 
have a distorting affect on the risk asset ratiO, along with 
the widely differing treatments of deferred taxation. 
TABLE 19: NEW CAPITAL RATIOS FOR LONDON CLEARING BANKS 1975-1981 
BANK GROUP YEAR 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
1. GEARING RATIO 
BARCLAYS 3.37 3.19 3.61 4.42 4.72 
LLOYDS 2.71 3.90 3.51 4.14 4.23 
MIDLAND 3.96 4.37 4.64 5.61 5.20 
NATIONAL WESTMINSTER 3.02 3.70 3.15 4.44 4.15 
WILlIAMS & GLYN'S 3.90 4.09 5.61 , 5.28 7.76 
2. RISK ASSET RATIO 
BARCLAYS 6.46 6.27 6.53 8.09 8.67 
LLOYDS 5.34 5.76 4.91 4.67 7.15 
MIDLAND 6.68 7.50 7.43 8.17 8.19 
NATIONAL WESTHINSTER 7.41 7.64 6.96 8.23 7.33 
WILLIAMS & GLYN'S 7.37 7.43 9.70 9.21 11.80 
SOURCE: Reports and Annual Accounts 
1980 
4.54 
4.63 
4.80 
4.20 
7.52 
8.16 
7.10 
7.56 
6.93 
11.75 
1981 
4.01 
4.70 
3.93 
4.70 
6.92 
6.93 
7.00 
6.14 
7.25 
10.76 
o 
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Nevertheless the ratios do offer an ini tial framework from 
which a crude assessment of the capi tal adequacy of a 
financial institution may be made. The public are unlikely 
to be able to calculate these ratios as accurately as the 
Bank of England, nor interpret them as flexibly. The 
important issue is that despite their limitations the ratios 
do illustrate that since 1978 bank capital ratios have again 
been declining. The risk asset ratio however should not be 
used as a proxy for the risk a bank assumes. The previous 
analysis detailed the inherent weaknesses of this ratio to 
which it must be added that it also fails to reflect such key 
factors as the adequacy of the management and the market's 
evaluation of that bank. 
In the final analysis the gearing and risk asset ratios will 
provide a useful framework within which to assess the capital 
adequacy of financial institutions in the U.K. What is not 
clear, however, is the interpretation of these ratios and at 
what levels 'minimum' values will become established. 
5.5. SUMMARY 
Capital adequacy has been discussed as a banking problem. 
The foundation to the analysis was provided by an examination 
of the functions and definitions of bank capital. These 
concepts and factors causing the recent decline in bank 
capital ratios are generally accepted, but the measurement or 
assessment of bank capital adequacy is not so clearly 
defined. In this respect bank capital adequacy remains a 
ne bulus concept. 
Quantitative and qualitative methods for assessing capital 
adequacy were discussed. This relied heavily on U.S. 
experience resulting from the spectacular failure of many of 
their banks in the 1930's. The Bank of England however chose 
to reject a formalised ratio approach. Instead a more 
flexible treatment of individual capital positions is offered 
in the U.K. This approach was based on the need to maintain 
public confidence, reviewing each bank on a group balance 
sheet basis and as a going concern. A 'disaster valuation' 
was rejected because in the U.K. the Bank of England have 
demonstrated in a crisis they will come to the aid of the 
marke ts. 
The assessment of capital adequacy in the U.K. relies heavily 
on two capital ratios, largely composed of confidential 
information only available to the bank concerned and the Bank 
of England. In this respect the Bank of England have kept 
considerable uncertainty regarding their ultimate assessment 
which is also tempered to include qualitative assessment. 
The latter is again vague and inconsistent with public 
assessments of a bank's capital adequacy. The Bank of 
England have agreed to recognise varying qualities of 
management in allowing for higher gearing. though the extent 
to which this is so is not clear. It is unlikely that they 
will weight this factor as importantly as the OCC formula of 
1962 in the U.S., but they do recognise that market status 
and the ability to obtain additional liquidity frequently 
depend on management reputation. In the U.K. therefore it 
would be unexpected if capital adequacy were to replace the 
" ... experienced and progressive management of a well-
conceived program of planning and control".(158p.35) 
However because of the inclusion of a quantitative 
assessment, we may also conclude that bank balance sheets 
could be affected by the current proposals even though no 
precise ratios are specified. The two ratios were defined in 
some detail, and it is to be expected, therefore, that whilst 
the Bank of England will not impose across-the-board' ratios, 
it will impose requirements on individual institutions. The 
extent to which these requirements may be varied is not yet 
clear, but where minimum levels are encouraged by the Bank of 
England this could have serious implications for a bank's 
capital structure. 
NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE 
1. See for example V.P. Apilado and T.G. Gies 'Capital 
Adequacy and Commercial Bank Failure', ~ Bankers 
Magazine (USA), Summer 1972, pp.211-30. 
2. Discussed in N.A. Okidegbe, .!.Ih.e. role .2..f: .lt2J!!mercial 
hank adequacy in ~ supply ~ money', Chapter 1, Ph.D. 
thesis, Howard University, USA, 1980. 
3. In November 1984 the Bank of England issued new 
guidelines, slightly relaxing the very stringent 
conditions applying to loan capital when assessing 
capital adequacy. Note 11 below refers. 
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4. Interested readers should note the Bank of England 
paper published on 28 November, 1984: "Subordinated 
Loan Capital issued by Recognised Banks and Licenced 
Deposit-Takers". This paper could provide some relief 
to bankers. Perpetual debt may now count as 'primary' 
capital subject to certain restrictions. A key 
condition is that perpetual debt must be wholly 
convertible into equity should the existing equity. 
capi tal of the bank be eroded by losse s. However, the 
reader should note that, for example, the National 
Westminster US$500m perpetual floating rate note issued 
in April 1984 does not qualify as primarY capital under 
these new arrangements. 
5. For further details see: 
a) Professor J.R.S. Revell, Solvency ~ Regulation 
.!U: Banks, Bangor Occasional Papers in Economics, 
No.5, University of Wales Press, 1915. 
b) H.D. Crosse and G.H. Hempel, .Managem~ Polic.iJLa 
iQr ~mercial Banks, 3rd edition, Prentice-Hall, 
New Jersey, 1980. 
6. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 'A measure of Minimum 
Capital Adequacy', 21 December 1952. The formula was 
devised by Howard Crosse, then Assistant Vice-President 
in charge of Bank Supervision. 
1. The discussion of current arrangements refer to the 
period prior to November 1984, and does not therefore 
include the Bank of England paper referred to in Note 4 
above. 
8. The liability of the Scottish and Northern Irish banks 
for their own note issue will not be included to the 
extent that it is covered by Bank of England notes and 
coin. Subordinated loan stocks, disallowed by the 
qualifying criteria for the capital base, will also be 
excluded. 
9. The March 1984 budget reduced the taxation advantages 
of leasing by phasing out the 100 per cent 'First Year 
Allowance'. Thus, the amount of deferred tax realised 
by the banks as lessors can be expected to fall 
noticeably. 
10. For more detailed analysis see:-
a) E.P.M. Gardener, Capital ~quac'y' .ruu1 Banking 
SY~~£xi~iQn, Bangor Occasional Papers No.18, 
University of Wales Press 19, pp.71-74. 
b) Professor J.R.S. Revell, Solvency .l'!.llil Regulation 
Q! Banks 1975, Chapter 7. 
c) H.D. Crosse and G.H. Hempel, Managem.e.n..l< Policies 
iQ£ ~mercial Banks, 1980, Chapter 4. 
d) Vernon Moore, 'The Control of Bank Exposure to 
Risk', Long Range Planning, October 1979, Vol.12, 
pp.35-38. 
e) W.E. Hoskowitz, 'Global Asset and Liability 
Management of Commercial Banks', Federal Reserve 
aank Q! ~H York Qyarterly ReyieH, Spring 1979, 
pp .112-48. 
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6.1. INTRODUCTION 
The approach to liquidity differs quite distinctly from 
capital adequacy and monetary control. The concepts of 
liquidity and liquidity management are central to balance 
sheet management. As in commercial business liquidity is the 
ability to meet obligations as and when they fall due. as 
opposed to solvency which is the ability to ultimately meet 
all your commitments. Liquidity is therefore concerned 
essentially with the day-to-day management of a bank. Thus. 
any attempt to apply direct control to a bank's liquidity 
will inevitably lead to conflict with bank management. 
The nature of bank liquidity means that banks have long 
maintained internal controls to ensure that it does not 
become illiquid on a given date. The regulators' problem is 
to assess these internal controls. The problem is compounded 
by three further factors: 
1. Liquidity or illiquidity can arise from several 
legitimate sources and so an accurate assessment must 
take account of ~ these factors. 
2. The arrangements for ensuring adequate liquidity are 
often closely linked to the monetary control regime 
imposed by the central bank. and particularly their 
intervention techniques (what instruments the 
authorities are prepared to exchange for cash). 
3. The objective of maintaining sufficient liquidity 
directly conflicts with the important objective of 
maximising bank profits. Brodt(159p.45) stated that in 
general the more profitable assets are also riskier and 
less liquid • 
The Bank of England have now issued four discussion papers 
since 1975 in an attempt to produce a workable assessment of 
liquidity adequacy. The proposals have changed considerably 
because of the above factors and because of the elusiveness 
of liquidity adequacy. In Section 6.2. the nature of the 
problem will be examined, which will be followed by a 
discussion of all the Bank of England papers in 6.3. It is 
proposed to discuss all the papers rather than just the most 
recent as it was noted that approaches to liquidity 
measurement elsewhere have been limited and because these 
papers illustrate the difficulties of defining adequate 
liquidity. Finally, the current position will be analysed 
from which we will conclude that the prudential supervision 
of bank liquidity in the U.K. is essentially a monitoring 
procedure and not a direct control system. 
6.2. BANK LIQUIDITY 
Richardson defines liquidi ty adequacy as a " ... particularly 
complex and elus ive concept"( 160p.22). Broadly speaking the 
need for liquidity arises from:(161p.242) 
1. the need to be able to meet overall increases in demand 
for advances and/or withdrawals of deposits from timing 
differences in the maturity of assets and liabilities; 
2. a shortfall in the anticipated inward cash flow usually 
as a resul t of the inabili ty of a borrower to repay on 
the due date; 
3. additional operating or capital expenditure; 
4. losses. 
Maintaining adequate liquidity is defined by Binder as 
requiring " ••• not just off-balance sheet efforts to gain 
funds during emergencies, but the organised and systematic 
implementation of strategies such as scheduling the 
investment portfolio so that a portion of it is always 
maturing".(162p.43) The crucial importance of liquidity 
management was noted by Einstein: "Banking is a risk business 
in most of its aspects; banks have traditionally lived or 
died by mismatching assets and liabilities in borrowing short 
and lending long."(163p.23) Thus liquidity will always be a 
banking problem because banks can only function as financial 
intermediaries by borrowing short and lending long. 
Nevertheless, past practice has shown that where public 
confidence and a prudent level of mismatching are maintained, 
then this is sound banking practice. Banking supervision is 
therefore directed to areas of a bank's balance sheet where 
it is considered imprudent mismatched positions are being 
maintained. The skill for bank management is trading off the 
required liquidity against the potential profitability of 
investments, which are generally less liquid assets. The 
conflict arises because ideally a bank will attract funds 
from deposit and other sources until the marginal cost of 
attracting those funds is equal to the marginal return on 
investments.(164p.19) This does not ensure short-term 
liquidity. 
The key factors to be considered in determining adequate 
liquidity are deposit volatility, turnover and maturity; 
potential credit demands; investors confidence; loan maturity 
structures and investment maturity structures. Liquidity is 
consequently determined by movements on both sides of the 
balance sheet. A problem peculiar to the clearing banks 
concerns current account balances, which al though in theory 
can be withdrawn overnight, clearly form one of their most 
stable sources of funds. By contrast Whi tmore( 165) argues 
the banks' lending on overdraft, though theoretically 
recallable, can rarely be instantaneously so in practice. A 
basic scenario is given by Brodt: 
'Uenerally, deposits provide a substantial portion 
of bank funds, many of which are withdrawals on 
demand. Banks must be liquid enough to be able to 
meet both expected and unexpected net withdrawals 
and run-offs. The other reason liquidity is 
important is that banks usually have a policy of 
granting any reasonable loan requests made by 
depositors or customers."(166p.44) 
Liquidity concerns liquid assets, liquid liabilities and 
operating flows. According to Revell(167p.86) the adequacy 
of a bank's liquidity is tested when the nature of these 
balance sheet structures forces a bank into action entailing 
losses, or which at best is sub-optimal, when an unexpected 
event occurs. The topic of adequate liquidity thereby 
entails more than liquidity risk, as it is also concerned 
with funding risk and interest rate mismatch. Thus the main 
concern is to have " ••• sufficient flexibility on the asset 
side of the balance sheet to keep pace with the rapid changes 
in the cost of funds".(168p.3 2 ) 
Commercial banks do attempt to maintain adequate liquidity 
positions. McCabe and Blackwell(169P.1 14) ascertained that 
at each maturity level a bank will try to match the volume of 
its liabilities. In the U.S. the growth of variable rate 
lending and financial futures contracts would also suggest a 
posi tive move to manage liquidity. "Futures and forward 
contracts may be used, among other purposes, as a general 
hedge against the interest rate exposure associated with 
undesired mismatches in interest-sensitive assets and 
liabilities".(169p.33) Binder(170p.56) however would argue 
that it is not possible to completely eliminate interest rate 
risk by hedging or balanced positions. 
Finally, however, it should be noted that " ••• liquidity, 
especially for larger banks, will increasingly be found off 
the balance sheet through purchasing funds".(172p.60) The 
growth of the wholesale markets and liability management have 
encouraged the use of 'purchased funds' to meet temporary 
liquidity shortages. Thus liquidity will also be determined 
by market status and the market's perception of bank 
management. Due weight must also be given to stand-by 
facilities and lines of credit. These views though were 
qualified by Jones and Pollack: "Whilst a case can be made 
that liquidity can always be purchased, a fundamental tenet 
of sound finances is being violated.,,(173p.1 3) 
The concept of liquidity is therefore central to the business 
of banking by virtue of the maturity transformation that 
financial intermediaries necessarily engage in. The 
implication of inadequate liquidity is that a bank will fail 
to meet its commitments on a given day, though solvency may 
ultimately be maintained. A shortfall of funds can arise 
from mismatching assets and liabilities. and from exposure to 
any banking risk. The concept of liquidity is therefore of 
crucial importance to bank management as it is central to 
banking, business. In this respect bank management will 
strive to maintain a profitable but adequa te liquidity 
profile - central bank intervention should only be required 
where the profile is imprudent or economic conditions 
threaten the liquidity of the banking system. 
The characteristics of central bank supervision of bank 
liquidity were defined by Blanden(174p.28):_ to maintain 
adequate liquidity in the system as a whole; to achieve a 
suitable approach for the assessment of individual banks; and 
to adopt an appropriate method by which the central bank can 
exercise its supervisory role. The importance of the first 
two was re-iterated by Richardson: "As a supervisory 
authority, we have to address ourselves not only to the 
adequacy of the individual institution, but also the 
liquidity available to the system."(175) The liquidity of 
the system as a whole is largely determined by the current 
monetary control techniques, so liquidity proposals generally 
concentrate on the liquidity of individual institutions. 
6.3. BANK LIQUIDITY - MEASUREMENT 
In the U.K. the Bank of England attempt to " ••• agree 
appropriate guidelines for the control and management of 
liquidi ty with each insti tution in much the same way as for 
capital."(17 6p.103). This broad brush approach however 
differs from previous assessments. Morison and 
Tillet(177p.88) stated that the general approach is to relate 
prudential holdings of liquid assets to the extent of a 
bank's maturity mismatching. Adequate supervision should 
however take account of operating flows, management and the 
potential to purchase funds under normal conditions. 
6.3.1. GENERAL CONCEPTS OF MEASUREMENT 
The most popular approach to assessing a bank's liquidity has 
been some form of liquid assets ratio. In Chapter 3 the 
transition of the liquid assets ratio since 1951 as a 
percentage of deposits to the reserve asset ratio was 
discussed. Thus until 1981, UK banks were generally required 
to hold some measure of prudential liquidity in the form of 
cash, money at call and short notice with the discount market 
and British government treasury bills for example. A similar 
approach was adopted in the US, in which four ratios were 
noticeably prominent and related to total deposits in the 
following categories 1:-
1. Cash assets - required reserves + total U.S. Government 
securities. 
2. Total loans 
3. Total cash assets and U.S. Govern~ent securities 
4. Cash due from banks + U.S. Government securities + 
Federal funds sold + securities purchased under 
agreement to resell - Federal funds purchased -
securities sold under agreement to repurchase. 
The liquid assets ratio iSJ however, too narrow a measure for 
the concept of bank liquidity. In particular Kaufman and 
Lee(178p.56) noted it fails to distinguish the composition 
and reliability of deposits, the maturity structure of 
Government securities, the extent of any loan commitments 
outstanding and the availability of cash assets. An attempt 
to overcome these limitations was the Bank Liquidity Analysis 
Form developed in 1973 by the Comptroller of Currency. The 
computation is given in Table 20 in which a measure of net 
liquid assets is compared with net liabilities and with total 
loans. This format gives a much more accurate assessment of 
liquid assets - a realistic view of cash assets is used, 
maturi ty and pledging requirements are considered when 
analysing Government securities. This aproach, however, 
remains a narrow assessment of a bank's liquidity position. 
The main problem identified by Crosse and Hempel(179p.182) 
concern the arbitrary nature of the calculations, lack of 
consideration of potential borrowing for liquidity, and the 
failure to consider the great variation in liquidity needs 
for loans and deposits among banks. 
It may therefore be concluded from the Table that regulator's 
assessment of bank liquidity have been largely inadequate 
because they failed to provide a comprehensive analysis of a 
bank's liquidity needs and a bank's potential to fill those 
needs. 
6.3.2. THE U.K. APPROACH 
The assessment of bank liquidity in the UK since 1975 has 
been characterised by the following Bank of England 
discussion papers:-
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1. The Capital and Liquidity Adequacy of Banks, September 
1975. 
2. The Measurement of Liquidity, March 1980. 
3. The Liquidity of Banks, March 1981. 
4: The Measurement of Liquidity, July 1982. 
The approach adopted bears close resemblance to the capital 
papers. The papers set out broad principles which can be 
applied generally to the assessment of bank balance sheets in 
the U.K. The Bank of England remain " ... firmly opposed to 
rigid formulae which take no account of the differing 
characteristics of supervised insti tutions."(180p.1 03) It is 
however, the intention to develop a single comprehensive 
measurement of a bank's overall liquidity.(181para.9) In 
this context the 1975 paper was really an introductory paper, 
simply establishing the general principles of bank liquidity. 
It is however the second paper which has aroused the main 
body of discussion. 
The 1980 paper established new principles for assessing bank 
liquidity. The need to ensure that adequate liquidity is 
held by the U.K. banking system as a whole was largely being 
ensured by the changing monetary controls, introduced a year 
later. The following were the main principles for ensuring 
adequate liquidity of a financial institution: 
1. A bank's liquidity in sterling and foreign currency 
should be evaluated together. 
2. Priority should be directed towards assessing the 
'funding risk' (the banks may not have available the 
cash resources needed to meet their obligations on a 
particular day) but one weight should now be given to 
the 'interest-rate mismatch risk' (by engaging in 
maturity transformation a bank may suffer losses as a 
result of movements in interest rates). 
3. Adequate liquidity can not be accurately assessed by 
liquid asset ratios. Such ratios also fail to 
distinguish between the two main classes of liquid 
asset:-
a) primary liquid assets - defined as cash or those 
assets in whichever currency are in all 
circumstances a ready source of cash, because the 
authorities stand ready either to purchase them or 
to accept them as collateral for last resort 
lending; and 
b) secondary liquid assets - other liquid assets 
which are near-cash or readily marketable. 
4. The traditional maturity transformation measures should 
be extended. The Bank of England had observed 
mismatched positions through two measurements:-
a) comparing the total liabilities with a remaining 
term of up to three months net of assets of a 
comparable maturity with holdings of negotiable 
instruments and firm standby facilities; and 
b) by comparing all foreign currency liabilities and 
assets according to their remaining term to 
maturity. 
5. Liquidi ty requirements for pruden ti al purpose s should 
be expressed as norms and not as minimum levels. 
/_...--. 
",-,? /-:< .. 10 6·5 Liquidity measures should take account not only of the A 7S.e5~ level of available liquid assets to total liabili ties 
~~~r\,(or certain categories of liabilities) but also the C, \~ I,~ ability of a bank to meet its commitments by examining ~// 
the known flows of funds both on a particular day and 
in the future. To do this a distinction between the 
following must be made:-
a) liabilities and assets which are maturity-certain; 
b) liabilities and assets which are maturity-
uncertain; 
c) assets which have a fixed maturity date, but which 
can be mobilised sooner because they are normally 
readily marketable (such as Treasury bills or 
CDs). 
Where this is done the need for liquid assets can be 
expressed in terms of a proportion of the gross maturity -
uncertain liabilities and a proportion of any net liability 
position ariSing from its maturity-certain liabilities and 
assets in a range of time bands, with the proportions in the 
nearer bonds being larger than those in the later bonds. 
Thus a primary liquidity and total liquidity requirement were 
constructed to measure the liquidity of a bank's balance 
sheet. Table 21 overleaf gives a hypothetical example of the 
proposed workings of this scheme. 
The integrated measure therefore involved two tests of a 
bank's liquidity. The primary liquidity requirement was 
designed to monitor the protection of the system as a whole, 
while the total liquidity requirement was to ensure a bank 
had sufficient liquid assets which can be encashed in all 
circumstances in suitable currencies to cover the needs of 
their business. The Bank of England concluded that all banks 
should hold some primary liquid assets, but that this 
requirement should be applied more stringently to recognised 
banks. Primary liquid assets were defined as cash, balances 
with the Bank of England (excluding SDs), call money with the 
LDMA, U.K. and Northern Ireland Treasury bills, Local 
Authority bills, bank bills eligible for re-discount at the 
Bank of England and British Government stocks with less than 
one year to maturity. (This was almost identical to the 
definition of reserve assets prior to 1981). In addition 
LDTs were allowed claims on recognised banks maturing within 
eight days. On this basis, the primary liquidity ratio was 
set at 40% of the total estimated needs of each bank. 
The scheme was not, however, well received: "It is hard to 
find a bank in the city which does not have 
reservations ... "( 182). This consultative document had 
necessarily to be limited in its application until the 
current monetary control framework had been implemented. The 
primary liquidity requirement for instance was based on the 
reserve asset ratio and did not represent a fresh approach to 
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the prudential supervision of banks' liquidity. The 
inclusion of cash in this definition would have given a 
competitive advantage to the retail banks who necessarily 
hold substantial sums of cash vis-a-vis the wholesale banks 
and LDTs. The distortion of the yield on primary liquid 
assets could also have been expected to continue under such a 
scheme. 
The more pertinent criticisms concerned the derivation of the 
liquidity coefficients. The coefficients were tentative 
propositions. The 25 percent coefficient on maturity 
uncertain liabilities was based on the traditional 1:3 quick 
assets ratio and the 28 percent liquid assets ratio observed 
by the London Clearing Banks. The 100 percent coefficient on 
gross liabilities in respect of market deposits from banks up 
to one month and irrevocable standbys given to banks was 
required because in the hands of the counter-party bank these 
were treated as liquid assets - this therefore prevented the 
creation of illusory liquidity through the inter-bank market. 
This would of course impose severe constraints on the 
wholesale banks which are primarily funded from the inter-
bank market. In fact the proposals as a whole did not give 
" ... sufficient weight to the role of liability management -
the ability of a bank to raise a new deposit rather than to 
realise an asset when it has to meet an unanticipated cash 
requirement.,,(1 83p.13) More generally the coefficients would 
tend to favour banks which raise deposits through current 
accounts and seven days notice to on-lend at fixed terms, at 
the expense of those banks who borrow at short fixed terms to 
lend at longer fixed terms.(184p.4) Thus the scheme had the 
potential to " ••• raise the cost of credit. distort 
competition and excessively penalise some forms of wholesale 
banking in London."UB5) 
The proposals covering foreign currency business were equally 
subjective. Their contents are outside the scope of this 
work, but these proposals have now been significantly 
influenced by a Bank of England paper on 'Foreign Currency 
Exposure'1.(186) and the Cooke Committee which studied a 
reporting model for a 'maturity schedule' of the external 
assets and liabilities of banks on a consolidated basis, 
" ••• enabling parent banks and parent authorities better to 
monitor the maturity transformation in the international 
operations".(187p.272 ) 
The approach to liquidity measurement was revised during the 
following year as a result of the changing monetary controls 
and extensive disagreements over the' integrated test'. In 
many ways the approach had represented a "radical 
change,,(188) but these stiff proposals have now been 
modified.(189) These modifications represented the Morison 
and Tillett view that " ••• liquidity requirements differ from 
bank to bank in ways that cannot easily be embraced by a 
simple formula".(190p.87) Particular attention has now been 
given to liability management (as a source of liquidity) and 
the liquidity adequacy of individual institutions. The Bank 
of England now recognise three vital sources of bank 
liquidity:(191para.2) 
1. Sufficient holdings of immediately available cash or 
liquifiable assets, subject to the qualification that 
marketable assets vary in quality in terms of the 
prices at which they are capable of being sold; 
2. An appropr ia tely ma tched future profil e of cash flow s 
from maturing assets, subject to the qualification that 
there may be shortfalls in practice if borrowers are 
unable to repay; 
3. By maintaining an adequately diversified deposit base 
in terms of both maturities and range of counterparties 
(bank and non-bank) which, depending on the individual 
bank's standing in the market and on the general 
liquidity situation in the system at the time, may 
provide the ability to raise fresh deposits without 
undue cost. 
The measurement system currently employed is based on a cash 
flow approach normally taking assets and liabilities in all 
currencies together, as shown by Table 22 
In this approach, liabilities and assets are inserted in a 
'maturity ladder', with the net positions in each time period 
being accumulated. The asset and liability categories are 
given in Appendix 9. The liquidity profile is only measured 
up to 12 months on the basis that the maximum excess of 
liabilities over assets normally occurs within the first six 
months, so this should allow a prudent margin. Thus the 
TABLE 22: THE BANK OF ENGLAND'S LIQUIDITY ASSESSHENT 1982 
Haturity 
I Sight-8days 8 days-1 month 1-3 months 3-6 months 6-12 months 
Liabilities: 
Deposits 
Commitments 
Less Assets 
Narketab1e 
Non-marketable 
Standby facilities available 
= NET POSITION 
+/- carried forward 
= NET CUHULATIVE POSITION 
SOURCE: Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, September 1982, p.6. 
measure provides a series of accumulating net mismatch 
positions in successive time bands, which will provide a 
framework for the discussion of individual bank's liquidity. 
6.4. APPRAISAL OF CURRENT ARRANGEMENTS 
In the U.K. the approach to prudential supervision of a 
bank's liquidity remains a monitoring procedure which is 
flexible in application. The present system effectively 
complements the capital paper iri outlining balance sheet 
supervision for prudential purposes. The primary liquidity 
requirements have now been removed; the liquidity of the 
banking system as a whole has been assured by the more 
relaxed monetary controls and the Bank of England's 
continuing role as a lender-of-last resort. The present 
system provides a basis for assessing the adequacy of 
liquidity of all deposit-taking companies for the purposes of 
the Bank of England's continuing supervision under the 
Banking Act. 
The approach is in many ways similar to that adopted for 
assessing the capital adequacy of banks. Across the board 
liquidity ratios will not be imposed, and full account will 
be taken of the particular characteristics and situation of 
each bank. In contrast the quantitative assessment is much 
simpler, though again relevant information will not always be 
publicly available. This might be important should the 
public require that " ... each bank is seen to have sufficient 
liquidity.n(192p.2) The formulas do however simply offer a 
framework from which an assessment of liquidity can be made. 
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The important facet of the new proposals is that the Bank of 
England have acknowledged the primary responsibility for 
ensuring the liquidity of a bank lies with its own 
management. The current procedure is thereby largely a 
moni toring procedure based on discussions wi th senior bank 
management. The analytical framework provided by the 
maturity ladder is a necessary but relatively unimportant 
guide in this respect. 
6.5. SUMMARY 
The assessment of bank liquidity remains a 'complex and 
elusive' concept. In the U.K. the Bank of England have 
chosen to monitor bank balance sheets rather than impose 
direct controls. Individual bank liquidity remains a 
management decision, though the Bank of England will require 
to be fully satisfied that banks have both adequate 
management systems and prudential policies. This qualitative 
assessment is flexible in approach and backed up by a basic 
quantitative measurement. It is unlikely that either feature 
will be imposed stringently. 
In the context of our assessment of current bank balance 
sheet supervision and control in the U.K., the liquidity 
proposals are not therefore a significant factor in their 
present form. This is because the inherent nature of bank 
liquidity makes an overall assessment which can be uniformly 
applied an unlikely choice. In practice bank management 
maintain a level of adequate liquidity which is commensurate 
with a profitable level of business or their business 
strategy. The 1980 proposals could have imposed severe 
constraints on profitability, both directly and indirectly 
through un fai r compe ti ti ve advantages. The present ap proach 
does not impose such stringent conditions, and is one in 
which particular attention is given to each institution's own 
system. This approach has provided a generally well accepted 
basis for the assessment of bank liquidity. In the final 
analysis the assessment of bank liquidity relies on 
discussions with senior management and confidential 
statistical returns. 
NOTES TO CHAPTER SIX 
1. For a more detailed discussion see Kaufman, D.J. and 
Lee, D.L., 'Planning Liquidity', Magazine QJ: .l31lllk 
Administration, February 1911, pp.55-13. 
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7.1. INTRODUCTION 
The control and supervision of bank balance sheets in the 
U.K. is a continuing and flexible process. In theory 
monetary control and prudential supervision should not 
interact. The design of the two in the U.K., however, may 
encourage some overlapping through their wider implications. 
This will be discussed in Section 7.2.3. An illustrative 
model of a London clearing bank will be given in Section 
7.3., showing balance sheet and trading profit account. This 
will provide a numerical illustration of the impact of 
monetary controls, the potential impact of prudential 
supervision and the interaction between the two. The results 
will be interpreted in Section 7.4. 
7.2. MONETARY CONTROL AUD PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION 
7.2.1. MONETARY CONTROL 
The new system of monetary contols has removed much of the 
regulation from bank balance sheets. Direct lending controls 
have not been reintroduced, but the SD scheme remains as 
before. Why this arrangement was left unmodified is not yet 
clear, though it should be noted that since August 1981 no 
calls for SDs have been made. 
The cash ratio and holding with the discount market are quite 
distinct controls. The cash ratio is a uniform 'tax' on all 
financial institutions in the newly defined monetary sector. 
The cash ratio is not important for monetary control. 
Instead it is the balances maintained by the clearing banks 
in excess of the mandatory requirement. These balances are 
important because the Bank of England have continued to 
refuse overdraft facilities on their accounts. Thus the 
clearing banks must maintain additional prudential balances 
in excess of the cash required for the daily settlement of 
clearing transactions. The cash ratio therefore provides a 
source of income to the Bank of England, whereas the excess 
balances held by the clearing banks continue to provide the 
fulcrum for the Bank of England's daily money market 
operations. 
The funds placed with the discount market appear, in 
retrospect, to serve two purposes.< 193) Clearly such funds 
have allowed bill markets of sufficient size for the Bank of 
England's supervision of the monetary system, but this also 
ensures that the traditional role of the discount houses is 
maintained. The emphasis in the bill markets has now 
switched to commercial bills, only a limited use being made 
of Treasury bills and Local Authority bills. However, after 
2.30p.m. the Bank of England will only deal in Treasury bills 
and Local Authority bills.(194) 
The minimum requirement has, however, ensured the continued 
existence of the discount market. In effect the Bank of 
England have continued to subsidise the operations of the 
discount houses vis-a-vis eligible banks by this requirement. 
This constraint imposed on eligible banks will be slightly 
offset by their ability to issue bills of finer maturities. 
Such funds placed by eligible banks do not represent sources 
of primary liquidity. The nature of the minimum requirement 
means that funds placed with the discount market can only be 
used as a prudential source to the extent that excess funds 
over this requirement are placed. Thus the minimum 
requirement on eligible banks is an implicit tax on their 
operations - a feature that is unlikely to change whilst the 
Bank of England continue to support the functions of the 
discount market. 
7.2.2. PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION 
The prudential supervision of banks in the U.K. is not as 
defined as the approach to monetary control. Instead it is 
more of a gradually evolving process which has developed 
considerably since the fringe banking crisis. The prudential 
supervision of banks in the U.K. is not a tight control 
system but rather a detailed checking procedure on the 
management systems in the banks.(195) Prudential supervisi6n 
may impact on bank behaviour, with due regard to the 
circumstances of that bank. This might be so for LDTs and 
smaller recognised banks. Barge,(196) however, argued that 
it was generally accepted that the Bank of England do not 
have the confidence to enforce prudential changes on banks 
nearer the centre. In other words the Bank of England are 
unlikely to challenge the commercial judgements and 
operational decisions of the senior banks. Professor 
Tew(197) suggested this was simply because of the importance 
of the maj or banks to the U.K. economy. If a clearing bank 
had to cut back on lending to maintain its capital ratio, 
this could have serious repurcussions for industry through 
the calling in of some overdraft facili ties. The prudential 
papers do not represent a control or regulation package, but 
rather indicate some of the ways by which the Bank of England 
will monitor and appraise bank capital adequacy and 
liquidity. However, where minimum ratios become established, 
then it is to be expected that the Bank of England will 
require a certain degree of undertaking from bankers not to 
breach these levels. The papers are not totally explicit on 
these issues as they were essentially measurement papers. 
Instead they provide a broader base on which to make 
decisions concerning capital and liquidity. The interpreta-
tion of these issues, particularly the comparability between 
banks, remains a matter of considerable judgement. 
Allen(198) suggested this is necessarily so because each bank 
works against the background of a unique combination of 
circumstances in terms of varying economic environments. at 
home and overseas, differing currency and interest rate 
exposures and, not least, each bank has a different customer 
base. None of these are satisfactorily incorporated in the 
Bank of England's measurements of capital and liquidity. The 
papers do, nevertheless, represent an important step by 
disclosing that the Bank of England is monitoring banks' 
pOSitions on a regular and systematic baSis. 
Therefore the supervision of the U.K. banking industry 
remains a highly confidential and subj ecti ve process, yet it 
is likely that banks' capital structures will be increasingly 
influenced under the current regime. The focal point is 
still the regular discussions with bank management and the 
quarterly statistical return forms. The Bank of England 
Banking Statistics return form BS is given in Appendix 10. 
This process has become more complex since 1975, but remains 
an individual approach. Cobbold(199) confirmed that attempts 
are being made to group banks, though suitable inter bank 
comparisons have not yet been established. Thus a flexible 
and personal approach remains. 
Finally it should be noted that unlike the monetary controls, 
the approach to prudential supervision is a dynamic one. The 
prudential supervision of banks in the U.K. is increasingly 
taking account of the international operations of banks and 
the gradual development of international banking supervision. 
The approach to assessing capital adequacy and liquidity is 
unlikely to change drama ti cally. but some modifica tions may 
be expected as a result of the Bank of England's current work 
on interest rate exposures and bank profitability.(200) The 
Bank of England may shortly publish a paper on interest rate 
exposure, though a discussion paper on bank profitabil i ty is 
not expected in the foreseeable future. The assessment of 
interest rate exposures will have important repurcussions for 
the appraisal of bank liquidity; the approach to capital 
adequacy may be influenced by an assessment of current 
earnings. This in turn would be a statement on bank 
liquidity as, in a crisis, the first and crucial difficulty 
would be liquidity; capital takes too long to realise for it 
to be of any practical benefit. 
In sum Yates(201) argues that prudential supervision does not 
affect bankers short-term operational decisions, but rather 
attempts to ensure a regular and progressive plan for 
adequate levels of adequate capital and liquidity for each 
bank. Banking supervision is particularly dependent on the 
standing and reputation of each bank and its management. 
Thus Bank of England supervision is largely directed towards 
LDTs and the smaller recognised banks. The clearing banks, 
merchant banks, discount ho~ses and foreign bank subsidiaries 
are subject more to a monitoring and checking procedure. 
7.2.3. INTERACTION OF MONETARY CONTROL AND PRUDENTIAL 
SUPERVISION 
The interaction between monetary control and prudential 
supervision occurs most frequently through bank liquidity. 
Liquid assets are those assets which the Bank of England are 
prepared to exchange for cash. This range of assets is 
directly determined by monetary controls, which define the 
pool of assets that the Bank of England are prepared to deal 
in return for cash. Thus bank liquidity will be directly 
influenced by the prevailing monetary control regime. The 
Bank of England have retained the discount window facility 
for monetary control purposes, but this also serves an 
important prudential function by ensuring that the banking 
system will always be supplied with cash.' 
Monetary control may also interact with capital supervision 
where monetary policy is defined in terms of bank deposits • 
. The U.K. currently emphasises three monetary targets which 
all contain eligible liabilities. The gearing ratio is 
expressed as a percentage of eligible liabilities. Thus 
where controls were imposed to influence bank capital 
adequacy, such controls could also have implications for 
monetary policy. Conversely Ta(202) argues that with the 
relaxation of monetary controls in the U.K., the Bank of 
England could be seeking to impose monetary supervision 
through capital controls. In the U.S., Golembe(203pp.21-22) 
185 
and Carey(204p.165) have both suggested that capital adequacy 
requirements are becoming an instrument of monetary policy. 
Whether or not capital requirements have actually been used" 
for monetary policy purposes in the U.S., Leavitt(205) has 
considered capital adequacy requirements as a monetary policy 
instrument. Conceptually this was queried by Yates(206) as 
there was no evidence to support this hypothesis in the U.K. 
It would be a crude form of monetary control of limited 
accuracy as banks can always improve their capital base in 
response to changing gearing ratios. 2 In practice, it is 
unlikely the Bank of England will impose direct controls. 
The current monetary control arrangements have widened the 
market for eligible bank bills. This may have an effect on 
banks' acceptance business which in turn would directly 
affect the risk asset ratio because of the risk weighting of 
0.5 given to acceptances. 
More specifically, the interaction between monetary control 
and prudential supervision will occur through the medium of a 
balance sheet. This link does not affect the preceeding 
analysis in Part 1, but it is important to realise the 
possibility. A basic scenario is provided where an advance 
is made which results in a further bank deposit. This 
immediately has implications for bank liquidity where the 
maturities of the advance and deposit differ. Increased 
advances will require increased capital cover as the risk 
asset ratio will rise. The increase in bank deposits will 
require a corresponding increment in funds with the LDMA and 
cash balances at the Bank of England. The change in bank 
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deposits will also affect the gearing ratio and again new 
capital may have to be raised. Clearly some increase of the 
capital base will occur through the profit retained from the 
turn on lending and deposit rates, though a constraint is 
imposed where this increase in retained profits is not 
sufficient to meet the new and higher capital ratios. This 
illustration is basic but serves to show the interaction of 
bank liquidity, capital adequacy and monetary controls. 
7.3. ILLUSTRATIVE MODELS 
7.3.1. BANK MODELLING 
The illustrative model developed below is that of a 
hypothetical London Clearing .Bank. It represents a basic 
numerical analysis of the combined activities of the four 
main clearing banks. Thus real figures have been used to 
construct a simplified balance sheet and trading profit 
account. These figures are then used to investigate changes 
in particular parameters whilst holding all other items 
steady. 
The approach adopted is a limited example of bank modelling. 
This is chiefly because of the lack of publicly available 
information which more complex models require. A bank 
planning model was developed by the Inter Bank Research 
Organisation (IBRO) which, for instance, required a growth 
rate to be set for each of its 46 deposit based 
liabilities(207p.2). A more advanced, general purpose 
deterministic simulation model was developed at Bangor 
University, known as SOFI - Simulation of Financial 
Institutions.(208) This would require information which 
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will not be made publicly available, for instance, the 
breakdown of fixed and variable rate lending to companies 
and individuals. 
Such models require decisions about future interest rates, 
inflation levels, deposit growth, payment volumes and 
miscellaneous growth rates. With SOFI these decisions can 
be made using sensitivity analysis and testing for critical 
variables. The IBRO model (209p.2) establishes a base year 
from which the position in the following year is calculated 
by applying to the base year figures growth rates and 
parameters which define key relationships between variables, 
such as interest rates and inflation. Thus the user can 
project forward year by year alternative assumptions about 
how banking business and its environment might develop, and 
calculate the impact on banks. On the other hand a notable 
function of the SOFI model is to implement contingency 
testing. This is concerned wi th " ... the thorny problem of 
uncertainty and a bank's corresponding ability to respond 
effectively to severe financial pressures that may occur 
during the time spanned by the financial plan".(210p.60 
Again a detailed knowledge of the future environment is 
required. This is true for all descriptive models, where 
the user tests the behaviour of the system under different 
sets of environmentalconditions'<211p.1.3) 
Therefore because such detailed information is not generally 
disclosed in the U.K. and economic forecasting can be 
uncertain, it was decided not to follow the approaches of 
these bank models. Park(212p.13) also argued that a 
deterministic prediction tool of the future is quite 
obviously over-precise, could suffer from data hunger and, 
where the detailed model becomes too complex, the 
significance of important variables could be lost. These are 
the main reasons why a basic numerical illustration is given 
below and not a computer based simulation model. 
7.3.2. HYPOTHETICAL BALANCE SHEET AND TRADING PROFIT ACCOUNTS 
The figures were extrapolated from the 1981 Reports and 
Annual Accounts of the big four London Clearing Banks. The 
limitations of this 'stock-orientated' approach are realised 
but this does not invalidate this hypothetical model which 
seeks only to illustrate the likely outcome. These 
illustrations were performed on the 'Supercalc' financial 
package(213) using a Superbrain micro computer. 
1. Hypothetical Clearing Bank Balance Sheet as at 31.12.81. 
ASSETS (£m) 
Liquid Assets - cOin,gold,Bank of England balances 
- money at call and short notice 
- Treasury bills 
- Other bills 
- British Government stocks 
Other quoted investments 
Unquoted investments 
Certificates of Deposit and other 
Items in suspense and collection 
Market loans to other UK residents 
Leased assets 
Trade investments 
Investments in associated companies 
Fixed Assets 
Total Assets 
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874.25 
4866.50 
186.25 
528.75 
675.75 
404.25 
314.00 
1962.50 
838.00 
27083.25 
1332.75 
64.25 
146.25 
906.00 
40182.75 
LIABILITIES 
Deposits 
Other non-capital liabiljtjes 
Total Liabilities 
CAPITAL 
Share Capital and Reserves - issued share capital 
- share premium 
Shareholders Funds 
Minority Interests 
Loan C.ap.it.ll.l 
.I9..t..tl .c a pit a.l 
- preference share capital 
- reserve revaluations 
- retained profits 
- other reserves 
N.B. Contingent Liabilities £4308m. 
2. Hypothetical trading profit account 
36400.00 
.11ll.15 
37579J5. 
216.00 
49.50 
3.50 
146.50 
198.25 
1298.25 
1912.00 
143.00 
548.00 
2603.00 
A full trading profit account could have been constructed but 
for the purposes of illustration we need only consider 
interest receivable and payable. Thus other operating income 
and operating expenses are ignored. The illustration is 
effected by considering an initial deposit of £100 and how 
this is used. There are four simulations as the deposit can 
be raised through customers or the money markets, and a 
sterling advance can be made either to a customer or the 
money market. The basic scenario is as follows:-
Amount Interest Interest 
(£) Ra te (%) 1 (£ ) 
Interest Payable 
Customer deposit 100 11.0 11 .00 
Money market deposit 100 11.5 11 .50 
Interest Receivable 
Customer advance 80 14.0 11.20 
Money market advance 80 12.0 .9.6.0. 
Other assets - LDMA holding2 7.00 11 .6 0.81 
- Bank of England 
balance 0.50 
- Treasury bills 1. 50 11.8 0.18 
- Other bills 6.00 12.5 0.75 
- HMG stock 4.50 13.0 (1...5.9. 
Total other assets 2.33 
Notes: 
1. Interest rates are estimated from 1981 figures. 
2. Funds placed with the LDMA comprise 7% of ELs. This 
assumes the 6% average is effectively a minimum 
requirement and that excess balances amounting to 1% 
over this requirement.~ill be held foroperational 
cl 
purpo ses. 
7.4. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS 
7.4.1. BALANCE SHEET 
The basic model was taken as a foundation on which certain 
key inputs were changed. This was done by changing the 
monetary and capital ratios - and secondly by altering 
certain balance sheet components. The necessary information 
and adequate measurement system to test bank liquidity was 
not available. 
1. Gearing Ratio 
This hypothetical bank has a gearing ratio of 3.96%. Where a 
minimum ratio of 5% was given, this would require a 20.9% 
decrease in liabilities if capital remained constant, or a 
26.4% increase in capital if liabilities were unchanged. The 
corresponding figures for a 10% gearing ratio would be a 
60.4% decrease in liabilities or a 152.8% increase in 
capital. Clearly a bank could make a change to both 
liabilities and capital to satisfy a gearing ratio, but these 
figures demonstrate the very significant impact a gearing 
ratio could have on bank capital structure. 
As might be expected, the gearing ratio is very sensitive to 
liabilities. A 5% increase in liabilities will lower the 
ratio to 3.76%. a 5.1% decrease. Similarly a 10% increase in 
liabilities will lower the ratio by 9.3% 
2. Risk Asset Ratio 
The model bank has a risk asset ratio of 6.3%. If a minimum 
cover of 8% was required, the bank would have to decrease 
risk assets by 21.2% where capital was unchanged, or increase 
capi tal by 26.9% where risk assets were constant. A 10% risk 
asset ratio would require a 58.7% increase on the existing 
capi tal base where no decrease in assets could be made. The 
figures are" not as drastic as the percentage changes 
involved with the gearing ratios, but again highlight the 
problems where minimum ratios are imposed. 
The change in balance sheet structure required to meet 
certain risk asset ratios is, however. a critical feature 
because of the risk weightings invol ved. For instance if a 
10% ratio was imposed and capital could not be increased. 
then the bank will have to decrease its risk assets by 37% or 
£13,038.40. The problem is that the risk adjusted total of 
all balance sheet assets apart from advances is only 
£6,028.65. Contingencies are here valued at £2,154.00. Thus 
to meet a 10% ratio on these figures, this bank would still 
be £~855.75 short even after writing off all contingencies 
and balance sheet assets apart from advances. 
This arises because of the differing risk weights applied, 
which make advances and contingencies the crucial influences 
on the risk asset ratio. On the model a 10% change in market 
loans changed the ratio by 7.13%. Table 23 overleaf shows 
the effect of changing certain assets by 10% and the 
resulting change in the risk asset ratio. 
The table demonstrates that the value of the risk asset ratio 
is heavily dependent on the value of market loans to other UK 
residents. Substantial changes in other important assets 
such as bills and CDs produce only very insignificant changes 
in the risk ratio. This suggests that the risk asset ratio 
is more a statement of the risk in bank advances than of all 
the risks associated with a bank's balance sheet. 
Furthermore, the risk weighting mean the ratio is more 
sensi tive to bank assets ra ther than capital. This is shown 
by considering an addition of £50m to the capital base by a 
rights issue. It is assumed investment in fixed assets and 
Table 23 Effects Qf Changing selected assets Qll ~ risk 
asset ratio 
Item Base 10% Risk Asset Ratio 
figure increase New 
(£m) (£m) figure decrease 
1.Money at call and 
short notice 4866.50 5353.15 6.29 0.27 
2. Treasury bills 186.25 204.88 6.30 0.01 
3.0ther bills 528.75 581.63 6.30 0.03 
4.CD's and other 1962.50 2158.75 6.30 0.11 
5.Market loans to 
other UK residents 27083.25 29791.58 5.85 7.13 
6.Leased assets 1332.75 1446.03 6.28 0.38 
7.Fixed assets 906.00 996.60 6.27 0.51 
8. Con tingencies 4308.00 4738.80 6.26 0.61 
associated companies will increase by £20m each. This leaves 
£10m for trade investments. Thus the capital base will 
increase by £50m but the total of risk adj usted assets 
increases by £85m because of the risk weightings. Therefore 
the effect of such a rights issue on these figures will only 
be to increase the risk asset ratio to 6.43%, a 2% change. 
Thus because of the risk weights, the risk asset ratio is 
more determined by asset structure rather than capital 
structure, and within asset structure advances are the 
crucial category. 
3. Eligible Bank Ratio 
The hypothetical bank maintains an average of 6% of 
liabilities or £2,254.19m with the LDMA. This ratio can be 
varied, and the resulting funds released will be reinvested 
in the money markets because they attract the same risk 
weight. A basic simulation would be as follows: 
fillil.2..!l. Eil.§CH Q.f Q.t@nges Qf e~igj.bil p.ank .rliiQ Q.ll 
~t.a.l ratios 
Workings (£m) Eligible Bank Ratio 
4% 2% 0% 
1.Funds released and reinvested 
in money markets 151.60 1503.19 2254.19 
2.Increase in trading profit1 9.62 19.24 28.86 
3.Taxation @ 16% 1.54 3.08 4.62 
4.Increase in retained profits2 8.08 16.16 24.24 
5. New gearing ratio 3.98 4.00 4.02 
6.New risk asset ratio 6.33 6.35 6.31 
Notes: 
1. Assumed differential between interest received on money 
market deposits and funds with the LDMA is 1.28%. 
2. Assume no dividend. 
The changing capital ratios show that where capital ratios 
come under pressure, the non-eligible bank could be in a more 
favourable position to contribute to its capital base, as 
opposed to the eligible bank who will be forced to continue 
wi th lower capital ratios directly as a result of the 
eligible bank requirement. 
7.4.2. TRADING PROFIT 
The four simulations given overleaf are based on a 
hypothetical trading profit account and illustrate the effect 
on retained profits of alternative funding and borrowing 
sources. 
Given these conditions the most profitable simulation is by 
raising £100 from customers and making an advance to 
customers. The least profitable is where the market advance 
is funded by money raised in the money markets. 
What all the simulations show however is the danger of 
imposing capital controls where certain balance sheet 
controls already exist. In the simulation it was assumed the 
bank had to hold a minimum of 6% of ELs with the LDMA. If 
the bank was also required to observe a minimum gearing of 
4%, then the increase in deposits of £100 would have to be 
accompanied by a rise of £4 in the capital base. All four 
simulations reveal that profits retained from this new 
business are unlikely to generate sufficient funds to 
maintain this gearing ratio. In this case a non-eligible 
bank may be able to increase its capital base through more 
attractive investment opportunities as it is not required to 
observe a minimum holding in the LDMA. The simulation 
TABLE 25 SIMULATIONS OF HYPOTHETICAL TRADING PROFIT ACCOUNT 
! Income Statement SIMULATIONS 
A.CustOmer adv:ance, B.Harket advance, C.Customer advance, 
eus tamer deposit Customer deposit Harket deposit 
1. Interest Receivable £80 Advance 11.20 9.60 11.20 
£20 Other assets 2.33 2.33 2.33 
Total 13 .53 11.93 13.53 
2. Interest Payable £100 Deposi t 11.00 11.00 11.50 
3. Gross Profi t 2.53 0.93 2.03 
4. Taxation @ 16% 0.40 0.15 0.32 
5. Net Profit1 Retained 2.13 0.78 1.71 
-- -- --
~~ote: 
1. Dividend payments are ignored. 
D.Harket advance 
Harket deposit 
9.60 
2.33 
11.93 
11.50 
0.43 
0.07 
0.36 
--
• c 
" 
highlights the difficulties a growing bank experiences in 
maintaining its capital ratios, particularly when it is 
subject to external controls. 
7.5. SUMMARY 
The state of Bank of England control and supervision is that 
monetary controls directly impact on bank balance sheets 
whereas prudential supervision serves as an important 
monitoring procedure. Section 7.2. discussed the logical 
reasons why prudential supervision remains, in the U.K., a 
monitoring rather than control system. The numerical 
illustrations in Section 7.4. demonstrated the dramatic 
balance sheet changes that would be required should specific 
capi tal ratios be implemented, particularly if these ratios 
were higher than those currently maintained by the banks. 
NOTES TO CHAPTER SEVER 
1. The arguments may be extended. Many US academics, for 
example, believe that the lender of last resort 
function and the risk related deposit insurance may 
obviate much of the contemporary prudential supervisory 
apparatus. 
2. Banks can always, in theory, improve their capital base 
to a limited extent by, for instance, a rights issue or 
raising subordinated loan capital. As discussed in 
Chapter 5 these methods are limited and may not be 
desirable. 
maintained 
liabilities. 
Nevertheless, 
without the 
198 
a gearing ratio could be 
necessity of reducing 
CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSION 
8.1. REVIEW 
8.2. CONCLUSIONS 
8.3. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
8.1. REVIEW 
The current position of U.K. bank balance sheet control and 
supervi sion has been di scus sed. The development of banking 
supervision in the U.K. was analysed, the importance of the 
1971 reforms and the subsequent changes were discussed. 
During the 1970's, U.K. banks were subject to a variety of 
controls, principally for monetary reasons. Prudential 
supervision received considerable impetus after the fringe 
banking crisis. A Working Party was set up to review the 
capital and liquid adequacy of financial institutions; the 
Bank of England developed a supervisory department 
specifically for this purpose. The Banking Act increased the 
number of institutions who were to be supervised by the Bank 
of England. As Morison suggests(214p.45): "It is almost 
universally accepted that the public interest requires an 
important measure of control over banking activities in the 
interests of the economy in general and the depositing public 
in particular." 
Prior to 1980, monetary controls and prudential supervision 
both existed but their form was not clearlY defined. The 
recent Bank of England papers indicate these issues are being 
assessed in a more formal and comprehensive manner. More 
emphasis has been placed on prudential supervision~ whilst 
the control of banks' assets and liabilities for monetary 
policy purposes has been tidied up. ~istl~UP~L\liSi~.n __ 
is largely concerned with an individual bank whereas mon~~ary 
-------------------------------_ ....• __ ._---_ .. __ .. _-
control continues to be directed towards the banking system 
---_ ... 
as a whole. 
" '''' 
In Chapter 4 the present stance of the monetary authori ties 
was discussed. We provided the rationale for reform, whilst 
noting that the overriding influence in determining a 
replacement system concerned whichever monetary target or 
aggregate the authorities would now consider as a prime 
indicator of monetary policy. It was stated that the 
government have been reluctant to move away from sterling M31 
the traditional prime indicator. This has several important 
implications:-
1. The exclusion of wider measures of money means that 
monetary controls will continue to be directed towards 
the banking system as the prime control mechanism. 
2. This factor more than any other will prevent the 
introduction of a monetary base control system -
because such a system would be meaningless where the 
key target remained sterling M3. 
3. Monetary control will need to be unambiguously related 
to a bank's eligible liabilities - as these represent 
the main constituent of sterling M3' . Hence, balance 
sheet size, asset growth and credit creation will be of 
secondary importance to monetary policy. 
In terms of this work, the key feature of the new system is 
that monetary controls have continued to be directed (in the 
first instance) to bank balance sheets. Definite ratios have 
again been prescribed. A degree of uncertainty remains, as 
the Bank of England can dictate the terms of liquidity to the 
system as a whole. These issues were discussed in Chapter 
4.4. The impact of monetary controls will continue to be 
influenced by how rigidly - and at what price - the 
authorities maintain the day-to-day liquidity of the banking 
system. 
An assessment of the impact of monetary control is a function 
of two factors:- firstly, the balance sheet ratios and 
secondly, the terms (price, frequency) at which the Bank of 
England will supply the banking system, or even one bank, 
with the necessary liquidity. The ratios are defined but the 
terms of intervention remain unclear. Thus in many respects 
the monetary authorities have maintained their control over 
the banking system. This also means that the impact of the 
new monetary controls on bank balance sheets cannot be 
clearly defined because of this uncertainty in the system. 
The same can be said to be true for prudential supervision. 
though for different reasons. This is largely because 
prudential supervision has now been defined in terms of an 
individual bank and not the system as a whole. The latter 
should (in theory) be protected because the LOLR facility has 
been maintained. As with the 'lifeboat', this should ensure 
the survival of the system where several banks suffer a 
liquidity crisis. 
In Chapter 5 we questioned the rationale behind prudential 
supervision on the basis that commercial bankers will run a 
sound business, operating a risk/return profile commensurate 
wi th their posi tion. In other words, bankers are likely to 
maintain their own prudential policies. Therefore it could 
be argued that prudential supervision should be concerned 
with the monitoring of a bank's existing prudential policies. 
However it was revealed that bankers' own prudential policies 
did not always provide the kind of buffer against disaster 
that the Bank of England now hope is embodied in their 
proposals. 
In the U.K., the Bank of England have (in common with other 
countries) concentrated on the topics of capital adequacy and 
liquidity. Chapters 5 and 6 discussed the often complex 
nature of these topics. It was noted that the al:>ll.I:-0_aches __ to 
the measurement of capital have been far more detailed than 
---------- - --- - - - -------------- --- -
the assessment ___ of1iquidity - yet, ironically} a bank without 
- ----~-"-.. --.-----------.. " .. -"- - ----,.-.,-_.-.. - ----~ •.. --'"-" .. 
capi tal _can-survive-wher_eas a bank without liquidity cannot. ~-- - -- - -- --- -------------------.-- ---- ---_._-----------
The capital chapter illustrated the particularly contentious 
nature of this subject. CrJC> ? It proved necessary to establish the 
profitabilit}l: and current earnings are more important. This 
contrasted with the views of Apilado and Gies, that capital 
is the most important indicator of a bank's financial 
strength. These arguments depended, of course, on the 
perceived functions of bank capital. The 'functions' are 
also open to deba te. It was noted that since 1975 the Bank 
of England have changed their interpretation of the functions 
of bank capital. As a result of these different 
interpretations, many contrasting assessments have been made 
of the adequacy of a bank's capital base. 
Extensive coverage has been given in the U.S. to capital 
assessment. Originally these approaches concentrated on a 
measure related to liabilities on the basis that a prime 
function of bank capital should be to protect depositors. 
However as the need for capital to absorb losses became 
apparent, the emphasis switched to the asset side of the 
balance sheet - or rather the risk inherent in those assets. 
In contrast, the 1962 oee approach highlighted the importance 
of other factors such as the quality of management. Finally 
the Vojta method re-iterated the importance of liquidity and 
current earnings. 
In the U.K. the importance of profitability is more of an 
implicit factor, whilst due account is also taken of certain 
qualitative factors. Although no ratios, or guidelines, have 
been published, it is the intention of the Bank of England to 
agree ratios with individual institutions. Furthermore, it 
is now a real possibility that a bank will be requested to 
bolster its capital base where it falls below an agreed 
level. 
The approach to liquidity is not, however, as clearly 
---defi ned. 
.., ........ ~.-. ....,.~"'.-.. ,-
w i t h i n ~,~a~!lk ISm ... b a I a n c e she e t j" the . I i qui d i t Y 0 f" t h'e 
--relationship between,that. bank and .other banks,.and .. th!! 
liquidity of the banking. system as a whole. Given_these 
---fac'tors, ba..!l.K_IJqui.dit.y can be influenced further by the 
-
monetary authorities. Monetary controls have affected the 
...--
liquidity of banks in the past - for instance the corset -
and under the new system the need to maintain funds with the 
?n lJ 
LDMA is also a constraint on banks' liquidity. Bankers also 
face a dilemma - they have traditionally mismatched assets 
and liabilities to gain profit. 
These issues were identified in Chapter 6, The area was 
complicated by the need to assess the impact of monetary 
controls and the policies of a bank's management. Most bank 
analysts agree that adequate liquidity is the ability to meet 
obligations as and when they fall due - but are unable to 
solve the practical problem of maintaining sufficient 
liquidity yet maximising profits by running a mismatched 
book. Brodt and others have argued that the more profitable 
business is usually riskier and therefore does not provide 
good liquidity. 
Many authors argued the case for liability management and the 
ability (or possibility) to purchase liquidity from the 
market. However, recent events show that whilst this is a 
viable day-to-day policy, it should not be relied upon or 
included in a credible assessment of a bank's liquidity. 
Since the 1970's, standby facilities or credit lines between 
banks have been constantly under review. Indeed, the hint of 
trouble at a bank can have very serious repurcussions on that 
bank's ability to buy funds in the market. 
In the U.K. the approach to liquidity measurement bears some 
common characteristics to that adopted for capital 
assessment. Both measures are concerned with individual 
institutions and not the need to apply a single measure to 
the system as a whole. Both approaches have a key input 
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provided by a numerical assessment. For liquidity 
measurement, the Bank of England have constructed a maturity 
ladder. The ladder is not designed to be all-embracing, but 
offers a framework from which an assessment may be made. The 
ladder is not a sophisticated measure and is concerned only 
with the maturity mismatch positions over the next twelve 
months. We noted this approach has been accepted far more 
favourably than the 1980 proposals, but that further changes 
are to be expected. 
The topic of liquidity adequacy remains a highly complex 
subject. The impact of the current proposals on bank balance 
sheets is open to debate:- in their current form, the 
assessment of bank liquidity would tend to be more of a 
monitoring procedure. Yet banks' balance sheets are being 
affected by the new monetary controls and capital guidelines 
- both of which have implications for a bank's liquidity. 
To summarise, the review of banking supervision in the U.K. 
-- -_ .. - ------, -- - ----------- .. ~ .. ,-----.-~ ....•. -,--_.--,. 
identified the widening role of the Bank of England - and how 
---._---_ .•.. '-'--_. __ ._---' - .. ,--.-~-'--- . - .","--,~,-, -~'------"-----
in many areas it now directly impacts on bank balance sheets. 
", -_ ••• _ •• _-_.-•• - >,.'" ._- ",~'---"- •• ----.~ ••• ---'.' .-- ... 
Monetary controls, almost by definition tend to be a more 
precise area of impact and assessment. Prudential 
----_. -----------~.-- ------ - - . 
supervision is less so:-
1. No precise ratios are prescribed, or can be prescribed 
where assessment is made of one bank and not the system 
as a whole. 
2. The approach adopted with each bank will be in 
confidence because of the need to maintain confidence 
in the banking system. 
3. Each assessment will attempt to take into account the 
individual circumstances of that institution. The Bank 
of England remain firmly opposed to rigid formulae 
which take no account of the differing characteristics 
of supervised institutions. 
8.2. CONCLUSIONS 
The Introduction gave the aims of this thesis as exam ining 
~ ._,_"_,~ __ ,, ... ------.-.. -~-~ .. --"-. -~·--~·--.-M~._-___ ..J 
th~g.r-Ow .. th.-of-banking supervision in the U.K .. defining the 
..------ . .._--. '-"'-'-'---'~--------'-" ....... -.. _-.-,"-'-"'-
rationaleforbank.supervision, assessing the need for change 
.----. . . - .... . 
and finally modelling the impact of supervision on a bank's 
, 
balance sheet. In achieving these objectives this thesis 
.. -.---"---~-- . - ~------.--.-~-.- .. , ,-.- -
remains one of the few works that has considered monetary 
.- - •• --.--- -- --. ----________________ - -, . ---.----- .---- -.--~."------•. ---.~ ---'-'--'- •. _-" ---'.1 
control and prudential supervision together - as part of an ------- .. _--_ .... --'_ •.. _---_. __ ._---. __ ._ .... -... . .. --"-"-"'"'' . 
overall package of. bank intervention by the Bank of England. 
This intervention may be in the_f.oxm __ of_spe.ciftc,_d.1..rect 
.. ~-.--- - ---.-~----~ 
~.~1 ance she.e.t_con.tr_QJ._s_o.r......more_fle x i blL.gui deIJ.n~s.Jor_ 
discussion. The thesis demonstrated the need to study these 
subjects collectively, as part of an overall assessment of 
banking supervision in the U.K. 
Lomax(215p.2): 
This view is shared by 
"Monetary Control indicates the way the 
authori ties intend to operate the monetary 
system, and the guidelines which will determine 
their o~n action: the prudential control papers 
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indicate correspondingly how the banking system 
will be forced to react to various stimuli from 
the authorities, and correspondingly how 
interest rates and balance sheet totals (which 
include the money supply) will move in response 
to official policy ... a new system to which all 
four papers make a contribution." 
The new monetary controls continue to impose direct controls 
on banks' balance sheets. The prudential reforms have 
concentrated on outlining the Bank of England's approach to 
the measurement of certain aspects of a bank's business. 
They do not specify the absolute levels to be maintained in 
applying that system of measurement(216p.548), but rather 
indicate the ways in which the Bank of England now assess and 
monitor a bank's capital and liquidity. These subjects are 
'complex and elusive'. The approach to their assessment in 
the U.K. is characterised by Cooke(217p.55): 
"At the end of the day in that slightly quaint, 
rather demure and faintly Victorian sounding system 
that we call prudential supervision, it is 
judgement not arithmetic that counts." 
The other important conclusions from this work are as 
follows: 
1. The need for a change and re-assessment of the Bank of 
England's supervisory role was justified. The 1979 
Banking Act confirmed and strengthened the role of the 
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Bank of England. Thei r approach is cautioned and 
gradually determined. However significant changes have 
now been introduced to reflect the dramatic changes of 
the U.K. banking system and economy during the 1970's. 
The previous systems of supervision had broken down 
under the spectacular growth of the secondary banks 
against a background of massive oil price rises, 
persistantly rising inflation, volatile money and 
foreign exchange markets, and a rapidly increasing 
money supply. 
2. The monetary control reforms represented" in many 
respects, a tidying-up of the previous system. The 
Bank of England now has greater flexibility in this 
area, wi th an increased emphasis on money market 
operations. However, the funds now placed with the 
LDMA have also ensured the con tinued existance of the 
Discount Houses at a time when many were questioning 
their validity. 
3. The monetary authorities have rejected a move to 
monetary base control. The new controls allow the Bank 
of England to monitor the behaviour of the voluntary 
cash balances of the London Clearing Banks. However, 
Sterling M3 remains a key indicator of U.K. Monetary 
Policy, whilst the Bank of England have also maintained 
control over short-term interest rates - neither of 
these features would be compatible with a system of 
monetary base control. Indeed the LOLR facility has 
been maintained; not only to ensure the liquidity of 
the system as a whole but also to dictate the terms at 
which liquidity would be supplied. 
4. The subject of prudential supervision has now been 
given comprehensive treatment in the U.K. This area 
will be subject to further change, but the Bank of 
England have now established a useful framework for the 
assessment of capital and liquidity. The framework has 
been subject to criticism but is generally accepted by 
the U.K. banking industry. The new systems are applied 
to the system as a whole, but exact requirements and 
measures are agreed with individual institutions. 
5. Banks' capital ratios (however measured) have fallen 
during the last decade. Capital bases have been 
adversely affected by inflation, asset growth, problems 
of external funding and the squeeze on overall 
profitability. The Bank of England do, however, 
recognise varying qualities of management in allowng 
for higher gearing. 
6. The achievement of the Bank of England's stated 
objectives in the assessment of capital adequacy is 
questionable:-
(a) To ensure the capital position is regarded as 
acceptable by depositors and other creditors - yet 
much of the information used by the Bank of 
England in their assessment is not publicly 
available. 
(b) To test the adequacy of capital in relation to the 
risk of losses inherent in a bank's assets - yet 
the asessment of risk by the risk asset ratio 
cannot be accepted as a surrogate for the 
assessment of risk in a bank's portfolio. 
7. The capital ratios represent potentially serious 
threats if the downward trend of capital positions 
continues. The Supercalc models demonstrated the very 
severe impacts the gearing and risk asset ratios could 
have if minimum levels were imposed above the levels 
currently held by the banks. In practice it is logical 
to expect the Bank of England to agree guidelines with 
individual banks. Thus given the low capital ratios 
currently maintained, there is now a real possibility 
that commercial banks will be urged to change their 
capital structures in order to meet the Bank of 
England's recommendations. 
8. The liquidity proposals represent a milder form of the 
original 1980 harsh guidelines. Today, the qualitative 
assessment to liquidity adequacy is flexible in 
approach and backed up by a basic quantitative 
measurement. It is unlikely that either feature will 
be imposed stringently. 
In sum the supervision of the U.K. banking system has 
developed rapidly since 1970. The style and approach adopted 
by the Bank of England has often been unique and offers a 
blend of numerical analysis and in-depth discussion. The 
.., 1 1 
system of monetary control is now more precise whilst the 
system of prudential supervision has been greatly enhanced. 
-~C~I\· 
8.3. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH ~~~ -
This work has reve,aled_many __ areas of uncer£ainty and possible 
~, . -- --- - - - . - ~ --
- ---------------------
areas for further research. Attention would focus on the -=--:...:~~..:;..::,-,~--, -----,- ---
issues of pr~~_~~~ia~ ___ ~uper.vision, though it is_possible a 
change in monetary policy or direction would necessitate a 
further change in _the monetary supervision of the banking 
---_."_ .. , ."," -"-''- . 
system. More specifically further work could be done in the 
__ -- 0 
following areas: 
1. Daily Settlements in the Honey Markets 
The Bank of England have refused to deal directly in the 
inter-bank market. preferring to settle the daily cash flows 
through the discount houses. Further work could be usefully 
carried out into the intervention techniques that are open to 
the Bank of England; why the role of the discount houses 
should be maintained; improving the methods of dealing with 
the daily shortages and surpluses; and defining the 
implications of these alternative techniques to monetary 
policy and bank liquidity. This could have important 
repurcussions for bank profitability as, if the Bank of 
England were prepared to deal directly with the banking 
system, then it is likely the mandatory requirement to hold 
funds wi th the LDMA would be modified. This would release 
funds which could be invested more profitably elsewhere. 
2. Bank Liquidity 
The 1982 Bank of England paper on bank liquidity illustrated 
the particularly complex na ture of this subj ect. Academic 
'J1'J 
material on defining adequate bank liquidity has been 
limited. preferring to concentrate on the broader issues of 
global asset and liability management. The management of 
bank liquidity is however of crucial importance in the day-
to-day business of commercial banks. Therefore more work is 
required to define and assess bank liquidity in terms of 
maturity analysis and interest rate mismatch. A theoretical 
approach to managing bank liquidity could be developed to 
complement the systems currently employed by commercial 
bankers. 
3. Capital Adequacy 
The topic of bank capital adequacy is not as nebulous as bank 
liquidi ty. N~~e~thel!ssf_the measurement of bank capital in 
~". __ .. ~ .... ~~ __ M_ 
-the UK merely_p..J:9"y_i_(L~_s __ a. basic assessment of these issues. 
- ' " '-'-"''''''-' '", ., . -.- .. , .. - . . ... " .... 
It would therefore be ,Lyj_able_proposition_to develop a more 
realistic model of bank capital adequacy. In particular, 
--------.------~ .---. 
emphasis should be placed on the quality of assets. The work 
~-------- -
.-----
.-.--
would benefiLfrorL_an_understanding and modelling of banking 
-- - --'.-.'-- - -,. .- .---.-< -".- -' '~"--" -.~ 
,,-
order to determine a more realistic assessment of the risk 
-------- ----------- .. _---
supported by a banks capital. Alternatively the arguments of 
P"''''~ __ ''_ ... ___ ". ____ ,_ •. 0< .-_ •• - - -'- - .- ., 
commercial bankers could be collated to establish a practical 
_. 'rr ___ ~,. __ ._ •• _____ •. ___ •• _"_ ••. _.~,___ __ __.. - -- -_ • 
approach to assessing bank capital adequacy. Either of these 
---
methods would provide an altern?tive framewor~_w:i,thin __ whi.9.h __ 
~k capi ta!~eq.!l_a.9y_c_ould-possi bly_ be more ___ ll_c._()~Eate ly 
assessed._ 
c -
4. Domestic and International Bank Supervision 
International bank supervision is a comparatively new topic. 
In many instances, however, international supervision and 
domestic supervision will be concerned with similar issues. 
Both areas are concerned with capital adequacy, liquidity and 
observing banks on a group or global basis. Thus a useful 
study would be to compare and contrast the approaches adopted 
for national and international supervision. This would be 
beneficial in highlighting both the domestic and 
international problems which face the bigger banks, thereby 
giving a global view of commercial banking and supervision. 
The analysis could be made more specific by either 
considering bank supervision in a number of countries for 
instance within the EEC - or between two countries - for 
instance the U.K. and the U.S. A detailed study of American 
bank supervision would be particularly useful because 
although it is a more legislated system, it exhibits many of 
the characteristics of the British system. 
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A.1. INTRODUCTION 
Monetarism has provided the intellectual ju~tification for 
monetary base control( 1p.82). Griffi ths l2 ) argued that 
monetary base control is based on the conventional neo-
classical theory of choice, in that the outcome for the money 
stock of a restriction on base growth is the result of 
maximising behaviour on the part of banks and the non-bank 
public, subj ect to the usual constraints of wealth and 
income. Central to this argument is the understanding that 
the stock of money in existance depends on how much the 
public wish to hold and is not a residual element. This is 
in direct contrast to cee where the authorities set MLR1 
Treasury bill rate and rates in the gilt-edged markets to 
obtain, ceteris paribus, a given public holding of currency 
and bank deposits. 
Prior to 1980 therefore, if the authorities wished to 
decrease the stock of money. they simply raised interest 
rates to reduce the demand for money as holders of bank 
deposits could switch into higher yielding assets. If an 
increase in the money stock was desired, the reverse would 
apply and the Bank of England would supply the banking system 
with the necessary reserve assets. The syst,em had two 
inherent weaknesses:-
1. If at a given interest rate, the public decided to 
increase their liquidity and therefore sell gil ts, the 
Bank of England will be forced to buy gilts to avoid 
rates rising. Thus~ the money supply would ri se. 
Similarly if the demand for advances increases, 
deposits (and the money supply) would also increase (in 
the absence of corset penalties) as the Bank of England 
supplied reserves. 
2. It was difficult to predict the public's demand for 
cash with a tolerable degree of accuracy. To do so 
would require the Bank of England also to have 
predicted the level of real income, expected rate of 
inflation and the public's expectations of interest 
rates for example. 
It was the conclusion of proponents 1 of monetary base control 
in the U.K. that such interest rate targeting techniques 
would inevitably introduce instabilities and distortions in 
the fi nancial markets. According to Bri ttan " ... whatever the 
difficulty of setting the latter (monetary targets) the 
ability to guess the level of interest rates appropriate at 
anyone time is a billion times rarer and is not possessed by 
gods let alone mere central banks".(3) The alternative is 
the direct control of the monetary base as a means of 
controlling monetary growth, though Friedman notes: "Of 
course, direct control of the monetary base will effect 
interest rates, but that is a very different thing from 
controlling monetary growth through interest rates,,(lO. To 
be a viable alternative in the U.K. monetary base control 
would require certain reforms. 
A.2 ESSENTIAL REFORMS 
Monetary base control would require three essential 
reforms(5) in the U.K. to be an effective alternative to 
interest rates as a means of controlling the rate of growth 
of the monetary aggregates. These are changes in the 
procedures by which the Bank of England conducts monetary 
policy, the accounting framework and certain insti tutional 
reforms. 
1. Changes in Monetary £QliQY 
This is the critical reform which would require the monetary 
authorities to choose a quantity (base money or the level of 
reserves) rather than the price (the rate of interest) as 
their operating target. This implies effective control of 
the supply of money can be achieved by controlling the means 
by which the banking system is able to create credit and 
money. This requires a change from the tradi tional belief 
that the total stock of money is not demand determined but 
primarily supply determined. Thus, it is the money markets 
that should determine interest rates. This implies 
disbandoning the present methods of discretionary control by 
the Bank of England over key interest rates and the setting 
of a tap price for gilt-edged stock, in favour of a market 
demand and supply price (or 'auction' price). In it's 
strictest form monetary base control would require 
flexibility on all interest rates and not just long-term 
rates. 
2. Changes.in.];M Accoynting F.r:aJll~}lo.r.k 
Certain changes in the present accounting framework would be 
required to place increasing emphasis on two ratios:-
a) currency/money - the ratio of non-bank private sector 
holdings of notes and coin to total money; 
b) reserves/deposits - the banking system's holdings of 
till money plus bankers' balances at the Bank of 
England to deposits. 
The authorities could then monitor the amount.of base created 
and the demand for base money by the non-bank private sector 
and banking sectors. This would be consistent with 
publishing a new series of monetary base statistics. 
3. Institutional Reform~ 
The present monetary controls would have to be redefined to 
solely consist of a cash ratio, defined in terms of base 
money (see A.4). This would necessarily imply changing the 
privileged position of the discount houses, though it should 
be noted that transition to monetary base control does not 
crucially depend on the withdrawal of the unique borrowing 
privileges of the discount houses. 
A.3. TYPES OF MONETARY BASE CONTROL 
There are generally three practical systems of monetary base 
control that could be implemented in the U.K., provided the 
technical changes were made and the authorities agreed to 
target base money and not influence interest rates. These 
are a negotiable licence, indicator and trigger systems. 
A.3.1. NEGOTIABLE LICENCE (NL) 
Where the monetary base is defined in terms of a NL it is 
essentially a unique reserve asset which will be created and 
controlled by the authorities. The banks, as controlled 
institutions, would be required to hold NLs directly in 
proportion to their deposits. By defini tion banks' balance 
sheets would have to be some mul tiple of the amount of NLs 
they held. The authorities would remain the sole suppliers 
of these licences so that the supply could be altered in line 
with the predetermined growth path. The NL could be defined 
in terms of Treasury bills, special documents, negotiable 
base assets or negotiable entitlements. 
In practice, as deposits rise, banks will be forced to bid 
for NLs. Competition would ensure that if the flow of 
deposits into the banks tended to rise above the level 
implied by the existing stock of NLs, then the market price 
of NLs will rise. This will impose an additional marginal 
cost upon the banks. It would be expected that this cost 
will be covered by an increase in lending rates or credit 
restrictions - from which a contraction in credit may be 
expected. Thus the public's holdings of bank deposits at the 
ruling rate of interest would be commensurate with the level 
allowed by the stock of NLs. 
By definition, however, the NL would be a form of direct 
control over the banking system, in many ways similar to the 
now disbanded corset. Under tight monetary policy (where the 
demand for deposits was increasing faster than the target) 
the increasing price of NLs would effectively impose a tax on 
the banking system. In such a situation, the danger is not 
so much the economic effects of increased lending rates (to 
choke-off demand) but disintermediation. 
It is probably true that the weaknesses of such a system far 
outweighed it's advantages. In particular the following 
disadvantages should be considered: 
a) Disintermediation 
When the price of NLs was rising it might be expected 
commercial bankers would encourage borrowers to borrow 
outside the controlled areas. This could be similar to 
the bill leak or poisibly disintermediation through the 
Euro-sterling markets could be expected. This problem 
could only be limited to the extent controlled 
institutions paid a modest penalty for inadequate 
holdings of NLs. This would effectively put a ceiling 
on NLs and limit the implicit tax. Some 
disintermediation could, nevertheless occur and, of 
course, the lower the penalty the more ineffective the 
control becomes. 
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The effect of periodic disintermediation could 
encourage the movement of short-term paper into non-
bank portfolios in substitution for bank deposits. 
This would probably be so to the extent the corset 
encouraged the development of a wider market in 
commercial bills. The development of wider short-term 
public and private sector debt markets could cause 
cosmetic variations in the money supply, leading to 
exaggerated market expectations of changing interest 
rates. 
Banks, particularly the clearing banks, lack the 
necessary short-term control over deposits and advances 
because depositors and borrowers are relatively 
interest-insensitive. Thus, where immediate action was 
required under a NL scheme this could aggravate their 
short-term control problems over assets and 
liabilities. This would also have implications for the 
acceptance of a NL scheme - in this form it is unlikely 
that it would be voluntarily accepted by banks and 
LDT's. In addition. neither the 1979 Banking Act nor 
the 1944 Bank of England Act could be used to cajole 
building societies into the scheme. 
In addition banks would be expected to determine the 
appropriate level of interest rates to achieve their 
desired balance sheet growth. This is in direct 
contrast to the present system where bank rates are 
heavily influenced by the authorities determination of 
overall monetary conditions. This again would have 
serious implications for balance sheet management -
unless credit could be financed off-balance sheet 
through some form of disintermediation. 
For these reasons it must be concluded that under present 
arrangements, a NL scheme would not be a practical form of 
monetary base control. However. if the base was strictly 
related to the assets of the central bank then it could serve 
either as a useful indicator to the thrust of monetary policy 
or to trigger changes in other monetary aggregates. In both 
cases the monetary base is defined as a cash ratio, the exact 
definition of which is considered in A.4. 
A.3.2. THE MONETARY BASE AS AN INDICATOR 
To serve as a useful indicator of the thrust of monetary 
policy the monetary base would not be directly controlled but 
rather monitored as a leading indicator of changes in the 
money stock. Of course, many such indicators of future 
developments already exist - the success of this method is 
thereby dependent on the extent to which it would improve 
current knowledge of prospective movements in the money 
stock. Current indicators have, however, proven to be 
unstable - forecasts for the current banking month made half-
way through the month can be half to three-quarter percent 
out. 
In this respect the monetary base could have an important 
advantage. A necessary condi tion for the use of a variable 
as an instrument to control a target is that the instrument 
is under the control of the policymakers - and that movements 
in it result in and not fL2m movements in the target. Under 
strict base control, changes in foreign exchange, Treasury 
Bills, issues of National Savings and the discount market 
will all directly lead to a change in the amount of base 
money outstanding. This in turn will lead to a change in the 
resources available to the banking system with which to 
change the rate of growth of the money supply. 
As a leading indicator the monetary base would not 
necessarily induce disintermediation. This is because no 
institution will be significantly penalised for undertaking a 
transaction others cannot - the authorities response would be 
to affect market rates of interest to both lender and 
borrower. There are, however, four further qualifications to 
be made in a system where the monetary base is employed as an 
indicator of future monetary developments:- this would only 
be a minor variation of the present system in the sense that 
interest rates would remain an instrument of monetary 
control(6); the issue is complicated by the perversity known 
as Goodhart's Law 2 as any single measure of the money supply 
tends to become " ... hopelessly distorted once it is the 
subj ect of official controls ll (71; thirdly banks would most 
likely have a greater incentive to hold excess cash reserves 
if the costs of holding excess reserves were less than the 
costs and risks of finding itself short of cash reserves, 
thereby weakening the power of the cash base as an indicator; 
and finally the Bank of England have suggested " ... the series 
could come to convey more useful information ll(8para45), but 
that several years of monitoring would be required before 
such movements in the cash base could be adequately 
determined. 
A.3.3. THE MONETARY BASE AS A TRIGGER MECHANISH 
In common with the indicator system, the authorities would 
set a smooth, seasonally adj usted growth path for the 
monetary base. The difference is that any observed 
difference of the actual base from the predetermined path 
will be used to 'trigger' changes in the Bank of England's 
lending rates to correct this divergence. The size of the 
adjustment would be related to the size of the divergence. 
also set by a predetermined scale. This approach necessarily 
implies a mandatory cash base and the lender-of-last-resort 
facility. This contrasts to present arrangements in which 
the authorities use the volume of operational funds held 
voluntarily by the clearing banks as their datum point for 
controlling the general level of market interest rates. 
The crucial characteristic of this system is that interest 
rates would be changed quasi-automatically. Thus, interest 
rate changes would be less of a political issue and more 
promptly adjusted. This would overcome certain problems with 
eXisting methods whereby interest rate changes are slower and 
less vigorous than perhaps they should be. Such adjustments 
would continue until the base was restored to it's targeted 
path. Because interest rates would be promptly adjusted to 
divergences of the base this could strengthen confidence in 
monetary control. 
In the short-run, financial markets would need to assess if 
. the divergence of the base was likely to persist or whether 
it was erratic and likely to be reversed. The short-term 
markets would, as now, seek to anticipate changes in the Bank 
of England's lending rates; their expectations would 
determine the structure of short-term rates which would in 
turn affect banks' lending rates. Thus, given a system in 
which the authorities discretionary influences are 
constrained, short-term interest rates may not necessarily be 
more volatile than at present. 
Increased confidence in monetary control would encourage 
greater long-term stability, particularly of interest rates. 
which would be advantageous to the gil t-edged and corporate 
bond markets. Such advantages could, however, only be 
achieved where certain rather severe handicaps were overcome. 
There would be notable political and social implications of 
such a system, particularly where a rigid or automatic 
interest rate rule applied. 
The main disadvantage of such an automatic mechanism is that 
the scale of response would almost inevitably be somewhat 
arbitrary. The Green Paper(9p.13) illustrated that, as with 
the current system, the authorities do not know whether a 
given excess of money of X percent could be eliminated over a 
desired time period by a rise in interest rates of Y percent. 
The issue is complicated further by the existance of lags in 
interest rate policy. This is particularly pertinant where 
an adjustment is triggered by transient or erratic 
fluctuations in the growth of the monetary base, as this 
could increase the variability of short-term interest rates. 
It would therefore probably be preferrable to 'override' the 
automatic adjustment, especially as this precludes the use 
(if so desired) of interest rates for any other purpose. 
Evenso should the override facility be used frequently, this 
would severely curtail the advantages of the automatic 
mechanism. 
Finally, the viability of this approach hinges fundamentally 
upon the Bank of England always acting as lender-of-Iast-
resort (LOLR). The authorities open market operations would 
be constrained by the objective to achieve a predetermined 
path for the monetary base - the banking system can only 
maintain a minimum cash ratio by making use of the LOLR 
facility. This is in direct contrast to strict monetary base 
control which implies the end of the LOLR facility. 
This is because without unlimited funds on a daily basisJ 
then either the commercial banks must fail to meet their cash 
ratios by potentially massive amounts, or the financial 
system must suffer a liquidity crisis. This reflects the 
issue that under lagged or current reserve accounting. the 
authorities have no choice but to supply reserves if reserve 
requirements are to be met. 
The spirit of base control might be maintained by a system of 
graduated penalties on LOLR borrowing - as under eee, the 
control was afforded by changing the price of such reserves. 
Thus, to the extent the money stock was growing faster than 
the targeted base, the marginal cost of base money would rise 
automatically and hence market rates would tend to follow. 
The problem would be setting the borrowing tranches and 
penalties - the authorities do not know what penalties would 
return the system to equilibrium. 
A.4. DEFINITION OF THE MONETARY BASE 
To operate as an indicator or trigger system, the monetary 
base should be defined in terms of the liabilities of the 
monetary authorities - notes and coin in circulation with the 
public, notes and coin held by banks, bankers' balances at 
the Bank of England, potential liabilities of the Bank of 
England and public sector deposits with the Banking 
Department. This, however, must be qualified. The 
effectiveness of monetary base control will depend upon what 
liabilities the monetary authorities can control or seek 
particularly to control: 
1. Notes ~ ~ in ~irculation ~jtb ~ Public3 
When ~eld by the non-bank private sector, notes and coin are 
money. When held by a bank, notes and coin represent a 
liability to a money creating institution. Approximately 6/7 
of the total note and coin issue is held by the non-bank 
public. 
The Bank of England have, however, argued that the " ... amount 
of currency so held is hardly a variable over which the 
authori ties would (or could) se ek control"( 1 Opa ra7). This is 
particularly so where the aim of the authorities is to 
influence some monetary aggregate consisting primarily of 
bank deposits, as the banks' stake in the monetary base would 
be very small. On the February 1982 make-up day the wider 
definition of the monetary base was £11,747 million of which 
notes and coin constituted £10,557 million. Hence variations 
in the non-bank private sectors demand for cash could lead to 
undesirable fluctuations in the growth of monetary 
aggregates. 
The analysis has been extended by eongdon(11p.33). His model 
assumes: 
a) the public's demand for cash has an interest elasticity 
of 10 percent; 
b) the public hold three times as much cash as the 
clearing banks, and 
c) the clearing banks can vary their cash holdings by up 
to 33 percent without straining prudential limits. 
If the clearing banks raise their deposit rates from 10 
percent to 11 percent (a 10 percent increase), the public 
would hand over 1 percent of their cash holding. The banks' 
cash holding will rise by 3 percent; their deposits would 
rise by as much as 4 percent. Bank deposits form part of the 
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money supply. A small change in interest rates has thereby 
caused a significant change in the money supply. In fact 
given the multipliers involved, the public's demand for cash 
would have to be almost totally interest inelastic to prevent 
such volatile fluctuations in the money supply. 
2. Vault cash 
Vault cash or till money is important as it provides the 
means of ensuring immediate convertibility of deposits. The 
inclusion of vault cash is, however, an operational rather 
than theoretical issue as banks have different business mixes 
and therefore differential cash holdings exist. 
3. Bankers' Balances £t ~ E£nk Qf England 
The advantage of defining the monetary base in terms of vault. 
cash and Bankers' balances is that it would specifically be 
related to the assets of the banks(12para7). Bankers' 
balances are readily convertible into till money. Under eec, 
the majority of these balances were provided by the cash 
ratio of the clearing banks. 
Since 1960 bankers' balances have also included SDs. and 
SSDs between 1974 and 19BO. Such items are best excluded 
from a definition of base money. An increase in their level 
is not an expansionary factor and should not therefore be 
regarded as a rise in the monetary base5. (SD's are 
deliberately called to withdraw liquidity from the banking 
system and are not liquid in the normal sense). 
4. Potential liabilities Qf ~ E£nk Qf England 
Potential liabilities are those liabilities named as the 
counterpart to the assets that the Bank of England may have 
to assume because of commitments previously given or because 
of 'automatic' borrowing rights of others. The relevance of 
any component to the base must be the central bank's ability 
to control that liability. In the U.K., the banking system 
has a unique automatic resort to the discount window. The 
Bank of England cannot therefore control such a potential 
liability. A strict monetary base control regime would 
therefore exclude such liabilities. Moreover, their 
inclusion would imply a relationship between base money and 
the potential, not actual, stock of money. 
5. Public sector deposits ~ ~ Banking Departm~ 
Public sector deposits include the government, government 
departments and foreign central bank holdings of sterling 
working balances B• Due to insti tutional arrangements such 
deposits tend to be small and stable. Their inclusion or 
ommission is not important when examining base movements. 
In sum a cash based 
generally preferred, 
balances. A cash base 
definition of the monetary base is 
defined as vault cash and bankers' 
would have four further advantages: 
1. It would stop the seemingly inequitable subsidisation 
of issuers of reserve asset paper. The reserve asset 
definition adopted in 1971 meant that these assets were 
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of special attraction. This was inequitable because 
the main issuer had been the government. 
2. Sales of gilt-edged securities to the banking system 
would not affect the money supply or the. rate of growth 
of monetary expansion. This would give the authorities 
a much larger range of debt instruments by which they 
could raise finance for the government - there would 
therefore be less pressure to keep up the maturity of 
that debt. 
3. It cannot be manufactured by the private sector. 
4. There is less elasticity in it's division between bank 
and non-bank holdings. 
Broader definitions of the monetary base would include notes. 
and coin in circulation with the public. The advantage of 
this approach is that the base ceaies to be affected by 
deposits and withdrawals of cash by the public. Though a 
much larger base. it should thereby be less volatile. Table 
26 illustrates these liabilities from 1965 to 1981. The sub-
total of columns (1-3) defines the broader definition, whilst 
(2+3) gives the cash base. Since 1969 the rapid growth of 
notes and coin in circulation with the non-bank public can be 
seen which substantiates the Congden argument for preferring 
a cash base definition. 
A.5. NON-MANDATORY AND MANDATORY CONTROL 
Given the general preference for a cash based defini tion of 
the monetary base, it is crucial to determine whether this 
should be a formal requirement on bank balance sheets. The 
nature of the system of control chosen will tend to imply 
whether a cash base should be non-mandatory or mandatory -
the trigger mechanism for instance is dependent on a given 
cash ratio being maintained, whereas more relaxed versions of 
monetary base control suggest a non-mandatory system. 
Nevertheless, the issues are important and should be 
identified and discussed to give due consideration to systems 
of monetary control which impact on bank balance sheets in 
this manner. 
A.5.1. OPERATING WITHOUT A MANDATORY CASH RESERVE REQUIREMENT 
A non-mandatory scheme implies banks hold base money only for 
operational reasons. The size of this reserve will be 
determined by the subjective attitude of each bank to risk 
taking it's business mix and the rules under which the Bank 
of England deal with the banking system - for instance how 
large flows into and from the exchequer will be dealt with. 
Wi th a non-mandatory scheme the base could be regarded 
primarily as another monetary aggregate - possibly a leading 
indicator - movements in which could convey informa tion on 
future developments. The efficiency of such a scheme will. 
however, depend crucially on there being a stable 
relationship over time between the banks' voluntary holdings 
of base money and their total balance sheets. In Switzerland 
such a relationship has proved sufficiently stable. Bankers' 
balances are voluntarily held with the Swiss National Bank 
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TABLE 26: LIABILITIES 01' l1lE 1I0NETARY AUTIlORITIES; 1965 - 1981 ANNUAL AVEMGES 
([m) Notes & Coin i,n Liabilities of the Banking Sub-Total of 
circulation out- Departrr.c.nt Columns: 
Averages of side the Bank Ot 
monthly fizurcs England 
1 2 3 4 5 
Year With the 'fill Bankers Special Other 
Public Honey Deposits D ,(I)'b'l" 1-3 2-3 eposlt5 L~3 ~ ~t1CS 
1965 2426 515 269 59 121 3210 784 
1966 2563 548 268 144 138 3379 816 
1967 2633 561 285 204 144 3479 846 
1968 2766 586 315 219 165 3667 901 
1969 2871 640 288 225 
.--
177 3799 928 
, 
1970 3067 682 192 270 181 3%1 874 
1971 3332 705 0o, I • ...I ... 268 306 4268 936 
1972 3644 653 209 10 361 4506 862 
1973 4091 703 246 919 364 5040 91,9 
1974 1,591 764 259 1047 374 5614 1023 
1975 53' .. 1 791 281 964 454 61,13 1072 
1976 6J.06 781, 308 1143 486 7198 1092 
1977 683:< 812 333 1062 561 7982 1150 
1978 7943 849 389 992 709 9181 1238 
1979 9031 914 460 550 679 10405 1374 
1980 9763 945 516 116 701 11224 1461 
1931 I 
SOURCE: Banl~ of Enrr]3nd Quarterly Rulletin Hareh 1981 Table A p.39 and update. 
(1) On several occasions between 1974 and 1980 this item also included supplementary 
special deposits. 
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(SNB), and are included in the monetary base. Until 1978 the 
Swiss monetary base proved to be a stable lead indicator of 
movements in M1 (which was not targeted after 1978). This 
success might not, however, be expected in the United Kingdom 
because: 
1. Bankers' balances at the SNB are virtually the only 
form of domestic primary liquidity. Thus, until 
recently such balances were the only assets of Swiss 
banks which were in all circumstances very liquid. 
2. The Swiss banks were in fact required to meet cash 
requirements on four days each year. This is 
relatively unimportant except that on such days the SNB 
always ensured adequate cash was readily available. 
3. There were large fluctuations in the monetary base and 
money supply. Brittan argues this was accepted only 
because of " ••• widespread confidence that lower 
inflation will persist and that these aberations will 
prove temporary"( 13) , 
In the U.K. it is unlikely that such a stable relationship 
will exist because of four factors: 
1. The U.K. has highly sophisticated and developed markets 
in primary liquidity. A U.K. bank will therefore hold 
a portfolio of such primary liquid assets and not 
solely prudential balances with the Bank. Shifts in 
the attractiveness of the various assets would almost 
certainly lead the banks to adjust, in no easily 
predictable fashion, their preferred liquid assets 
portfolio. 
In fact it might logically be expected that where 
prudential balances were held, these may be more a 
function of small shifts in the relative, actual or 
expected short-term interest rates, rather than being 
indicative of some current or future change in the 
stock of money. 
There is no guarantee that banks would hold balances at 
the Bank of England - even the clearing banks might not 
be prepared to do so if they could obtain overdraft 
facilities for clearing house settlements. 
2. In the U.K. the volume of inter-bank transactions are 
not necessarily good indicators of immediate or future 
movements in a monetary aggregate. The Green 
Paper(14p.21l found they could reasonably be expected 
to be a function of the expected values of both average 
volume and the variability is that volume, of all 
transactions - including inter-bank payments - passing 
through the banking system. 
3. A non-mandatory ratio has the inherent weakness of 
being unable to distinguish between a banks' holding of 
prudential reserves and excess reserves. Additional 
reserves may well be held as the counterpart to a 
decline in the demand for bank credit or an increase in 
the bank's demand for liquidity. 
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4. It is felt(15p.9) that a bank's requirement for cash in 
the U.K. would depend more on the total level of 
transactions and type of business than on the size of 
it's balance sheet. 
The efficiency of a non-mandatory cash base is therefore 
consequent upon the U.K. financial structure. To induce 
banks to hold the bulk of their prudential balances with the 
Bank of England rather than in short-term liquid assets would 
require a major change in the structure of the money markets. 
If the LOLR facility was withdrawn the function(s) of the 
discount market would be radically changed. This in turn may 
well encourage banks to hold prudential cash reserves which 
were related to their liabilities. Such institutional 
changes may well be deemed necessary, but until the present 
financial structure is modified, the usefulness of a non-
mandatory cash ratio must be questioned. 
A.5.2. MANDATORY CASH RATIO 
Notwithstanding the criticism of a non-mandatory ratio, it is 
not clear if the imposition of a mandatory cash ratio would 
be essential to improving the predictability of the monetary 
base. The recent imposition of the half percent cash ratio 
would however, seem to favour this approach. 
There aye two main advantages to a legally imposed cash 
ratio( 1op.39): 
a) It is non-discriminatory between the clearing and non-
clearing banks. The two groups will be subject to the 
same requirement, but any excess or voluntary balances 
also held will merely be reflecting their varying 
business mixes. This overcomes the issue that the 
clearers have a substantially higher volume of retail 
business and therefor e hold a considerably larger 
proportion of cash in their portfolios. 
b) The cash ratio implies that both groups are equally 
taxed by holding non-interest bearing cash balances. 
This is important to the non-clearers who could be at a 
competi tive disadvantage if cash holdings (including 
excess holdings) were interest bearing. 
The main disadvantage under a mandatory scheme would be if 
the level imposed was higher than that which banking system 
would hold in the absence of such control. But more 
relevant to the current situation, a mandatory ratio could 
cause a paradox. If the' requirement was a small proportion 
of deposits, then unexpected daily movements in the base 
which currently occur could be very large relative to the 
size of the balances. Under such conditions, the banks may 
find it technically difficult to maintain the required ratio. 
The solution might require three additional features:-
a) institutional changes, such as the government placing 
funds with the commercial banking system rather than 
repaying debt for example through the Issue Department 
of the Bank; 
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b) very low penalties for anything except an 
'unreasonable' short fall in required reserves; 
c) some form of averaging procedure rather than strict 
day-by-day adherence to the required minimum. 
The alternative would be to require large interest-bearing 
balances so that unpredictable fluctuations were less 
significant relative to the size of the base. This would, 
however, necessitate large structural changes in the money 
markets. 
One further problem remains which concerns how the mandatory 
relationship between base money and deposits can be 
expressed. This is examined in Section A.6. 
A.6. RESERVE ACCOUNTING FOR MANDATORY CONTROLS 
In the context of this appendix this section will be 
predominantly concerned with the problems of reserve 
accounting when applied to monetary base control. These 
issues raised are nevertheless very pertinant to the current 
system of monetary control in the U.K. as the mandatory half 
percent cash ratio is placed on a lagged basis (as was the 
former reserve asset ratio), the disadvantages of which will 
be discussed below. 
A mandatory relationship between base money and deposits can 
be expressed in one of three ways:-
1. Lagged accounting - banks hold base assets at a time 
(t+1) related to the level of deposits in time t. 
2. Current accounting - banks hold base assets at time t 
in rela tion to deposits in time t. 
3. Lead or reverse-lag accounting - banks limit their 
deposi ts at time t to some mul tiple of base assets held 
at a previous time (t-1). 
Stewart stated: "Whether there should be lagged, current or 
lead accounting can be endlessly argued about,,(16). The 
issues are. however. important because they have been 
considered in designing present monetary control 
arrangements, increasing research is being conducted into 
reserve accounting and a move to monetary base control would 
only be complete where the base was calculated on the correct 
accounting basis. We shall not therefore 'endlessly argue' 
the issues but offer a concise appraisal. 
A.6.1. LAGGED ACCOUNTING 
Lagged accounting is used in virtually all countries for the 
purpose of calculating required reserves, and is indeed 
suitable when the purpose of reserve ratios is to provide a 
fulcrum for money-market operations to control interest 
rates<17para40). Virtually by definition, however, when the 
total of required reserves is related to the past level of 
deposits and where there are no excess reserves at the outset 
in the system, changes in deposits must cause the authorities 
to allow changes in bank reserves, and not vice versa. Thus 
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monetary base movements can hardly either control, cause or 
even indicate future movements in bank deposits. 
The present half percent cash ratio is lagged to eligible 
liabilities in the previous six months. Thus, the amount of 
cash so held is predetermined. The danger occurs where this 
level does not correspond with (and in particular is greater 
than) the level of the base desired by the authorities at 
tha t time. Three reconc ilia tions can be suggested (18p.24): 
1. To define the mandatory base such that banks would 
normally hold substantial excess balances, by setting a 
low ratio and paying interest on such balances. This 
though has a similar di sadvantage to a non-mandatory 
scheme, in that the relationship between base assets 
and monetary growth becomes weakened as the volume of 
excess base assets increases. 
2. To modify the requirement so that it was not absolute 
but that addi tional base money would only be supplied 
on penal terms. But under this option the resurgence 
of disintermediation must be considered a possibility. 
In practice such penalties would tend to fall on those 
banks seeking to maintain some stability in their 
lending rates. Such banks would be induced to 
disintermediate, switching business to offshore 
associates or into uncontrolled forms, rather than 
loose business. The risk of excessive 
disintermediation is of course the risk of any penalty 
system. 
It has been suggested that two further d~sadvantages 
would result(19p.11):-
a) as banks tried to escape penalties they could be 
expected to bid vigorously for base money. Thus 
market rates and bank lending rates would rise 
dramatically. But because of the lag before 
interest rates significantly affect bank lending, 
instability in monetary growth and interest rates 
could be considerable. 
b) The Bank of England may not be able to achieve the 
desired level of base money through open market 
operations - if only because of the large 
unforseen swings in and out of government. Thus, 
the amount of penal-term lending, and the 
penalties on the banking system could sometimes 
differ from the amounts intended. 
3. The authorities should provide the additional base 
assets to enable the banks to meet the mandatory 
requirement. This, of course, implies an acceptance by 
the authorities that the base assets on any day may 
differ from that desired level. Such a scheme would be 
against the grain of base control (cash should not be 
supplied on demand) but may be reconciled if a scale of 
progressively penal rates were applied and control of 
the base was being achieved over a period and not 
daily. 
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Should the Bank use the cash ratio as a form of trigger 
mechanism, then this method will prove to be particularly 
condusive to it's efficiency on a lagged accounting basis. 
Since September 12, 1968 a system of lagged accounting has 
operated i(2d)merica. The two changes to Regulation D made 
then were: 
1. Coincident reserve requirements of reserves based on 
deposits in that week were to be lagged to deposits two 
weeks ago, and 
2. Banks' current reserves were to consist of balances on 
deposit at the Federal Reserve Bank plus the amount of 
vault cash held two weeks previously. 
Several authors6 have, however, argued that lagged accounting 
has in fact reduced the FRS's control over monetary 
aggregates and increased the cost of reserve management to 
individual banks. 
A.6.2. CURRENT ACCOUNTING 
Similar problems would occur with a system relating required 
reserves to current liabilities. The clearing banks, with 
their large branch networks and vulnerability to 'fluctuations 
in demand for deposits would be particularly troubled. At 
the time when they still had the opportunity to bid for base 
assets, they would not know what their requirements at the 
close of business would be. There would inevitably be delays 
in obtaining current information on movements in liabilities 
and vault cash held at branches. Thus, the banks would note 
what adjustments would be necessary during the course of the 
day to meet their required ratios. ~his uncertainty was 
often apparent under CCC when the scramble for funds on make-
up day caused large interest rate fluctuations. 
A.6.3. LEAD ACCOUNTING 
The Bank(21para42) have recognised that it would be more in 
the spirit of base control for the reserve ratio to be put on 
a lead accounting basis. This approach is favoured by 
Laurent(22) as it would allow the authorities to set the 
level of required reserves accurately from week to week, 
thereby improving control over targeted monetary aggregates. 
This could yield two further advantages as it would be 
effective no matter how low the mandatory level was set and 
secondly it could decrease a banks' portfolio management 
costs. 
The strictness of the regime could then relate to the 
adjustment time allowed, the ave~aging procedures adopted and 
the penalties imposed for non-compliance. The efficiency of 
the system would depend upon the ability of the banks to 
predict their future balance sheets, and controlling them to 
meet that forecast. This is clearly a problem given the 
uncertainty of certain bank facilities (overdrafts, term 
loans) and that the banking system provides residual finance 
for the Exchequer, whose position neither the authorities nor 
the banks can accurately predict in the short term. 
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Nevertheless, there would have to be some penalty for 
inadequate or excess holdings of base money - otherwise banks 
would have little incentive to make realistic forecasts. Two 
further problems remain. In the absence of penalties on 
excess holdings then, because of future uncertainties, banks 
may well hold base assets in excess of their requirement. 
Thus, a change in the demand for base money could signal a 
change in banks' precautionary holdings of excess base money 
or relative yields - but not in expectation of their future 
deposit liabilities. Secondly severe penalties for 
inadequate holdings of base money may cause 
disintermediation. A bank might respond to an under-
prediction of their deposit level by ensuring that business 
over and above this level (for which they had previously 
aquired base assets) was done through channels which were 
outside the mandatory requirements, such as the Euro-sterling 
markets, 
It is largely due to their respective technical problems that 
nei ther current lead accounting has been adopted in the U.K. 
Nevertheless it has been shown that the possible 
disadvantages of lagged accounting for reserve requirements 
may warrant future research into an accounting system which 
could overcome such technical problems. 
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NOTES TO APPENDIX 1 
1. See 'Annual Monetary Review', 17 February 1981, Vo1.3, 
Ci ty Uni versi ty, London. 
2. Goodhart was a former chief monetary economist at the 
Bank of England. 
3. Since 1854, Northern Ireland and Scotland have been 
authorised to issue their own notes in excess of the 
fiduciary issue, provided the excess issues are backed 
by holdings of Bank of England notes. Such excess 
issues are not therefore liabilities of the Bank of 
England and are not included in the monetary base. 
4. Strictly speaking coin is not a liability of the Bank 
of England as it is issued by the Royal Mint, a 
government trading fund. In circulation, however. 
notes and coin are interchangeable and in fact coin is 
only a small fraction of the total. 
5. Special deposits and supplementary special deposits are 
however liabilities of the Bank of England to money 
creating institutions. A compromise has been therefore 
adopted by the IMF by making an offsetting adjustment 
to the base every time the rate of call changes. 
6. See for example, Journal of Money. Credit and Banking:-
a) May 1976, 'Lagged reserve accounting and the money 
supply mechanism'. 
b) May 1976, 'Contemperaneous v. Lagged reserve 
accounting'. 
c) November 1977, 'Money supply control and lagged 
reserve accounting'. 
d) August 1979. 'Reserve requirements - are they 
lagged in the wrong direction?' 
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APPENDIX TWO 
CITIBANK DEBT EARN BACK TEST 
B.1. ASSUMPTIONS 
A hypothetical example is considered using a 100 million, 25 
year debt issue:-
a) after-tax return on assets is 0.60 percent, net of 
operating expenses, bad debts and the interest cost 
associated with the new debt issue; 
b) the debt/capital leverage ratio is 16.67. This 
determines the level of D~H assets that can be. 
supported by the debt; 
c) the assets/equity ratio is also assumed to be 16.67. 
This determines the amount of new assets that can be 
supported by the retained earnings generated; 
\ 
d) time required to reach the maximum leverage factor is 
assumed to be immediate, implying that either the 
institution can acquire the new assets and the 
additional funding immediately, or, that the assets 
have already been acquired and the institution uses the 
issue to restore its capital ratios; 
e) the dividend payout ratio is 40 percent, and therefore 
the earnings retention rate is 60 percent. 
B.2. THE SIMULATION 
The simulation is given by Table 27 and is explained as 
follows. The assumptions state that the debt will be 
leveraged 16.67 times immediately. Thus, a $100m debt issue 
is leveraged by acquiring $1567m of short-term liabili ties 
and investing the total funds in new assets. $1667m of new 
assets are therefore acquired (column 3). From assumption 
(1), $1667m assets will produce $10m in earnings (column 6). 
of which 60 percent or $6m are retained. 
In Year 2, the debt has already been leveraged 16.67 times. 
but the $6m retained earnings from year 1 is added to the 
equity base and may now be leveraged. This produces another 
$100m in assets (16.67 x $6m). Total assets now of $1767m 
will give an after-tax return of $11m from which $7m will be 
retained. The cummulative contribution to retained earnings 
from both years' earnings is then $13m (column 9). 
By the twelth year the contribution to retained earnings will 
have reached $101m at which point Citibank claim the debt 
will have 'earned itself back'. Over its entire life, this 
debt will contribute $331m to retained earnings. though only 
the original principal of $100m is considered capital. 
Therefore if the premise that capital debt is an equity 
supplement is accepted, then if that debt generates 
sufficient earnings to replace itself over its life, it 
shoUld be included within the capital base when assessing 
capi tal adequacy. 
TABLE 27: D::BT EA .. "" BACK ':EST ON A $ 100 HILL-::ON 25 YEAR DEBT ISSUE ($M) 
! 
~ . . 
b,~g!..nrang 
Year 
(1) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
il 
12 
~3 
20 
i 24 
J 
j 25 
J 
Debt 
Ou ts tanding 
(2) 
100 
lCO 
100 
lOO 
100 
1CO 
leo 
iOO 
100 
leO I i 
I nn ~v "j 
! 
Asset., S'"PPo7ted by I 
Debt 
(3) 
1,667 
1,667 
1,667 
1,667 
1,667 
1,667 
1,667 
1,667 
1,667 
1,667 
i, 66 7 
, I Reta~ned 
, Earnlngs 
J i (4) , . 
.1 
., 
1 ' 
! 
i 
I 
I 100 
i 
, 206 
I 1131~ 41;0 
I I 1,330 
1 1 ,507 
! 1,698 
i , 
, 
i 3,394 
I i 4,,723 
I 5,104 
.! 
SO\JRC::: }!o-:·;rc?::-d & Hoff~an Citib2.nk 1988 Exhibit 8 
Total 
Assets 
(5) 
1,667 
1,767 
1,873 
1,986 
2,107 
2.997 
3,17L~ 
3,365 
5,061 
6,390 
6,771 
I "-r I I I . 
I Earnings I Dividends 
I (6) (7) 
I 
I 
! . 
I 
I 
I 10 
in , 
, 
11 
12 
13 
13 
i9 
20 
30 
38 
41 
I 
I 
4 
4 
4 
5 
5 
7 
8 
8 
12 
15 
16 
Re tained EarI1i~gs:-
Annual 
(8) 
6 
7 
7 
7 
8 
11 
11 
12 
18 
23 
25 
CU!'!1ulative 
(9) 
6 
13 
20 
27 
35 
~.: 
:;0 
1011 
113 
222 
306 
3312 
APPENDIX THREE 
EFFECT ON CAPITAL RATIOS OF INFLATION/SIMULATION MODEL 
C.l. ASSUMPTIONS 
a) A highly simplified bank is considered where its assets 
are assumed to be homogeneous and to earn the same rate 
of return. 
b) The bank initially operates with a 
percent given: 
Capital and reserves 
Deposits 
Total 
capital 
£m 
5 
95 
100 
ratio of 5 
c) The interest margin between the rate paid on deposi ts 
and the return received on assets is 4 percent. This 
margin is related to total assets. 
d) Fees and commissions are ignored. 
e) The gross surplus or profit before tax is 1 percent of 
total assets. 
f) Corporation tax is 50 percent, as is the dividend 
payout ratio. 
C.2. THE SIMULATION 
The initial assumptions are summarised in Column A of Table 
28 below. 
Table 28 Simulations of the effects of growth in deposits on 
bank profitability and capital ratios (£m) 
Gross earnings margin 
Opera ting costs 
Profits before tax 
Tax 
Profits after tax (net surplus) 
Dividends 
Retai ned Earnings 
Capital ratios (%) 
Dividend yield (%) 
A 
4.0 
3.0 
1.0 
0.5 
0.5 
0.25 
0.25 
5.0 
5.0 
B 
4.8 
3.6 
1.2 
0.6 
0.6 
0.3 
0.3 
4.4 
5.7 
C 
6.0 
3.6 
2.4 
1.2 
1.2 
0.3 
0.9 
4.9 
5.1 
D 
4.80 
3.30 
1.50 
0.75 
0.75 
0.3 
0.45 
4.5 
5.5 
Source: J.R.S. Revell" Costs .an.d Margins in. Banking =- .An. 
International Survey, Table 7.2, page 89. 
In the first simulation it was assumed that deposits had 
increased by £20 million to £115 million, a purely 
inflationary growth where prices rise by the same proportion. 
This is summarised in Column B. Because all other 
assumptions remained unchanged, all the figures in Bare 
120/100 times the equivalent figure in Column A. Thus, to 
maintain a 5 percent capital ratio, the bank needs to add £1 
million to its capital from retained earnings - yet the bank 
is unable to add more than £0.3 million at this level of 
earnings after covering operating costs, taxation and 
dividends. 
The bank cannot therefore continue to operate with a gross 
earnings margin of 4 percent with inflation at 20 percent 
unless the supervisory authorities and the market are 
prepared to see its capital ratio dropping sharply. 
Column C of Table shows the effect of raising the gross 
earnings margin to £6 million. with the same £20 million 
increase in deposits as in the first simulation. The 
possibility for a real growth in deposits is allowed for in 
Column D by assuming that the general price level rises by a 
little over 10 percent but that deposits rise by £20 million 
again. The table shows the clear difference between 
inflationary growth of deposits and real growth in the 
effects on the operating account and capital ratio~ 
APPENDIX FOUR 
EXTERNAL FINANCING OF MAJOR LONDON CLEARING BANKS 
D.l. NON-DEBT CAPITAL FIl!UlIlICIE OF MAJOR LONDON CLEARII!Mi BAlIlIKS 
1969-1981 
1. Barclays B~nk 
None. but effectively raised £85 million by acquiring 
Investment Trust Corporation for shares and then 
selling it to the General Post Office Pension Fund in 
July 1978. 
2. L.lQYlis Bank 
£76 million rights issue. February 1976. 
3. Midland .B.gnk 
a) £53 million rights issue March 1975. 
b) £99 million rights issue February 1978. 
c) £51 million raised through disposal of interest in 
Bland Payne Sedgewick Forbes. February 1979. 
d) £45 million raised through disposal of interest in 
Standard Chartered Bank. October 1979. 
e) £38 million raised through disposal of interests 
in Bland Payne Sedgewick Forbes and Standard 
Chartered Bank, January 1980. 
4. National ~IDj.M..t..e.r 
£67 million issued~ July 1976. 
SOUR CE: G r i ev s on. Gran t & Co., .I.h51 .E.ngliJill .eil a r.i.ng llank.s. =-
Results. ]j.s.ks ~n~ PrQgpects, May 1980. 
APPENDIX CONT. 
0.2. LOAN CAPITAL OF MAJOR LONDON CLEARING BANKS 1970-81 
1. BARCLAYS BANK GROUP 
a. BAR CLAYS BANK PLC 
pre 1969 81% Unsecured Loan Stock 1986-1993 £59m 
b. BARCLAYS BANK INTERNATIONAL LTD. 
pre 1969 7j% Unsecured Capital Loan Stock 1986-1991 
1972 81r. Unsecured Capital Bond 1986 (US$21m) 
1975 91% Unsecured Capital Notes 1982 (US$47.4rn) 
1976 91% Unsecured Capital Bonds 1985 (US$SOm) 
1976 91% Unsecured Capital Bonds 1987 (US$25m) 
c. BARCLAYS AMERICAN CAPITAL CORPORATION 
1981 141% Guaranteed Capital Notes 1991 (US$100m) 
d. BARCLAYS·OVERSEAS INVESTMENT COMPANY 
1977 8!% Unsecured Guaranteed Bonds 1992 (US$89.7m) 
1978 4j% Unsecured Notes 1988 ( Sw Fr 60m) 
1979 6i% Unsecured Bearer Bonds 1979-1989 (OM lOOm) 
1979 Guaranteed Floating Rate Notes 1990 (US$100m) 
:~.tJl 
59.0 
Em 
10.1 
9.4 
21.3 
22.5 
11.3 
74.6 
S2.2 
40.4 
16.9 
26.0 
45 
2. LLOYDS BANK GROUP 
Year of Issue 
a. LLOYDS BANK PLC 
1973 71% Convertible Subordinated Unsecured Loan Stock 1984 
1974,9% Subordinated Notes 1980-1989 (US$20m) 
1974"9% Subordinated Loans 1981-1984 (US$75m) 
b. LLOYDS EUROFINANCE IUV 
53.4 
9.0 
33.7 
96.1 
1975 Guaranteed Floating Rate Notes 1983 (min.7!%) (US$7Sm) 34.1 
1980 Guaranteed Floating Rate Notes 1990 (min.8%) (£ or US$payable) 50.0 
1980 Guaranteed Floating Rate Notes 1992 (min.S!%) (US$100m) 41.8 
125.9 
c. LLOYDS FIRST WESTERN CORPORATION 
1974 8i% Promisory Notes 1982-1994 (guaranteed and subordinated) 
(US$40m) 18.0 
d. LLOYDS BANK CALIFORNIA 
1974 4!% Capital Notes 1975-1989 (Subordinated) (US$8.4m) 3.8 
e. LLOYDS AND SCOTTISH PLC 
1981 Debentures payable in more than five years (controlling interest 
in Lloyds and Scottish, acquired 1981) 6.5 
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3. MIDLAND BANK GROUP 
a. MIDLAND BANK PLC Em 
1972 7!% Convertible Subordinated Unsecured Loan Stock 1983-1993 83.0 
1972 101% Subordinated Unsecured Loan Stock 1993-1998 31.1 
1975 Floating Rate Capital Notes1982 (US$50m) 22.4 
1976 Floating Rate Capital Notes 1983 (US$50m) 22.4 
b. MIDLAND GROUP SUBSIDIARIES 
1974 9.9% Secured Loan due 1997 
1976 81% Guaranteed Bon~ 1986 (US$70m) 
1977 Guaranteed Floating Rate Notes 1987 (US$50m) 
1977 81% Guaranteed Bonds 1992 (US$75m) 
1978 Guaranteed Floating Rate Notes 1993 (US$125m) 
1979 Guaranteed Floating Rate Notes 1989 (US$125m) 
1980 Guaranteed Floating Rate Notes 1992 (US$150m) 
1980 8!% Guaranteed Bonds 1980-1990 (DM180m) 
1981 4.6% Capital Notes 1989 (US$8.9m) 
1981 Guaranteed Floating Rate Notes 1991 (US$150m) 
1981 Guaranteed Floating Rate Notes 1994 (US$75m) 
1981 51% Convertible Subordinated Debentures 1996 (US$4.3m) 
1981 Other Long Term Borrowings 
4. NATIONAL WESTMINSTER BANK GROUP 
a. NATIONAL WESTMINSTER BANK LTD. 
158.9 
3.7 
31.5 
22.4 
33.7 
56.1, 
56.1 
62.9 
38.5 
4.7 
78.6 
39.3 
2.2 
122.9 
552.6 
1970 9% Subordinated Unsecured Loan Stock 1993 20.6 
1970 81% Subordinated Unsecured Loan Stock 1980(1) 8.7 
1973 8%. Bearer Bonds, Subordinated, 1979-1988 (DM 90m) 23.4 
1976 9% Subordinated Capital Bonds 1980-1986 (US$50m) 22.4 
1978 9% "B" Capital Bonds 1983-1986 (US$75m) 37.6 
1978 Floating Rate Capital Notes, Subordinated 1982-1990 (min.5!%) 67.2 
(US$150m) 
1979 Floating Rate Capital Notes Subordinated, 1983-1994 (min.5!%) 44.8 
(US$100m) 
1979 3l% Subordinated Loan 1987 ( Sw Fr 25m) 7.1 
1979 3 11 % Subordinated Loan 1987 ( Sw Fr 25m) 7.1 
16 
b. SUBSIDIARIES 
1977 Floating Rate Capital Notes, Subordinated, 1981-1984 
(min.6%) (US$120m) 
1979 US$ Floating Rate Capital Notes 1980 
Various 3!-6!% Debentures Repayable in More Than Five Years 
SOURCE: (1) Reports and Annual Accounts 
(2) N.S. Cou1beck, Funds ~lanagement in UK Clearing' Banks 1970-1980, 
Unpublished paper, 1982, Table 22. 
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234.9 
53.9 
8.4 
25.S 
87.8 
AlTENIlU: F.1.VE 
FEDEltl\J. lilii:JmVE )JoJ\l\n OF NEII YOJUZ CII)') 'fb], j\])W1IIACY l'ClHNliLA 
E.1.. TIlE FOmlLTLA 
118Gets 
Car,h 
Accruals and Prepaid 
F.R.n, Stock 
TrenG. nil,]s, C. of I. and U.S. 
Conds due witllin 5 years. 
S"vin!;s & Depos i tary Bond" 
C.C.C. - Cert. o[ Int. 
IJ.S. Govt. - All OVC)~ 5 ycnrs. 
Other ::;~~cs. - 5 )'e~n'f, (Croup I) 
F.li.lI. s, 502 V/A mle". 
Se~llred by U.S. Govts. 
Scc.uretl by Lifr~. IllS. 
Secured by Pnssboolu.; 
lll"c~':.ers (( Cam:l. p.:1ppr 
F.ll,A. 'fitle J 
nc~. ItV" Loans (Gtd. PorLion) 
R.F.C. Part. Loann (GtJ, Pnrtion) 
SltoJ:t Term Loam; to HUll, 
J3alilllce of Seeuritics 
(in ,,'>.5 t. grmle) 
Otber. LOaJ's 
(except classified) 
Other Assets 
F17I);otandard A:ulei;s •. 
(Include Group 11 Sccuritie~~ 
YO.p/(ou'c AtJ8eto 
j)ouhcful 
Re.,J. Estnlc 
StOC.kH 
D~f"ull:H 
LO;H~ 
Bnl'll.::i nr, HeJ1.tt1c 
B':lnldllg IJou~e IlH.'.Olil~ x !j 
Furnit1lre & Fixt:l1rcf; 
IimOl1ll t 
07. 
5% 
12% 
207. 
50% 
(:apZ: lea 7-
11 CQllil'CI1ICW/, 
E.2. DEFINITIONS 
The risk asset categories were defined as follows: 
a) Riskless Assets - were a banks' required reserves and 
highly liquid assets. specifically covering:-
(i) cash. accruals and prepaid, treasury bills and US 
government securities maturing within five years, 
and 
(ii) bankers' acceptances and Federal Reserve Banks' 
Stock, which were of comparable quality and short 
term maturity. 
b) Minimum Risk Assets - loans and investments that have. 
less than normal credit risk or those that may be 
readily pledged or sold. 
c) Normal Risk v. Portfolio Assets - assets with normal or 
usual banking risks. 
d) Substandard Assets - assets with a greater than normal 
banking risk as a result of the financial condition or 
unfavourable record of the obliger, insufficiency of 
security or other factors. This category recognises 
that some aspects of banking business will involve a 
greater banking risk but that such assets do not 
necessarily contain an element of loss. 
e) Workout Assets - to realise will require costly actions 
with a high degree of uncertainty. They are unlikely 
to be repaid without bank intervention and the bank is 
unlikely to be repaid in full. 
f) Fixed and Loss Assets - defined to include bank 
premises. furniture and fixtures because they are not 
considered bank investments in a true sense. These 
assets therefore require the full 100 percent capital 
cover. 
SOURCE: RevellJ J.R.S., ~Q1xen~~ gn~ R~gQ~t~Qn Qf ]gnk~, 
1975, p.31. 
;"PI'l:NDIX SIX 
Emu FOil ANALYSING hAKl: C:~PI'ff.L 
P.l. 1955 l·'ORH FOr:. Af-jA1.YSING lIAN1( CAt'I'fAT. 
(rlollar AruOlJ!ltr. i:l ~'hous~llds) 
I',}j)liNT CAPITAL I\J;QUIRE}lEr:r 
():JT~TA!mING h!rc\!ot Amount 
(1) I'RIHA!tY A:-:n Sl:CO:;V!J:,Y RESF.RVJ: 
CHsh AS!H~ls , 
.. ,-----
07. 
LIQUlDITl CALCllt.t.TlQ}; 
47% of Dcm~lld Deposits ipc 
367. of Tim~ Deposits ire 
1007. of ])epod t.s o[ l\anks 
lflO% of Other l>eposi ts 
$_--
Gross ro~:tioll c.{ CCC or V-loans 
Coins, P'lp"r,llnl' Acep.pt.&Bllks ' LU5 
V,B, Govt. SCCfl: 0.57. , ____ lOO~; of llorrot-:i.nr,s 
nJ,lls 
Ccnifical:es,Hc. (to 1 yellr) 
Othet· (1-5 yrs.)(Incl. Treas. 
Inv. S~ries A & B) 
Other Secs. Jnv. Rlngs 1!2 or 
r:(lui.". (to 3 yrs.) 
TOTAL: 
(2) HINlmnl RISK A58E15 
U.S. G~vt. Sccs. (5-10 years) 
I1W.r.;..rtl0I1 rlJA Rer.Pbdr·u t(IU1IS 
L02.rUl 1:111 Pa5sh'k!-""B.f •• S~cs, or 
CSV U,fc Ins. 
Short-t('l'm Priuc.ipal Loa:H: 
TOTAl.: 
:3) l:'Tl:jU.;r~IJIATE A~~r:TS 
U.S. Cl"l!:. f,..::,~. (Over 10 YC:J.rs) 
r'ltJ. an~ VA LO:l!\f". 
TOTt.!.: 
JtDr:.Ti'QL10 !,SSr:TS (Gross. (If Hes.) 
rfj"est"I~('lll$ (nol listed elsc',l1icn') 
L{1.",!jl~ (l~ot li.<:u·u Elsc.\;rllerc.) 
TO'iAL: 
r----
r----
=-~= :;'r~,u~ l~:: of ht $100,000 ef 1'01'tfolio, 10% 
ol.nC:!xt $1.O'J,(.'YJ ii:IJ 5~ of nexl $:-IOa,6')J. 
'.5) Fli:i:U,CLl.S2Vn:n & 01:IiE~l ASSETS 
Ht:.. Fn:j:l •• l'·un~. & r.i:r.t ,Oth':!r 1-:cR1 
t~t:'te 
Stoel::; 1. n('I<"·.:~,:('d Scc. 
Ar.I)('.~,~ CLIS!;j,1 i'~,l RS "LoS,," 
Assctf.; cl .. ~ssi[:i{:d O~, ".t;oubtlUl
'
: 
Assc.:t~ f.:lu~s).fi.~J ;l~ "SlJl)F;L~nJarJ': 
Accl'lltlls, F{~d. Res, 1:;1;.. Stock, Pre? 
l:xFl!lt. 
'IOTAL ASSETS: 
4_07. 
47. 
107. 
1002 
50Y. 
207. 
G) ALLO',!!\~lC;:" PCl~ 1il.US.:: DE .. )T.(Amt.Cqlllll v; JOOZ of al\1\u.'l1 gross 
cnrlli:l~!. of V,-,_p.lrt·:TiCLtt) 
i) !:!:rl\/, C/'1'. REQD. If' t.!:! ASSfl'S H: r:rWl;rZ; 2 .. :. USED POl{ 
LIQ~':l[!"l'fY ("l:C":ro i.:.. line. Ch Li.::h;.liry C,~.!..~ulation :_s 
;-;e-(." fltill'n1ise. '1.'O!::I] ill. lit,!.:. 11) 
g) ALt'.",J.Fui'. :,!i·:G.np./d)vlT.i'.!_CT01~5.1r I::I'O • .'I.VAILt.nI.!;'(+ (lr-) 
(5(:(: 1I;.\".I.'S ("1 r,,'/';l";" ~,,~.j~) 
9) TOTI'!, CArl'fAL 1I.~·:(ll!ljC;·!Ei-JT (1 lllr~l. ~) 
-----
Allm~.for spec. flletors,if 
infa. availeLlc
H (+ or -) 
A. Tot31 Pl'ovisioll for 
Liquidity 
B. Liquidity availahle from 
l)ril~,. and S~_condary Rcs. 
(IIamt.outstandinf,u less 
• C3p. require-cl thBt'COI:) 
C. l.iq<lidity to be provicled 
frot:! asse.ls in Grol1ps 2, 
3 or {.(zero if n C'qlJals 
Ol" excecdtl A, 0 tli!::rwi St' A 
lese! B) 
D. Liquidity availahle from 
Hin.RiEk Assets(90% of 
l'mut.ol.!t.;;tllIldi.ng'• in line 
2) 
E. Liquidity to be l'rc.vidcd 
f-rol.l assets in Grollp<: J 01' 
li(zc.ro if D cqu;1l$ c:- exc-
ceds C,othc)~is(> C less D) ______ _ 
F. UCjddity {\vailnble hom 
JntenH,~diatt! Ass'(!ts (35% of 
"<l:l1t.outstantling,"in linc :9 _____ _ 
G. Liquidity to be provided 
from FortfoUo I\sse-ts(zero 
if P equ.'!l s or e};c('('IJ:,. E. 
otlH·rwj.se E less r) 
"* "* 0); "I< "" 
____ ixt:-o CapitRI Rcqui.rcJ on Any Assets in 
Groups 2-t. U<;ed [0, li q,tidi ty 
6.5% of lin,~ C 
------
li.07- of line E 
9_5% of line G 
____ 11. Total Extra C~l'. R('q. 
~==::.; 
--.--.. --,-----.----,,---.--~,----- -------.- .. _.-_._--------'._--
0) /,Cn:l.L CAl'. ETC. (~u;., ,)f: C:l:).5td('k,Sl;1-plw;,t/!lJiv.hofits 1 ltc!l.Jur CO:lting.,i.oan Valul1L'ion R{,s., 
Net. t:ll."1ppl-!.cd SI.'(:.V~11l"tioll kes.,tin.Jllo(;:It:P(l CIHln~,~·-(>ffs. and allY (~c.:njlm:;lble 
i l\'I~.:.}(i:;H~hl<.h' lJt:I/I·(·,~ii1ti(lll IIl1d Aw)rt.i.Z'l;;-ion Rc-;cl'\!cs) $---_._--_ .• 
W);: . .E 1.1111:"1 n!l!ui.rem<:Jtt 00 IT'.inoJs 1) _________ _ _ ______ •• '_H __ +$ __ , ____ _ 
Q' 
(Y I.,illt,;; 10) -S 
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}'. 2. NOrES REGARD} Ne J"OH:I FOIl A1iAI.YSJNG nANK CAt'tr/.J. (1956) 
A t.hnrcugh appr:lisill or. lhe capit.11 need!: £If a P,1Tticull1r b;lIlk \1111~l t<lkc du.! .1eCOlll1t of ill} 
re]covilnl fnct£1rs affecting the h;wk. Thcf.(· illcllld,~ tilt' eh:Il-Il{'t<:'dstior.s I)f iu; ;H:~rts, itr. 
J.iabiliti,~s, its trust or Cltiler ('orporate rer.poTL!dhiliti('s. "ud il:s m;'ln.1g(·I",~llt - .Hl "'d) WJ 
lhe hb-lacy o]ld pl:ospecls <>f the b{lI1k, it~ ('lIf,t(1m,~rs ancl jt:.: t:omll1unity. TiI(> compl(>}:ity of 
the prob).cm rC{juirC's l.l C:(Jnsid(~r{l11le cy,l'rci~e o[ jlldJ:('mellt. The r,roupinr,s :lnd rt'rcC'nt<lgc~ 
sur,gl'sted in the Form For AI1;11Y!'lil1~ }lank C'l.pitnl r.an n~cr.!lsariJy he no nlon'. Ih,m {lids tn the 
excrcist! of judg(·tlI'~J1t. 
'l'he rt'Cjuircment.s inuiC:,<1tE'd by the VllriO\IS i tCIIlS on the forll1 are eosentia11y "lIormr." anll eRn 
provide no more than nn ini,li,"Ll presu'l\pt;,on o'l!; te> th~ net-ulll (,l!pit.:11 rc"Jujt"<'d hy il parti.c:ulllr 
bank. These "norm!';" tire ('utitlcd to conr.idct .... 'ble \\'ld.r,ht, h\lt v.:Iri('us upl<.'.:1nl or {lo\mw<lrd ndj,'!>t-
mC-lltl'; in rCtJui.n:mcnts may be <lpproprinte for a 1'.1ttlC'ulHr l'.:Jnk if r,·p£!cial or mlll!>I"ll cirCUrnt:tllllcl'S 
nre ill fuet present: in lhn r.pecific situatinn. f,u('.h :lrlju!:lmclltN coulu be midc im)jvidunlly <18 the 
reqU1.n'T'lcllts m:e cnt('.n~d for ('.<1(:11 group of: :J:!'isets; but it uSIJolly i.!'i p1"C'f('riJhlE!, jl.:1rtic:ullll-1y io)· 
futU1~e r~fercllce, to combine thcm Ilnd entE'l: t.hem 1I!1 <I sinf,l.e ndjustment umlet: Item 8, i.ndicat.ing 
00 the An:t1YF.is Form or mVAttachp.d pllge the spt!ciC:ic: h,}!:i.s fot: e.n .. :h adjustment. 
The requirclJ'IC'l1ts fiuggestcd in t.he'! AnalYfli.s Form nr.stl\nc th<lt the b:lllk hn!> M\C'CJlI<Jtp sl1f(~BII3nis ;111<"1 
insur:mc{' covcrn~c.' against .rire, defalcation, bl,rr,l.ary, ctc. Lack oE such ~o{"'r;u(ll·ds or covccage 
.... oult! place lIpOIl the bmlk's cnpitR.l risks which it shOl,lrl not be! e<l11ed upun to bc,1r. 
J1'EM (l,) - rO~nrOLIO ASSETS 
Concentr.:1tioo or Diwrsifir.:ntion - The extra TE'(jUlrCrlCnt of 157. of the fir:::t $100,000 of portf:olio. 
10% of-tl;~--;\Cr.l:1-10().000~ind 5% of the next ~300,OO('l, as sIH'cifi~cl in ill:m 11. is 1I rour.h npPI'o:-:.i-
rniltion of the co;~ecHtr.at:i.on of dill<; (lack of divendfi(·;:ltiol') ""'hie:' i::: IH:cly in 0 slMlJcr l'ot'tfc.1] io, 
,UlU which is u:·;ually r.dh~(:t(~d in the SOmC1-:iHll laq;('l" PTI)P'.)rti.Ull of capit:ll r;h("ll-ln by mo:::t hflnks \.'ith 
smaller pc;rtioli(l~. This requirement is applie'!.1 to R11. banks, hut if. natul:ally Cl larr,c:r p(lrtic,n of 
the total capital T~quircla~nts of. h;'Hlks ",..ilh t:rnallc'l· portfolio:>. llowever, a particul<Jr jlCll·tfClliD, 
whatevcr its size, may in f<Jet h,1'JC r.itilu: I"l~)r(> or lc!'iS c('tlcC'nlratiol1 of ri};k thnn othc'T po .. tfc·];o .... 
of similar siu'. If lil':':l"(' is i.n (<let sul'st.:mri.o:tlly r;rentl'l' or lcsser ~OllCCl1tl-ilti('n of ri:::k in I.bc 
portfo)jo a~sets of the p<1rticular bank - M .. for f'x<lrnpl(' (lrpcmknc:t'! upon A smnller (.T. L1t"J_:P.)' 111)11I1)(·r 
of l'COIWl1lic acti.vities - it youlll he lIppr0l'ri.1tC' t·f) inrn:;nH! PI· (10cr<!i\Se n>quirclllcnts C('ITc$por...linr,ly. 
l'rofiU; At· C(,P t:('d 'By !lank - \·'h~\1 drafts Ij:lvC' bt'1'1l ;](',ccptecl hy the 1'.,nk, ordinarily tht:! cllstom(,I-~1 
IT:ibrlTly-to-t-hTb-,-~ikt:ho1l1d be In!nled us l'ot"tJ.oli() A:;f,(·t.<: if. tlte <JCCcpl:lll1ces nr£' 0\1l':<lttll1diIl1.:, ,,1: 
the ("IC(·,c:ptllncl.!s the,nr.clvc<; r.hn\IJd be so trcul~d j,r held by the b;]n~. 
J.'l'EN (5) - FlXI:O, CLASSllo"l[,ll, ANl) OTlIER J\f,SEffi 
!'~{':.!'..!..2~_I~Ee!:.:~!,_~ - Bad, Jlrend~l'f" furniture nnd fixtures, :nHI other 1"~;]J c!itlltC 11r(' 1I!l!d.f,nc(1 tl 
lom; lC(jllUehll'lIl as <l first aprroxin'lltion. r.hlce lhp.~c ar,r.ct.s uS1,,"}ll}' nr.e not avail:ll,iC' to p.:1)' 
clE'po!iitor;; 1I\\]Cr,S the b,1nk (:(,CR into liqllidali(,l1, lIIHI C\'l'n t.l1l'11 they USIl<llly can t,f' l·u'·lwc! iHlu 
c"sh onJy fit suhst:mti;:d s:lc:rifice. How(;'\'c:r, s('me pn'pC'l"lies Hhieh hrinB in inder~ndcnt in('(1I:"1(" 
r.uc:h 1l!l u,lnk prCJ:.ti.f,C<': luq~cly r('nleu to others, lIny hc' more l"l',1di1y c:onvf"rtib]~ into cD ... h hy ::cllinp, 
01- hOrl:olJinu on 1·la.::I'.J, ilnd in r.Ul:h sillLati()I1~' it: m.iy bl' .11'11T<lprj:tI_c to r{'dllt~(! t1H' ).00% rC'(lld.1"o.'IIIr'llt 
by an.;J.I',(lIJllt ('.qual to <In ;J~!:ei11(>d "sar.rificc" V.:11 IIC , such ll!i. r.ay. tt~(1 or tilr('c tilnC's th~ r,ro~s 
annual i l1depcndcnt i lIC'omr:. 
Stocks - In the COl:::C of stoe.ks, tllcir wide rluctl,nl:ion!: in p:d<:P. sur,gcst it 1007. rC(juire1ne!l,t M, ll. 
fir:;1. ';lp\J,."ox,imntion. UC'WC\,C'T. i.n sOllle ca~es it 1>'11ly l,e <lrpn)pTitlt~ to reduce the 100;: I"Njllir(,Ttl!!llt 
8{;a1.11st A r.toC'.l<; hy an <1I!lOllnt {'CJual to ("In llr.SIIMCd "~,1t:rifi(:e" vn llu! , !:lIch as th(' 10\-1esl: mnrkt~t v(I1t1~ 
r(>3c,hc(\ hy the stock in, S;IY, the pl'ccC'dinC 36 or llr. mont-hs. 
l!.i~clE!..!,!;!ict:yp - In some cases assets m,iY he cl1rdr.u lit booK v<llu(-s "lhi.ch appear to br. below '·ll1'ir 
,1cl.lI:l1 \"1111(",, M,d rn1j' thlls rlppear to I'roviclc hiddrn sln'll:;lh. Um,·cv~r, any .,llcl\,'.]IlC(' (c,r ~t1l'h a 
si.t-IJ<ll;i(II' shuuhl tU! 1".1t.!P. w.ith Creol. t:nut.iol1, ;'Ill!! only •• rU~r till.:il1/; full accO\lnt of pnsr;i"h~ c\CClil1l:S 
in WIJ.II(·S .:>ad thc gn~al tliffitulty Cl[ li.quiil,:,ting a~;~;E:f·": ill di:'lres.'l drcI'r!lstnne,cs. 
1TEH (G) - AJ.l.o\~At\CE FOil 'J'ltUST lJLPARHU':N! 
!~~::'.P.!2:~.!~~:(1_J~,:'£.!L~~:j!:f;., - TI,(! l:("f]IIi.n.!lIlent i.<'r llL(, tnlt:t d,'pin'lmPI'!. dl{luld in \1(' (~V{:il1 I)(! lc:nr. IlI,m 
lhc /.Iw"'n!. Clf ;'lilY ~(·(.tlril.j(,~; dl'lIouit(~cl ~rjth 11,(, St':I('C~ il\)th'JI·ilil.'1: for the proll·<:I.inll of pt·iV:lIC 
or l:{lUn I'ntst[:. f:j!ll'(~ ,;'.t(!h 1;('Clldlit~I': l\r~' nnt Ilv,lililhlc: iu oltlin·'ry cin.'ulIIGt:lllCCS to prnt.l·(",I· 
L1w h,lIlk'" del'osi l:m-!:. 
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]'crCI'I~~tr,!~~ CIf DCjlo".i..~. - 1'11(' prOVl.S10Il for ill'!. Jiflld\lily for c1cr.l;l1ld <iCPOSilF; of individlw}f:, 
p.:nt.i1C'rf;hj,i's find (;prvol'nl'iom~ nr.lunlJy r('>pn~sf'lll:$ :D-J/JZ po!.~:ihlt~ .. hrinl';I);r: ill Ih~por.itfl, pIlls 
207. of thc l"C'mllining 66-2/:.1Z. 3(i% of till!'.' dCP(}~ll's Lp.c. rcpl"c,,('nts 20% "hrink.lr,c, plm. ,O!. 
of the l"C'm.-dning 807.. )11 bOl'la ii1~tLIIH,e", till' I'Hlvi!oiiorl [P1' 20;~ liquidity fCll" l"c:>m.:d,ning clepor.its 
is to hdJl the bank t~onLinul.' .:IS n. F,oill~ ('.11Llec'1'1l even nfl"t nuf[criuC suh.<;L<IIltiDl deposit 
shd nkDr,c. 
AmonG I'o""ihl(' spedal fnctr>l's lo be considered in COllIWc:Li('01l wtth th.! lilJlddity c;clculot)on 
""(IUIII be cOIIC'(!uLrntion I'r ciivcrsific<Jtl.c.'Il r.f rif,;k [tlllonp, Jl'jlt'Rits. Thi~ mir,ht be dllC lo sllC'.h 
thine,oS "r, d(>pcll(lencc' \11)0H a smaller or. 1.1rger lIumher of C'l!oll"mic ·a('tiv.i'·i~fl, or. pr(!ponclC'rl'nc~ 
of largc! or fHll<lll dc-posi.ts - large d(~POf;jts uSlI,111y hejllg 11'0)'(> voJatih. 
J,iqt1ldity Avail.nbll! frelln .... B~;('l~ - I.i1Iuidi.ly av.1ilnblc frOln prlmClry .mu f,(!I~ond.1ry ["('server; i.~ 
liS~·tW1cdt:;:~"C(jlld l-I:Ft:I'in7:~it·oi- tho!lc fHH';('!·$ ll'~n; onJ y I.hl~ J"('!;.ular enpi l,11 n'fjuir('d t"h~rC'oTl, 
Rinee the r£'G'.llur cppilal ~;pecj fiad (or thc!le D::SctB .~f,Stlm(;!-: forced 1iIIUid'll·iol1. 1I(I\~c"('T. Lhe 
r<'cuL1t i':npi.l:!.l sped,n(·cl for other OSf,('l~ (i.c. lho~c i.n Groupr. 2-/1) is only a portion (.1pPTOX-
:i.mately 40%) of th.1t rCCJuired for forcNI liCjuidi1lirm. 1'11'.'l'c[ore, in dctl~I,Utjl1ing the litluidily 
avai.l"hle from such other OS!';cl~. the :mlnunt of sllch oth~~r nss('\ts must hl~ reuuct>d Ily more t1Utn 
Lhe regular sllecifi.ed cap) till. 
~~,!.~c:.~r.i:t"l Rcquil'(!d - 1'his e~;trn capit,l] is to C('WH pOl'=rdblc lOHSCS in forced liquidntinu 
of ",SSP.!"S otlw!" than prim;Jry ':'.Ild s~c(lnd;cr)' r(>t.('l'ves in c:.1!>(! they hnd to he used to pr(>vidC' 
liquj.d i tv. The:! 1\ % ind iC;lted for I.i ne E .lIr.,Junts lo .1n ,lutomot:i c ndd i lhlll to lhe 6.57. Lha t has 
1I1rend}' hccn applied to I.ine:! C, ,llld rf.!Ru]t~ in a total c:>:trn rC'tj1l1T(>mCIl!: ",f 10.5% of the liquidity 
to be provid<:!d frem 111te11wdi.;lle:! Assets. Simi]~lrly, thc~ loCal extr.1 !'(!(jldr('\T!('nt on the liquidity 
to be provided from P()l"f'[<>lio A!)s(>ts i6 207.. If th(' r;:It:l(' ::n;ollllt~ of exlr.:! e.1pit<tJ. were stolc'.d "s 
pcn:t!lll.:lgef. of thC1 1lJ;~cl:s I:n be ] iqlliunt(>d .'l1ther th<ln of tile' liqlliJiLy lo he provicicd, tll(! 
pcrCl'ntllr,CH 1>'Quld he SITWl.l.cr, nalllf:>.ly, 67. of HiniJlllJ1Il Ri.sk 11:>';('1'5, 91. of 1111'~rlncdii1tc A~F.ets, Ilnd 
157. of Portfolio Assel". 
245 
..... 
.. ~ 
I".J. I!);;~ 1'11\\tl lljllt A\;}.l.y~;1t\(: MN)~ (:Al'I'fN. 
l.h,I1!Jt'l'n: l~\l.n'I.ATh)~ ~ll):llR'\~U'\ 
1l.'nltlnJ ,1,'1"':; i 1::.11'1.: 
$;Ivin)~" ')"lw::il!\ 
'[inl., .t"Il"l'it~.JJ'C.\111,kl· $ln,I.11Iljl 
TiM~ 1"'I",.~;t,;.II'I;,~llll).u\k) nnJ 1'\','1' 
ll"lh'hill'l .,( h.U\~1l 
(ll]lC't tl.,I"'~' i tf. 
ll.'r t'n""i nr.s 
(llhl'r I bioi! i f i.,'~ (n) 
5\'1": i ILl (n>.'1 l'I'S: 
TOTAl. 1.1QtIlIJll'Y CAI,C\IL,\l'lt)~1 (I,) 
(1) I'RUlARY RI-:~;I::R\'J; 
Cash nSl'clll (c) 
FcdN.,ll Cunds sold 
(1) l'O'l'AL 
(2) ~t:CO!-.11A,.'\Y R£!';r::~W: 
Commercial PJper & b;mkl!rs 
/I,,:ccI't<!nCt·~ 
Securities n~1turillS under 1 yr: 
Am,HUll 
llut~1 unJil\~ 
------
._----
------
----.--
._--_. 
-----
-----
-----
~=~ 
/ull..,unt 
Outatll\\O.lin& 
1"'1' 
{:"Il\ 
;'IS 
25 
'0 
'0 
'0 
so 
,<>.> 
100 
'00 
,,,..,,,-.. 
Cal'iL.a1 C .. lcul.ltj(ln 
Crl'dit Risk 
Perccnt 
o 
o 
__ 0_ 
o 
-y-
illli(nlm.'lIt" Ilr~' ~lhll>l: Il,'t ef: 
\}'~'I!"l'S l'I's~'r\·,'g ••••••••••••• 
111,:.,:11.' (',']!('et,~,1 hul 
IIt'l 1.':11·1\",1 •••••••••••••••••• 
(I» "1,\I.!lllnl'r'l' r,\'AII.J.I'.!.:: 1'1\1l~: AS:,;!:rs" iN t(, 
J,., "1'.~:I·"!:~lt.,,1 "l\ly until it "IIUCll!: 
"1'lI'\,/\I. 1.1(!UlllIH CA!C!II.ATIO;.l" . 
(t') "C;l"h ASI'('ll''' 111'(' g]ll'\.m u.'t fOIC: 
}k1Iuir<!.1 r~s.'t'ves •••••••••••• ___ _ 
(d) "'1\1'1''''1. A~$I':TS" lit/: S]WWII net of assets 
111.j,l>tful .................... . 
Loss ........................ . 
C.11'it;l1 C .. lculntir;>n 
t!:Jrk.'t Ki$k 
o 
o 
1 
Alllount 
° --0-
--0-
Liquidity Av,'il~ble 
fn..m Assets (b) 
AlI'"lUllt Asr.rc>ga(e 
U .5. lreasu::-y 
_,_ 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o • 
Govcrn~nt AG,;""cics 
StAte,coullly 6. r,:uniciVal 
Other C,rocp 1 
(2) TOTAl. 
(3) HlNUMI RISK I,S5t'iS 
Securities mat~:rin& 1-5 )'rs: 
U.S. Treasury 
Governr.xlnl "[;cr.cics 
State,coullty I: l:runicipal 
Other Crc>~p 1 
(3) TOT.\L 
(t.) INTr.F.:.·'Zt.DlA~ i: t,5sr.TS 
SeclI-.:i::iu .. ·,;;.tUrill& 5-10 )'u: 
U.S. lrcolsury 
('.OVE:':I\J':i~llt a);cncics 
St.lte,count)' l. t."-unicipal 
Other lircup 1 
Loans c~pc~ial1)' bc~urcd or 
gu.cr;mtc(Od 
(4) TOTAL 
(5) J'ORTj-'OLIO ASH1S 
Securitics L1;.1tudng over le yts: 
U.S. TJ'ea~lIry 
Govcrm:«llt .ag~llcjt!s 
State,count)' & ~~nicip~l 
Other Group 1 
Loans: P.cnl cf;tat£' 
COIlSUlJ<.lr int:t .. lll,ent (ll) 
All othc.r 
(5) TOrA!. 
(6) }'IXED,CI.ASSIFIIJ) & OTHI:R AS~l::TS 
bunk. pn·nisLs 
Furlliturc~rixll':"'l',9 ,other real 
estate: 
(7) 
(b) 
(':1) 
(la) 
Group 2 sccuriti .. ·; 
Cto'Jp 3 lo 4 !wr;"ritie,; 
Asset!> clitssifi(;d ,>uLlit.::nda:-u 
/,~cruoll!'_ 6 (lther .assets 
(0) '1:0'1'1.1. 
TOTAl. CAPrfAL CALC!a.f,TW 1'OR 
fV,!'-f.f:r Rl:;r. 
TOTAl. CAI·ITA!. CALCt.:IJ,T£D J'O~ 
CHEIJll' RISK 
1'OTIIL "~~I:rs (d) 
'J:1'.USl' ill:I'MO}!W'f 
~;ARNIl'L:5 
!',i'I:CIAL J'AC'J'OHS_ 
(,ROS::; 
===:::'--= 
o 
o 
-,-
, 
o 
o 
-3-
3 
-'-
o 
0-
-,-
T 
-,-
-,-
-'-
.lQ 
100 
50 
lOO' 
20 
-0-
-,,- --.--
-" --.-
--0- -,-
--0-
o 
o 
o 
--0-
o 
--0-
• 
--,--
--.--
-S-
• 
--,--
--.--
l!l_ 
-'-'-
• 
--.--
--.--
2'5"-
-,-,--
-,-,-
Z-S-
"'Sec r(;Ver.s.c a;idc for f,CCurltJE:S co:nputa-
tion w1lid: tDl:e Ilccount or quality,yield 
and narrower reaturiLy ranges. 
, 
200 
(1J) 
(I :!j 
(D) 
TOT!.I. CAI')'IM. (;AI,GliU,'J'!,O:i (';I'~J uf lifl('~ 7 Lhmuch (1) 
AlIJl1~jl'ElI C/d'11I1!. $'JiaiC'!l:rJ;: t, Cid' flAr. STI'l!C·JtrHE rim);/( 
(Mj'J1Hcd CClI,it:l! Iltn:c:-L'JI(' dj,vjdwi hy li.tw (2) ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• $ ____ _ 
(14) AlJJIlf,1i:JJ /,q);IT', CIII'J1'I,l<! " !:1.1Vl'J'Y CM'OAL 1!.1J1;){ 
(A.Jju~!~'d ",!uiry (:o1l'illli uhj,Jflt hy lille (l:O ....•.•..•...•••••••.•••.••••.••• ~-__ .. 
-------------------------------.---.---~--.------~-"------~----------.-
(;AI'1'/1I1, !<A'I 1(1:; 
",!j"III..~d 1;/'I,il.JJ a;tn,·~tllrt' 1[;1 I. 1,I·nUl': or: 
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'''1111 f''''".I,I~_._ ... _._ •.• '!.i tt.'!:;: ;\P:::'j' f·,il.:/. j.ri,:i.:ry fl":, 1'.'\"" I'.:;, Tn·"I.II/:1 1/1),II')("II"I'Y fI(·(11Iiri". 
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"I ""',' It I I."".;' ;"1 
11/'1'1 )1' 
.,,1.1 j'.: I 
,'1'''' 
i 
t 
1 
i 
( 
A lhorol!1;h :I]1pr;.i::;:t Hr- !.h,' (':IPll;!l 1:1'('(1:; ,·r :t 1';111 j.ul:l\· l';IlII, 1'lu:~1 tilb· (Iu(' ncl"t'llrll. or ,,11 II..~J('\·II!t" 
f'lcL,.r~ ~Irfl'!"liltf: ll·c: h'lHk. 'fill':'''' 1"''')11,1<' 11t,~ 11'·'·'.I("I"li::ll!'!-' n! jt·~; m;!"{',::, it:: Ij;lloilitit'!:, it:; 
t:rllsl ('t· (lIIL(:r C'.(.rl"·rl1!{' rt!~1'111I:;jhjljlil'l', and it!: n·ln:!!".I·III",\t - :I:: 1.'1:11,1:: Ihp hi::I~lry an.! l'l·o~IH'r.l.s 
nJ. the h:ll1l:, jl.l' CIl;.tl'l:U"I'!: ,"1.\1(1 ill' connll11llily. Th,· C(,,"T!"):ilY pf tll<' 1'1"1,]111'1,1 n·1I1in·f, ."I C'OI"'lr.jdl'l·lIht(' 
I!xf'n:ir;(' u[ jl1t!gt"CIIL. 'rh~ l:1"(.:l1l'illl'.:'l and IH'L'('(·III.:q~c'"f: t:1l)'..!:' ,;tl'cl in ("lit! l'nnll If.') IIlW):;!;1l1g lInnk Clll'il':Ll 
C.1n Ilccl!~a;al"jJ)" be' llv IH'r(' ,I,,""m ajt1:; L(I Ihl' ('Xl'I'(:ira' "I .iudr,l:U:Ilt. 
TI1<.' rcqujj'('na'l1ls jndjcnL('d hy lilc' \',1riou.<:: i.1·l'ln~ no the 101"111 Ill',: (>f;:;I'lltLilly "1101"01::" .11l1i CI1T1 pnwic1" 
un mol'e lhnll an jllit.i~tl J~r('~;"Jl.lpl.j(11\ ;:\:: 1.0 111(, ",·rwll t''!pit':ll n~'Jui'(',l hy 11 p:lr!"irlll:u' b.1Ilk. 'J'1H":C 
"norlus" ;lI'C l!lltir l(·d ttl ('("1J\~ddcrilhl" ~.'(d.nH·, hilI. \·'lI·inll~.i 111'IWl'd nl dp .... '1lI·1i1nl ndjl1t.l"IlII'nt:t; In l.'('rpdn·-
fllf".'llt::; \11:J)' hI' :lpl'ropr.lnr:e ft'l::l {"illti~\lJ.ar hOln1:. i( ';I'l"t.:inl. or 111111:::1,:1 (~jl'(II"I~(:lI1C('~; :11"1' in f<lct" pl"l·:lt~1l1 
il' lh(' I'p(~C'jfi(' ,1ltu:lU.nn, Sllch ."1.d:iHr.LIllt'IlI·.n Ill:l)' h(' ('ntc,rt'd ll11ch:r "~p",,:i;d filt:l(ll'!;" jndic·"tcd I'll Ihl' 
Allalyd.:'l l'c,r~I, 
lll(! r<'quit"l~m(;111!' I:\li'./',('r.l.~·d i.1l I'hl: Anal)Tir, Form :l:::"JI'.l(' tlw1" 11!1' h;~(l',: hits ,'{kIJlI.1t·l~ ~:lfl"r.llO\I·,l~: 11,,<1 
i.nSlll'.111Cl' 1,1l\'{'r:1!,.'! .q;;.j!l:;1. [irt'. IkJ,IJC';llioll, \'llq',lm·y. 1'1:,·, 1.11('1: pf !;(I(:h :;:,r 1·t;,i:I1·.] !; l't crov('r,,(/, 
\"0\11:.1 rLtcr! 1I1't'.1 the h"l"lk':,; c:11l'ilnl d:;k:; ",l1i('h it. {:hQu]d un!. hC' c;ll](·d 11p(1n l(. ],C'.1 •• 
* SECtl!nTn:~: G(I:IPlJ'fl'J.".rO!\~ \~hjch t.ab' aCC\111llt «I' IJI,.l]jty, yiflll llIld !I:1rTl"IV(~1' l11<lturi.ly ).':lng('1":. ror 
d(~t:cnllj.\i.n& h,o.l·kC'1 I jr-t l;Jb: lltc [olJ(), .. dnr. l:tl'l't;~ 
1.. Di.r.lrl.butc.: Lh(: hnni,'s IwJ.dint;!' uf U.S. tr'~,:wlll'y. !l.S. Agl"IH~y :111'1 St..:1tf' <lntl ]'u)"ir·ict1J. ~l\h.::1i\'i.!1i(ln<; 
in the fOl1("1I.i.llg fll[ukcts! 
"\'l'l"'l~(' C'()\lI){111 ,',)1.1:. Tll('. r"('f(~~ H,d r."·tI,,,d i 1'; lo nht" i 11 hy ""1111'111 i I')'. :'f' r 11;11 ;'11:111;11 CIIUI)(]LI i l't'O!,,~~ 
,'.cIII·r:flr,,1 11)' r:("'·lll.jlj(~~: i,,;t I;J\'("II f,;c]1 (!IIt! d.ividilll; SIlI'11 ,'111111:11 ""111,,)11 i)H'Ol'''' hy Ih,' par \':11\1(: 
flf rlt(: ",,]1. JII t1,,~ ,1JI.r'J"tr;l!..ivc, Ihc' ;"I 'It'I·.Ij;t· 1 .• )111",,1 ,;11.1' tIll~' j", i:"I"'!!''] d': tJ..~·.C'1··il!(·d I)vl'l·ll';tf". 
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l (f~OI' 11,:r:(':;nilry !'.O ~·"I:I!,J.,'t, j r "VCI';'l~,~ (:~lltIJl'n )',ill' j:: Lll~'\.·n). A\'I~l"iL<'.i' (,'IITI'l1t 111;11 kt·t )' lcld 
(:IPPTO:d,IU11' )'il':Jd h.-!.:r: j()J TI1;Jr~':l·t va1'.1" ~:lIp~ .. 'l) In:1)' Il~ (,hlnln,·d ['1'1;1 "clllal 1:I1o·,Jtl'dj',r~ (If yiC'ld:; 
ll!a:d to <,l>t;';.lt ;,lH'\J.~ I!:;td;:;:t '\"alll •. , I'" hy nl'!."! ljll:~ ,,:.jp!:l,' i"\'('~;I'I1('l1t: i:;!HI{, f"1" t'arh etl] rh,,( 
in n'l"'(·!H'l1l.:>ti'.'t; of lh.~'. p;~l:l,i"lILll- ('1'11,1:.1,. Jf'1 :;t.11(- :111'1 1'"Jiticill t.lIh,li\'i .. ;jull:'l \.litllll';lll1dti{·!: 
(If fl'om 10";'0 yl·;11~. se1(:("!: ;: :·,·."li"1l1 gr.1d(· i;,;r,II(' IIl:d,lrill); ill 1:; )'0'111"" m: ;,~_: d(.'1d! \H J~I Y('.,lT1' :l!; 
j" nv.,i),tld(,. 1)j\'i(\:.: 11,- 1l1:,rl~('(, V;lllll' nf thl.! i:;nIH' hy p;11' '1';,111(' Iwd ]oc:ll{' tll" le~;\lllHI1I ',',1111(' i.n 
lhe' Ccmpl'('hl'!l;~i\'~; l\ol~u 1:"lIJo.' '!',I],l{'{; 11l1,h~r' '-]".: 1:<':1]1"11 ral'l' or f],,' i:;~;lIC t('jp(:I('<i (llld t"r:~t(~ :teT(!:-;~ 
1.\) 1:::"lI,lIrily yiel.d. Ent •. '" "1,11 nr'; ly y,ir,_ld lI11d(']' ".r\\,;:, CIIt', ~'l.t," ,'lhU\'I'. Ir i'lfpIl1l'1tinll ('OllCe'I'ldllf', 
llll' iluliv idll:tl 1;\'(:111:1 d (;s ('('I,ll'd:-d n('. catil cd 1 if; 11)1:!\,0I j,11l1111!, {,pI ('I l'I.l!'I;I~t: yi ('J cl l'hla,; w,t! f t III;t 
:1 rCJt('r:ll rt" .. i_l''' pf. r::!:c:<: 1'1'1'-\',.; I in!'. ;11: 01' m',;1)' tJ,t~ Lh)(~ (.( 1,l"i.t'inr" 
2, rdce! I.hl' fP,!C~lri!"icli itl l)iJ~',h rdl. to yidd ;I\. !ilt~ hir,h yiC'ld r,ltc' M'.t forth in tIle hir,h yield 
1:l.:ltrb:. f~Llll~! j-',:i.f'C'. ,I:'; (hour'!t L'll!.:h u!ll \,.'",,:t filti',ll' i,~;r.UI' l',;jng ;l"Cr;),~(' cotlpnp r,lle :1Il,\ '1'1':11 
par v,lluc:, A::!;:t;ne nWi::'.'ill.(,; fllr ('<Jrh ('dl "!; rn'll~\)~: )-(J ye"r); 1-:l(l~ y('.HI'::); ~-5(3! yC;I"~); 
~-]()(7l Y":lT!;); J(1'?C(JJ )'I';in.); ,o(25 ye,11'~ «('~:"('l'l: 'H;~\'·:".~ ::'J y,~,!n; [01' 11.~~. !.r',l'nclc·::)). No.;\.C' 
If h,1J1\.; \1;:11. " f"'n<'(~111"1"tlti(ln ('If J()~I\'J' Cj\l:\l.i,y HtllHi,cipal :.;('0,:11 r i.ti.C':: "dd ahout ~O bmds point:: ton 
hit.h yir.l.tl ~(\r "~'.~::ltn. noel 1',,1illC',,1 stlh(ll"~f',i(>II!'.". 
3. l}c:t('Tmj,I1f~ t-h~: <l~,c:a;lt -:of J,:,}:j"'\lr,~ }l1"oh:thl(! ):l;I1'l;pl d(:i'rcC'j,'ti~)11 ill ('(1(:11 l'c'1 11)' Htll'Ll':lcti"i; I.he: 
1~,1rk~'L V;;J11)(.' (Jh:;,d.I'C'd I:ro;1I ::1"\:)1 2. <1\10\'(' fr(J111 the ht.c.].: "alll(' of P('(:lldtjC'.s. ]:,,1(.'\' ne tl1il t f"ii',llt(' 
f(lr m,1;dllll"'1 r'Pl!'eli,'l 1,"ll'b-'r lost 1.11 ll'(t {lPl)l"t'f.rj,1tt: l'r:I"k!'t rll;k (,l"·llllnll, C(ll"blllin~; Fll('l'c l'~r.(':":'l1y 
in (It:dl'!" to t,;.II,fnrr,\ t., di!;:;J'jhution 'IS .1PI'(·':l"n ('11 thC' fn~'ll I,f thfl ]'onn. I[ C;()U:l'ttt<lli('n~~ r-ho,,' 
p,)l:cnli;,1J, m<Jl"k~~. "I'I,,,,:d;;tioll (1nl!')" l'_11J'fl ft,]: ,;l:I1'!:<_'l risk. 
Hcthnd [0[, l.nj)t" ; 'T. (:OUPf,lf: 
l':Jr v .. due> + If:lrkr~:,: '>'<llue " ..... i;'H'J1("J pl:i('c 
l.ocat!' <It.!=UI'lL''! }lricr~ :il'l tlt:'.Contpreltcn:,:ivl.' Bond V'llllal",joll 'filhlc::; ;lSf,t1"ti'~;; {I (,(1\11"'11 (.·qqnl t('l 'IV"l-,It:(' 
(;\)1:1'('111: yjr:l.I, 'J'I';'lL'I' lia.' p,:ier. tll tile: yield le It;:tll'''ily I'(llllmtl in lh(' t:.1t.lt·::. 'f},(' yi.r>lol to 1I1'lLlldty 
is tlH': iOll •. ,;:r:d ;\\'(;1,',;,:,,::1, C~'\Jp{ln T.:!tc of th<ll pal'l:i(:ulnr c:('.11. (J-kltt'~ (hdnp, te. tllf', "(>r,trainl(', of \.1.(' 
tlll;l~ I;;Z" tile ),i.I.'l\1 lrl:t)' ]':1\'(: to ht· jnl'Cl'pol:ltcd; " r.l\'lrc~ ]lrc:ci.!;C' m'.'I.j)'}rl for t1hl:tildlli.'. lhl~ ),jchl "1,")' 
be! Itchie\,tocl hy Ittili:!.i!!;; Il!(~ m;llhr.I:l:ltir.aJ (~qt"'ti.rm r.Ol' tll't<'l'In:illilll: latch yj(·lch.), 
Notr-: If llt~' a1>(',',,(' ;1 •• 1'" :01'(: 1I11.1 .... :ilnbl('. <1lld as ~1n ~tll·('rnilt.i\,r> ],111 l::!l:s d(·!:il'i!hj(~ ii,,·!tlnd, till' fp]·!N".il1i! 
]H!l:t.:I;l1t ~'i>: (::1,'\1'0,'1: m,IY 1)(' 11.',,~d: 
All. r.\~{,I1I'il:.i(!1i Jr.:I!·ul·i1\;~ 1I11':l')' 
(lV{'r 10 y(~,1l:S. ;:~. lwr,:,~nl. 
)'NH, 11"'n:r:,"t; J-5 ),(',1!'!" El !,rtcl'nt; !1--10 ),I'nl"f., 15 1'(']'(,('Ic!'; 
\ 
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fIle. t\i~:;I.~ter va]U::ItiO!1 .'"!.p!)n:.~('1J b;I5Cd ;In tll(; 'J930!H ('.~ln he seen in the liquidity 
:alclll~ti.ot1s. ThE.~ pC'rccntnger. fnr dcm:md anll time depn~;itr. of indivi.duals, 
):lrtn.erships a.nd CQ1.'pcl .. atio:l~ au_", octeI'miTlc{l frum the WOl.·st deposit: 'shrinkagen' 
,xpcri.enccd during the 1.980'5. To this in ac1dQd ·1 20% murgi.n, "npPoi:<odl.y to 
;'!nublc the banl~ to lllCJintain it.~j~l1': as a gujng COJ1cern~ Thus a 47% requir.ement 
-, 
J!1 ti.me deposits ipe actually rc'prcr,ents ,i thirty-three and a third percent 
shrinkn!;e plus 20% of tb;, remaining sixty-six and two thirds percent. Similarly 
36% is 207, shrink;]!;,' 1".115 20% of: 110%. 
tt is interesting to note, however., the 100% r.equirement against all. other. deposits. 
rhus if pri.mary ,me! ,,«c'llldary reserves arc not "uf:£icient to cover these liquidity 
requi.r('mcnts, then a::i~ets in SlIcc.cssivc lCBS liquid categ(')ries ,\Till have to be used. 
~gnin incorpol:atiI1i; tlH! disaster. valuation approa~h, if such asuets are used then 
they will be valued en n forced sale basin or gone-concern. 
:)f Inore. analytical in~pol~tancc, houevcr, is t:1l{~ llotes acc?ropanying the statlstical 
breakdowiH;. It notes that spcc:ial factors to be cOl1n:i.clcrcd in connection • ..rith thl~ 
liquidity ealculatiou \\I·ill be e)~ccntrD.tioll or diversificCltion of risk among dcposit.8 * 
Uut j t also not(~d that tt_I":"; capital needs of a bJuk must take! into account all 
relcv3nt fa~:tors affectiHr. tb~~ hrmk. Thus 'vbilst no guidelines were laid dO\\1U 
fOt, j:",dging the mC:ln':lBe.r.1Qllt, histl'ry c1nd pro~pr._ets of Cl b.:tnk, the lloard of Governorr. 
\-"oultl r.onsideI' th2<:O:P lc"!.clon:. Int:ere8tin~J.y enough though their conclusion \-Ins 
'The C:Ofl1r;-le;d ty of: tt1(~ proh]cln }'cquircs ;). contiidenlhlc exercise nf juor.me:nt.. The 
gl.'Qupings :Jud p~.rccntnges ~':f'$~~~~::(~d in the f:'o~T\ [("II' Anoly:d.ng Bauk. Capital can 
necessarily be no Ir.Ot-;.: th:'tL~ aidr: ill th(~ exer('1.sp. 0f ju(lgnlcnt.' 
In 1972 form Anr: \1d~ rcvi~~e.l ~'.-:"I t;:tkc' 1.:1tO 'I("count the tuo 'credit crunches' of 
1966 and 1~j(J9 .. '1'h1!$)o the dlS,-I~:tcr vnlu2tion '·:'·:!S now to bp based nn the experiences 
of. the period 1~J!jO~"1971. The new fe'llurcG \'.'(.:J"E;' l1OW:-
3. H.'lrket .ri.s}: to be c."':.lculal'.'-d [or." difrercnL r.J.ar;r;Pf.i; coupons and mtlturitics 
of loarkct:,l:J.e sc"a,-illcs in all lG cell 11Iatr;x. 
• '1'1 1 . • d • , 1" ., 1 -, . ' ••• t.t.. le. lqUl It)' en .. l-:U ntJ.an f;l1()·.~S ·":·CQUC(!( req.l1JTCmeHt5 an:nnst lpC. tl.me. rind 
e!e=n~, d,~.p"si t3 ur,dl'!r $100,000, bUl ti".~ d"po~,; ts over $100,000 have a 
requirement of 60% bt'caiJ3c of. the ,'olatilitv of OU'n. 
. . 
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APPENDIX 7 
THE MEASUREMENT OF CAPITAL SEPTEMBER 1980 
G.1. OBJECTIVES 
The two most important objectives are: 
1. To ensure that the capi tal posi tion of an insti tution 
is regarded as acceptable by its depositors and other 
creditors; and 
2. To test the adequacy of capital in relation to the risk 
of losses which may be sustained. 
It was concluded that the first obj ective is broadly met by 
relating current liabilities to capital resources - a free 
resources or gearing ratio - which is to be constructed as 
far as possible from elements available to the public. For 
the purpose of supervision the second obj ective is the more 
important, and will be measured by a risk asset ratio. This 
requires information, an important part of which is likely to 
be available only to the supervisory authority and the 
institution itself. 
G.2. DEFINITION OF THE CAPITAL BASE 
For both ratios there is a common definition of shareholders 
funds to which certain adjustments will be made. 
1. ~~holders EYD~ 
a) Share Capital. 
The amount paid up (whether in full or in part) on the 
issued ordinary and non-redeemable preference shares, 
plus the share premium. 
b) Loan Capital. 
Loan capital which is fully subordinated to other 
credi tors (including depositors), whi ch has a minimum 
initial term of five years to maturity and incorporates 
no restrictive covenants: subject to a maximum of one 
third of the total capital base net of outstanding 
goodwill and to straight line 'amortisation' in the 
last five years of life. 
c) Minority Interests. 
d) 
When included in accounts as a result of the 
consolidation of subsiduary companies not wholly owned. 
Reserves. 
Comprise balance on profit and loss 
reserves, however described, 
reserves'. 
account and general 
including 'inner 
e) Provisions. 
General bad debt provisions less any associated 
deferred tax asset. 
2. ~ Gearing Measurem~ 
The gearing of free-resources ratio is determined by 
incorporating the following deductions to shareholders' 
funds: 
a) Investments in subsidiaries and associated companies 
and trade investments. The preferred treatment is to 
consolidate the business of the subsidiary and the 
parent, but where this is, not done a deduction from the 
parent's capital will be made. Such investments are 
likely to be used as a basis for gearing by the 
affiliate, and unless some adjustment is made the 
capi tal in the parent will therefore be geared on 
twice. In addition lending to such companies which has. 
the character of capital should also be deducted in 
full. 
b) Goodwill. 
This is justified on the grounds of the uncertainty of 
the value of that part of the cost of acquiring an 
asset which exceeds its net value. 
c) Premises. 
d) Equipment and Other fixed assets. 
A full deduction of these fixed assets is made on the 
basis that it is imprudent to employ depOSitors' funds 
to finance the offices from which banks operate and the 
equipment used in the business. 
3. ~ Ei§k Measure 
Some of the deductions from the capital base made in the 
gearing ratio are equally appropriate for the risk asset 
ratio. Thus investments in subsiduary and associated 
companies, trade investments, goodwill, and investment in 
plant and equipment will be deducted as before. However, in 
terms of capital risk, bank premises are no more vulnerable 
to loss than other property assets. For the risk and 
calculation premises will therefore not be deducted but will 
be treated like other balance sheet assets. 
In calculating the capital base for the purpose of the risk, 
extra adjustments may be made to reflect any genuine hidden 
values in the balance sheet and to any over-statement of 
assets in relation to their market value. 
G.3. CAPITAL RATIOS 
1. ~ Gearing Ratio 
The gearing ratio measures the adjusted capital base against 
all other non-capital liabilities apart from contingent 
liabilities which are incorporated within the balance sheet. 
Acceptances are excluded because they are more appropriately 
considered within the risk measure of capital adequacy, and 
secondly because they are not always separately identified in 
published balance sheets .. they are inconsistent with the 
objective that the gearing ratio should, so far as possible .. 
be capable of being calculated from published accounts. 
The risk asset ratio establishes the proportion of the 
adjusted total of risk assets represented by the capital base 
as modified above. Each category of asset currently 
identifiable from statistical returns is ascribed a risk 
weight. These weights attempt to reflect the relative risk 
of loss arising from credit or investment and forced sole 
risks inherent in a particular class of asset. The adjusted 
total of risk assets is calculated by multiplying each 
balance sheet asset by its risk weight. Assets and their 
risk weights are classified as follows: 
(a) Nil weight 
(b) 0.1 weight 
(c) 0.2 weight 
(d) 0.5 weight 
Bank of England notes and UK coin 
Other sterling notes 
Balances with Bank of England 
Special deposits with Bank of England 
Debits in course of collection on banks 
in the United Kingdom 
Balances with overseas offices of the 
reporting bank 
Lending under special schemes for 
exports and shipbuilding 
Certificates of tax deposit 
Items in suspense 
Refinanced lending at fixed rates 
Gold physically held in own vaults 
Gold held elsewhere on an allocated 
basis. 
Foreign currency notes and coin 
UK and Northern Ireland Treasury bills. 
Debit items in course of collection on 
overseas banks 
Market losses with listed banks, 
discount markets, etc. 
Market loans to UK local authorities and 
public corporations 
Balances with banks overseas with a 
maximum term of up to one year 
(including claims in gold) 
Bills other than UK and Northern Ireland 
Treasury bills 
Other loans and advances to Northern 
Ireland Government, UK local 
authorities, public corporations and 
other public sector 
British government stocks with up to 
eighteen months to final maturity 
Acceptances drawn by UK and overseas 
banks and UK public sector 
Claims in gold on UK banks and members 
of the London Gold Market. 
British government ·stocks with over 
eighteen months to final maturity 
Northern Ireland government stocks 
UK local authority and other public 
sector stocks and bonds 
(e) 1.0 weight 
(f) 1.5 weight 
(g) 2.0 weight 
Acceptances drawn by other UK and 
overseas residents 
Guarantees and other contingent 
liabilities. 
Market loans with other UK residents 
Other loans and advances, net of 
specific provisions for bad debts, but 
excluding connected lending 
Assets leased to customers 
Working capital provided for overseas 
offices of the reporting bank, both in 
the form of deposits and in other forms 
Balances with banks overseas with a term 
of one year or over (including claims in, 
gold) 
Claims in gold on non-banks 
Aggregate foreign currency position (as 
defined in the Bank of England's paper 
on 'Foreign Currency Exposure') 
Other assets e.g. silver, commodities 
and other goods beneficially owned by 
the reporting bank 
Other quoted investments, not connected. 
Connected lending (to be looked at case 
by case and to exclude market-type 
lending where this can be separately 
identified) 
Unquoted investments (subj ect to case-
by-case treatment) 
Property (includes all land and premises 
beneficially owned by the reporting 
bank) • 
3 • .Q.Q m p 0 s it ion Qf g ear i n g .lilld ..r.lika1lJi..tl r aliJl.:l. 
(a) Capital base 
(b) Adjustments to 
capital base -
deduct 
(c) Adjusted capital 
base (a-b) 
(d) 
(e) 
~jng ratio RiM asset ratio 
Share capital 
Loan capital 
Minority interests 
Reserves 
General provisions 
Investments in 
subsidiaries and 
associates 
Goodwill 
Equipment 
Other fixed assets 
Deposits and other 
non-capital 
liabili ties 
Gearing ratio 
(c:d) 
Investments in sub-
sidiaries and 
associates 
Goodwill 
Equipment 
Other fixed assets 
(f) 
(g) 
Adj usted 
total of 
risk 
assets 
(Derived 
from the 
applica-
tion of 
the risk 
weights) 
Risk asset ratio 
(c as a percentage 
of f) 
Source: Bank of England, 'The Measurement of Capital', ~ 
Qf England Quarterly Bulletin, September 1980. 
APPENDIX 8 
CAPITAL RATIOS FOR LONDON CLEARING BANKS 1975-1981 
H.1. The following tables represent a rudimentary measure of 
the gearing and risk asset ratios for the major clearing 
banks. The data has been taken from publicly available 
information. In this respect the study is limited but serves 
a useful exercise by illustrating the basic trends and key 
components of the ratios. 
The information disclosed by the banks is not consistent. but 
an attempt has been made to structure the data in a 
comparable fashion. The following assumptions have been_ 
made: 
1. Deferred taxation has been left out of the computations 
of the capital base. The uncertainty and differing 
treatments of deferred taxation make this omission 
necessary. It is of course appreciated that where 
substantial sums accrue to reserves instead of the 
deferred tax account then this will improve the capital 
ratios. 
2. The figures for general provisions until public 
disclosure in 1978 are calculated as one percent of 
market loans to other UK residents. 
3. Certificates of Deposit and inter-bank placings over 30 
days are grouped together. Lloyds Bank do not, 
however, disclose these figures. 
4. The disclosure of foreign currency liabilities is 
generally limited. Where disclosed they would 
significantly increase the value of risk assets. 
5. The distinctions between acceptances, engagements and 
guarantees are not always clear. Where this 
distinction is not made, the figure for acceptances and 
engagements are taken to include contingent liabilities 
in respect of guarantees as well. 
6. Securities guaranteed by the British government were 
given a risk weighting of 0.3, as the relevant maturity 
schedules are not publicly available. 
7. All the information was taken from the published annual 
reports and accounts. 
. 
N 
. 
:I: 
1 
11 
A 11 B 11 C 11 D 
BARCLAYS BANK 
11 F 1 I G 11 H 
1975-1981 
2/----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3 CAPITAL BASE FOR GEARING RATIO ([m) 
4 DU 
5 ITEM 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
6 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
7 Share Cap 201 202 203 232 233 282 284 
8 Pref Cap 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
9 Ret Pref 41 60 100 199 305 296 275 
10,Res Rev 21 74 77 77 148 150 156 
1110ther-Res'lJ 497 535 625 780 995 1231 1514 
12/Share Prem 12 13 14 70 74 33 38 
131Total Res 571 683 816 1126 1523 1710 1983 
141ssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssss 
151S/H Funds 773 884 1019 1358 1756 1992 2267 
161ssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssss 
171Gen Prey 106 127 149 111 145 177 202 
181Min Int 59 66 70 68 86 102 132 
191Loan Cap 122 178 240 227 262 323 432 
20lssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssss 
211Tetal Cap Base 1059 1255 1478 1764 2249 2593 3033 
22/ssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssss 
23lLess; 
241Trade Inv 29 34 36 28 35 35 39 
251Inv Ass Cos 85 114 129 159 168 190 229 
261Prem & Equip 428 529 565 594 713 795 924 
271----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
281Adj Cap Base 517 579 748 983 1332 1574 1842 
291======================================================================================== 
CD 
'" 
'" 
1 A 11 B 11 C D 11 E 11 F 11 G 11 H 
371GEARINll RATIO 
381ssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssss 
391 YEAR 
40 lITEM 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
411ssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssss 
42 1 Deposits 14494 17254 19348 20841 26300 31980 42834 
431 Non-Cap Liabs 877 909 1400 1390 1928 2700 3087 
441----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
451Total N-C Liabs 15370 18163 20748 22231 28228 34680 45921 
46'Adj Cap Base 517 579 748 983 1332 1574 1842 
47 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
48 Gearing Ratio (%) 3 3 4 4 5 5 4 
49 ======================================================================================== 
50 
51 
52 RISK ASSET RATIO 
53 CAPITAL BASE 
54,SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS 
551ITEM YEAR 
561 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
571----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
581 Tot Cap Base 1059 1255 1478 1764 2249 2593 3033 
59lLess: 
60lTrade Inv 29 34 36 28 35 35 39 
611Inv in Ass Cos 85 114 129 159 168 190 229 
621Equip & FAs 61 67 64 68 107 143 175 
631----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
641RA Adj Cap Base 884 1041 1249 1509 1938 2226 2591 
651======================================================================================== 
I A I1 B ' , C I1 D I1 E ' , F 11 G ' , H , , , 
68 RISK ASSETS 
69 Risk Weight YEAR 
70 & ITEM 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
71 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
72 0.1 Treas Bills 567 553 312 299 356 259 386 
73 0.2 Call money/short noti 1624 2080 2529 2136 3614 4326 4895 
74 Bills other T Bills 545 307 346 282 328 481 782 
75 CDs(Bank placings )30 days N/A N/A 3472 4142 5510 6704 
76 0.3 HMG Stocks 483 393 502 525 433 822 727 
77 0.5 Acc/Engagements 1490 1978 2018 2186 3205 4089 5504 
78 Fgn Curl'S N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
79 Guarantees See El Accepts 
80 1.0 Mkt loans to other UK 10569 12717 14857 13504 15364 18662 26807 
81 Leased Assets 157 193 193 304 867 1408 2054 <Xl 
82 Debtors N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Lt) 
"" 83 Instal Finance N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
84 Other quoted Inv: 
~ 85 UK 33 26 21 19 26 22 32 
'" 0 86 Elsewhere 273 454 601 721 836 906 790 0:: 
<.:> 87 1.5 Con Lending: 
:.: 88 Trade Inv 29 34 36 28 35 35 39 z 
-0: 89 Assoc Cos 85 114 129 159 168 190 229 
'" Cfl 90,Unquoted Inv 245 280 292 208 242 174 224 j 9112.0 Property 367 462 501 526 606 652 749 
tJ 921ssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssss 
~ 931Total Risk Assets 16465 19590 22335 24368 30222 37537 49922 
'" 941======================================================================================== 
A 11 B I1 C I1 D I1 E 11 F 11 G I1 H 
96lWeighted Risk Assets 
97 'Weighting Year 
98 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
99 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------100 0.1 
101 0.2 
102 0.3 
103 0.5 
104 1.0 
105 1.5 
106 2.0 
57 
434 
145 
745 
11031 
537 
734 
55 31 
477 575 
118 151 
989 1009 
13390 15671 
641 685 
923 1002 
30 36 26 39 
1178 1617 2063 2476 
157 130 247 218 
1093 1603 2045 2752 
14548 17092 20998 29684 
592 668 598 737 
1052 1211 1304 1497 
107 ssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssss 
10tl Total risk adj assets 13682 16594 19123 18650 22356 27281 37403 
109 ======================================================================================== 
110 Risk adj Cap Base 884 1041 1249 1509 1938 2226 2591 
111 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------112 Risk Asset Ratio 6 6 7 8 9 8 7 
113 ======================================================================================== 
. 
<'1 
. 
;r:: 
A 11 B 11 C 11 D 
1 LLOYDS BANK 
1I E 
GROUP 
1I F 1I 
1975-1981 
G 1I H 
2 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------3 CAPITAL BASE FOR GEARING RATIO (Em) 
4 YEU 
5 ITEM 1975 1976 19'[7 1978 1979 1980 1981 
6 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
Sh2.re Cap 
Pref Cap 
Ret Prof 
Res Rev 
Other Res 
Share Prem 
Total Res 
130 
0 
30 
-4 
412 
0 
438 
166 166 
0 0 
60 63 
21 5 
437 556 
38 0 
555 624 
166 168 171 178 
0 0 0 0 
106 162 172 157 
17 5 2 137 
745 878 1046 1224 
1 2 3 17 
868 1048 1224 1535 
14 ssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssss 
15,S/H Funds 568 721 790 1034 1216 1395 1713 
16:ssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssss 
171Gen Prov 62 78 88 44 53 67 107 
18:MinInt 2 2 3 4 3 9 81 
191Loan Cap 126 185 173 163 152 236 352 
201ssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssss 
211Total Cap Base 758 986 1053 1245 1424 1706 2253 
221ssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssss 
231Lessj 
241Trade Inv 75 71 78 95 111 148 147 
25:Inv Ass Cos 55 58 64 81 99 134 133 
261Prem & Equip 378 432 471 509 533 581 773 
271----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
28:Adj Cap Base 250 425 441 561 681 844 1200 
291======================================================================================== 
o 
<0 
'" 
1 A 11 B 11 C 11 D I1 E 11 F 1I G 11 H 
371GEARINu RATIO 
381ssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssss 
391 YEAR 
40 lITEM 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
41 Issssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssss 
421Deposits 9085 10746 12394 13521 16009 18118 25309 
43 'Non-Cap Liabs 113 135 171 42 79 118 206 
44 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
45 Total N-C Liabs 9198 10881 12565 13563 16088 18236 25515 
46 Adj Cap Base 250 425 441 561 681 844 1200 
47 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
48 Gearing Ratio (%l 3 4 4 4 4 5 5 
49 ======================================================================================== 
50 
51 
52 RISK ASSET RATIO 
53 1 CAPITAL BASE 
541SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS 
551ITEM YEAR 
561 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
571----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
581Tot Cap Base 758 986 1053 1245 1424 1706 2253 
59lLess: 
60lTrade Inv 75 71 78 95 111 148 147 
61IInv in Ass Cos 55 58 64 81 99 134 133 
621Equip & FAs 40 46 58 88 97 117 143 
631----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
641RA Adj Cap Base 587 811 853 982 1117 1309 1830 
651======================================================================================== 
.... 
'" 
'" 
I A 11 B 11 C 11 D 
681RISK ASSETS 
691 Risk Weight YEAR 
, , 
, , E , , , , F G 11 H 
70 I & ITEM 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
71'------------------------------------------~---------------------------------------------
72 0.1 Treas Bills 105 24 63 38 2 35 1 
73 0.2 Call money/short noti 1669 1616 2186 2357 2365 2362 3436 
74 Bills other T Bills 160 262 206 203 391 290 233 
75 CDs(Bank placings )30N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
76 0.3 HMG Stocks 452 519 495 432 282 332 
77 0.5 Ace/Engagements 1031 1379 1382 1467 1753 2359 
78, Fgn Currs 5387 7521 11531 16315N/A N/A N/A 
791 Guarantees See E/Aecepts 
8011.0 Mkt loans to other UK 6158 7791 8784 9778 12224 14306 
811 Leasea Assets N/A N/A 151 218 324 584 
82 Debtors N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
83 Instal Finance N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A NIA N/A 
84 Other quoted Inv: 
85 UK 2 1 2 1 3 8 
86 Elsewhere 192 258 232 298 293 296 
87 1.5 Con Lending: 
500 
3788 
20308 
1008 
3 
313 
881 Trade Inv 75 71 78 95 111 148 147 
891 Assoe Cos 55 58 64 81 99 134 133 
90 I Unquoted Inv 39 51 51 54 52 50 41 
9112.0 Property 338 386 413 421 436 464 629 
921ssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssss 
931Total Risk Assets 15662 19936 25636 31755 18335 21366 30539 
941======================================================================================== 
"1 
co 
"1 
, A 11 B 11 C ' , D ' , E 11 F ' , G 11 H , , , , 
961Weighted Risk Assets 
97 'Weighting Year 
98 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
99 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
100 0.1 11 2 6 4 0 3 0 
101 0.2 366 376 478 512 551 530 734 
102 0.3 136 156 148 130 85 100 150 
103 0.5 3209 4450 6456 8891 877 1180 1894 
104 1.0 6352 8050 9169 10294 12844 15194 21631 
105 1.5 253 270 289 344 392 496 481 
106 2.0 676 772 825 841 872 928 1258 
107 ssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssss 
10tllTotal risk adj assets 11001 14075 17373 21015 15621 18431 26148 
1091======================================================================================== 
110lRisk adj Cap Base 587 811 853 982 1117 1309 1830 
1111----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1121Risk Asset Ratio 5 6 5 5 7 7 7 
1131======================================================================================== 
'" ., 
<'l 
A iI B I1 C II D II E II F I1 G I1 H 
11 MIDLAND BANK GROUP 1975-1981 
21----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
31 CAPITAL BASE FOR GEARING RATIO (£ m) 
41 YEAR 
51ITEM 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
61----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
71Share Cap 133 133 133 163 163 164 165 
81 Pref Cap 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
91Ret Prof 18 55 62 92 134 134 84 
10lRes Rev 0 5 2 -1 123 -8 12 
1110ther Res 383 400 460 603 701 957 1083 
121Share Prem 31 30 30 97 99 102 104 
13 1 Total Res 431 490 554 791 1057 1184 1283 
141ssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssss 
151S/H Funds 563 622 687 954 1220 1349 1448 
161ssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssss 
171Gen Prov 60 70 80 40 42 46 69 
181 Min In t 10 14 12 9 14 33 336 
191Loan Cap 151 231 283 326 362 441 754 
20lssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssss 
21 1 Total Cap Base 786 936 1062 1329 1638 1869 2607 
221ssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssss 
23lLess; 
241Trade Inv 12 18 19 41 63 36 35 
251Inv Ass Cos 115 140 150 148 97 108 122 
261Prem & Equip 279 300 318 340 510 595 940 
271----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
281 Adj Cap Base 379 479 575 801 967 1130 1511 
291======================================================================================== 
I A 11 B 11 C 11 D 11 E 11 F 11 G 11 H 
371GEARINli RATIO 
381ssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssss 
391 YEAR 
40lITEM 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
411ssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssss 
42 1 Deposits 9213 10441 11754 13825 18042 22906 37748 
43lNon-Cap Liabs 374 515 635 435 567 615 728 
441----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
451Total N-C Liabs 9587 10956 12389 14260 18609 23521 38476 
461Adj Cap Base 379 479 575 801 967 1130 1511 
471-------------------------------~--------------------------------------------------------
48'Gearing Ratio (%) 4 4 5 6 5 5 4 
49 ======================================================================================== 
50 
51 
52 RISK ASSET RATIO 
53 CAPITAL BASE 
54,SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS 
551ITEM YEAR 
561 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
571----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
581Tot Cap Base 786 936 1062 1329 1638 1869 2607 
59lLess: 
60lTrade Inv 12 18 19 41 63 36 35 
611Inv in Ass Cos 115 140 150 148 97 108 122 
621Equip & FAs 34 45 57 62 76 100 186 
631----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
641 RA Adj Cap Base 625 734 836 1078 1401 1625 2265 
651======================================================================================== 
. 
It) 
to 
'" 
I A 11' B 1 I C 1 I D I1 E I I F 11 G 11 H 
681RISK ASSETS 
691Risk Weight YEAR 
701& ITEM 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
711----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
7210.1 Treas Bills 499 279 431 209 277 256 203 
7310.2 Call money/short noti 1152 1593 1291 2182 3076 3483 5023 
74 Bills other T Bills 147 189 374 394 317 408 479 
75 CDs(Bank placings >30 126 186 424 76 198 325 347 
76 0.3 HMG Stocks 466 368 378 530 563 866 802 
77 0.5 Acc/Engagements 1383 1853 2142 2339 2844 2875 4961 
78 Fgn Currs 1960N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
79 Guarantees See E/Accepts 
80 1.0 Mkt loans to other UK 6041 6955 
81 Leased Assets 79 121 
82 Debtors 174 207 
83 Instal Finance 143 185 
84 Other quoted Inv: 
85 UK 
861 Elsewhere 
8710ther assets 
8811.5 Con Lending: 
23 
31 
69 
19 
47 
77 
8003 
175 
262 
247 
27 
49 
76 
9467 
304 
244 
318 
33 
67 
86 
12315 
~9 
253 
430 
68 
97 
207 
15977 
572 
287 
491 
98 
222 
158 
27597 
799 
334 
799 
99 
284 
160 
891 Trade Inv 12 18 19 41 63 36 35 
901 Assoc Cos 115 140 150 148 97 108 122 
911 Unquoted Inv 7 12 11 18 28 37 597 
9212.0 Property 259 271 288 285 448 509 968 
931ssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssss 
941Total Risk Assets 12687 12517 14347 16740 21720 26708 43608 
951======================================================================================== 
A II B 
971Weighted Risk Assets 
, , 
, , c II 
981Weighting Year 
D 11 E : I F : I G : I H 
991 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
1001----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
101 : 0.1 50 28 43 21 28 26 20 
102'0.2 285 394 418 530 718 843 1170 
103 0.3 140 110 113 159 169 260 241 
104 0.5 1672 926 1071 1170 1422 1438 2480 
105 1.0 6491 7533 8762 10433 13603 17648 29912 
:; 106 1.5 200 254 270 310 282 272 1130 
~ 107 2.0 518 542 575 570 896 1018 1937 
108 ssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssss 
~ 109 Total risk adj assets 9356 9787 11253 13192 17118 21503 36890 
~ 110 ======================================================================================== 
~ ~~~;~:~~-:~~-~:~-~:~~--------------~::------~:~------~:~-----~~~~-----~~~~-----~~::-----::~: ~ 113IRisk Asset Ratio 7 8 7 8 8 8 6 
~ 1141======================================================================================== 
A 11 B I1 C I1 D 11 E 11 F I1 G 1I H 
11 NAT WEST BANK GROUP 1975-1981 
21----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3 CAPITAL BASE FOR GEARING RATIO (£ m) 
4 YEAR 
5 ITEM 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
6 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
7 Share Cap 184 222 225 228 234 235 237 
8 Pref Cap 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 
9 Ret Prof 38 63 81 153 289 259 277 
10 Res Rev 233 181 179 168 165 164 281 
11 Other Res 391 423 497 732 815 1106 1372 
12,Share Prem 0 30 31 32 36 37 39 
13ITotal Res 662 697 787 1085 1306 1566 1969 
141ssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssss 
151S/H Funds 859 933 1026 1326 1554 1815 2220 
161ssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssss 
171Gen Prov 91 106 120 73 91 115 125 
18 Min Int 14 15 21 25 22 19 23 
19 Loan Cap 134 231 163 275 323 331 654 
20 ssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssss 
21 Total Cap Base 1098 1284 1330 1699 1989 2280 3022 
22 ssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssss 
23 Less; 
24 Trade Inv 83 80 80 35 38 35 36 
25 Inv Ass Cos 53 62 72 80 88 98 101 
26 Prem & Equip 550 554 613 673 742 785 987 
271----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
281Adj Cap Base 412 589 566 913 1122 1362 1898 
291:::::::================================================================================= 
1 A 11 B 11 C 11 D 11 E 11 F 11 G 11 H 
371GEARINli RATIO 
381ssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssss 
391 YEAR 
40lITEM 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
411ssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssss 
42 1 Deposits 13239 15384 17603 20228 26542 31820 39709 
43lNon-Cap Liabs 413 508 376 330 506 584 698 
441----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
451Total N-C Liabs 13652 15892 17979 20558 27048 32404 40407 
461Adj Cap Base 412 589 566 913 1122 1362 1898 
471----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------481Gearing Ratio (%) 3 4 3 4 4 4 5 
491======================================================================================== 
501 
511 
521 RISK ASSET RATIO 
53 1 CAPITAL BASE 
541SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS 
551ITEM YEAR 
561 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
571----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
581Tot Cap Base 1098 1284 1330 1699 1989 2280 3022 
59lLess: 
601 Trade Inv 83 80 80 35 38 35 36 
611Inv in Ass Cos 53 62 72 80 88 98 101 
621Equip & FAs 61 67 64 68 107 143 175 
631----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
641RA Adj Cap Base 900 1076 1115 1517 1756 2004 2710 
651======================================================================================== 
1 A 11 B 11 C 11 D 11 E 11 F 11 G 11 H 
681RISK ASSETS 
691Risk Weight YEAR 
70 & ITEM 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
71 ---------.-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
72 0.1 Treas Bills 129 225 236 188 185 256 155 
73 0.2 Call money/short noti 2163 2546 2803 3530 4558 5436 6112 
74 Bills other T Bills 207 243 266 338 391 586 621 
75 CDs(Bank placings >30 348 433 425 361 478 639 799 
76 0.3 HMG Stocks 604 533 685 668 641 647 674 
77 0.5 Ace/Engagements 1230 1628 1752 1769 1910 2120 2951 
78 Fgn Curl'S N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
'" 79 Guarantees 37 50 42 48 37 35 28 8 
'" 
80 1.0 Mkt loans to other UK 9057 10615 12042 14068 18115 22319 30112 
t!l 81 Leased Assets 120 109 187 362 661 987 1470 
:<i 82 Debtors 44 52 62 78 101 131 209 ~ 
"" 
83 Instal Finance 323 411 488 630 867 967N/A 
'" 
84 Other quoted Inv: 0 ~ 
'" 85 UK 14 18 29 17 23 23 29 '" E-< 
'" 861 Elsewhere 19 24 47 44 49 59 67 z H 87 11 .5 Con Lending: is . 881 Trade Inv 83 80 80 38 36 ;; 
'" 
35 35 c 
!Ol 891 Assoc Cos 53 62 72 80 88 98 101 
...:l 901 Unquoted Inv 15 17 27 24 366 320 394 ~ 9112.0 Property 483 479 532 529 577 562 728 0 921ssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssss H 
E-< 931Total Risk Assets 14930 17523 19773 22768 29084 35220 44486 ~ 941======================================================================================== 
A 11 B 11 C 1I 
961Weighted Risk Assets 
97 Weighting Year 
D 11 E , , , , F , , , , G 11 H 
98 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
99 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
100 0.1 
101 0.2 
102 0.3 
103 0.5 
104 1.0 
105 1.5 
106 2.0 
13 
544 
181 
634 
9576 
228 
966 
. 22 24 
644 699 
160 205 
839 897 
11228 12854 
238 268 
959 1063 
19 18 26 16 
846 1085 1332 1506 
201 192 194 202 
908 974 1078 1490 
15201 19817 24486 31887 
207 737 680 797 
1058 1154 1124 1456 
107 ssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssSSSSS5SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS 
108 Total risk adj assets 12142 14090 16010 18438 23977 28919 37353 
109 ======================================================================================== 
110 Risk adj Cap Base 900 1076 1115 1517 1756 2004 2710 
1111----------------------------------------------------------------------------~----------~ 
1121Risk Asset Ratio 7 8 7 8 7 7 7 
1131======================================================================================== 
M 
.. 
C<I 
1 
11 
A 11 B 11 C 11 D 
WILLIAMS & GLYNS BANK 
11 E 
GROUP 
11 F 11 
1975-1981 
G 11 H 
2'----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3 1 CAPITAL BASE FOR GEARING RATIO (£m) 
41 YEAR 
51ITEM 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
61----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
71Share Cap 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 
81Pref Cap 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
91 Ret Prof 5 7 7 11 25 29 36 
10lRes Rev 0 5 0 0 15 0 0 
11 IOther Res 68 73 87 93 118 158 193 
121Share Prem 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
131Total Res 73 85 93 104 158 187 229 
141SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS 
151S/H Funds 107 119 127 138 192 221 263 
161ssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssss 
171GenProv 11 13 11 12 7 8 10 
181Min Int 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
191Loan Cap 11 14 36 31 61 55 71 
20lssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssss 
21 I Total Cap Base 129 145 175 182 260 284 344 
221ssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssss 
23lLess; 
241 Trade Inv 9 10 9 9 9 8 8 
251Inv Ass Cos 8 8 8 9 10 11 12 
261 Prem & Equip 50 57 60 62 80 89 99 
271----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
281Adj Cap Base 63 70 97 101 161 177 226 
291======================================================================================== 
A 11 B 11 C 11 D 11 E 11 F 11 G 11 H 
371GEARINu RATIO 
381ssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssss 
391 YEAR 
40 lITEM 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
41 Issssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssss 
421 Deposits 1574 1688 1687 1839 2007 2286 3174 
43lNon-Cap Liabs 29 35 43 71 62 67 85 
441----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
451Total N-C Liabs 1603 1723 1730 1910 2069 2353 3259 
461Adj Cap Base 63 70 97 101 161 177 226 
471----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
481Gearing Ratio (%l 4 4 6 5 8 8 7 
491:====:================================================================================== 
501 
511 
521 RISK ASSET RATIO 
531CAPITAL BASE 
541SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS 
551ITEM YEAR 
561 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
571----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
581Tot Cap Base 129 145 175 182 260 284 344 
59lLess: 
60lTrade Inv 9 10 9 9 9 8 8 
61 1 Inv in Ass Cos 8 8 8 9 10 11 12 
621Equip & FAs 6 7 10 12 13 15 20 
631----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
641RA Adj Cap Base 107 121 148 151 227 251 304 
651======================================================================================== 
: A 11 B C 11 D E 11 F 11 G 11 H 
68IRI~K ASSETS 
691Risk Weight YEAR 
701& ITEM 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
711----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
7210.1 Treas Bills 42 50 28 2 35 5 1 
7310.2 Call moneylshort noti 262 251 246 270 272 433 822 
741 Bills other T Bills 20 20 19 22 39 56 26 
75' CDs(Bank placings )30 5 12 50 31 30 30 25 
76 0.3 HMG Stocks 28 10148 129 81 75 75 
77 0.5 Acc/Engagements 186 234 230 234 230 257 225 
78 Fgn Currs N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
79 Guarantees See E/Accepts 
80 1.0 Mkt loans to other UK 1149 
81 Leased Assets 13 
82 Debtors 4 
83 Instal Finance N/A N/A 
84 Other quoted Inv: 
85 UK 
86 Elsewhere 
8710ther assets 
8811.5 Con Lending: 
N/A 
4 
1 
N/A 
1288 
14 
5 
N/A 
o 
1 
N/A 
1142 
21 
7 
N/A 
o 
1 
N/A 
1246 
32 
9 
N/A 
3 
1 
N/A 
1477 
59 
9 
N/A 
3 
2 
N/A 
1589 
89 
7 
N/A 
12 
3 
N/A 
2164 
130 
9 
13 
8 
89 I Trade Inv 9 10 9 9 9 8 8 
901 Assoc Cos 8 8 8 9 10 11 12 
911 Unquoted Inv 1 4 0 2 3 4 1 
9212.0 Property 44 50 51 51 67 73 78 
931ssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssss 
941Total Risk Assets 1775 1956 1959 2051 2326 2649 3598 
951::::::::::::============================================================================ 
A 
971Weighted Risk Assets 
98 1 Weighting 
991 
11 B 11 
1975 
C I1 D I1 
Year 
1976 1977 
E 11 F I1 G 11 H 
1~8 1979 1980 1981 
1001----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
10110.1 4 5 3 0 4 1 0 
10210.2 57 57 63 65 68 104 175 
10310.3 8 3 44 39 24 22 22 
10410.5 93 117 115 117 115 128 112 
10511.0 1171 1307 1171 1292 1550 1699 2324 
10611.5 26 33 26 30 32 33 32 
10712.0 88 100 101 101 133 147 156 
108'ssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssssss 
109 Total risk adj assets 1449 1623 1523 1644 1927 2134 2822 
110 ======================================================================================== 
111 Risk adj Cap Base 107 121 148 151 227 251 304 
112 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
113 Risk Asset Ratio 7 7 10 9 12 12 11 
114 ======================================================================================== 
APPENDIX NIRE 
THE MEASUREMENT OF LIQUIDITY BANK OF EHGLAND JULY 1982 
The Bank of England assessment of bank liquidity incorporates 
the following definitions: 
1.1. LIABILITIES 
1. Deposits of all types are included according to 
earliest maturity.1 The stability and diversification 
of the deposit base will be taken into account in 
discussion of appropriate guidelines. 
2. Known firm commitments to make funds available on a 
particular date are included in the appropriate time 
band at their full value. 
3. Commitments which are not due to be met on a particular 
date are considered unlikely to be met in full and 
cannot therefore be treated precisely. The extent to 
which undrawn facilities will be included will be 
determined with each bank, having regard to its past 
and prospective draw-down experience. 
4. Contingent liabilities are not included in the 
measurement, unless there is reasonable likelihood that 
the conditions necessary to trigger them might be 
fulfilled. 
(It may however be appropriate for certain special categories 
of deposit, for example those where it is agreed that set-off 
should apply, to be netted off against specific assets and 
excluded from the calculation. The Bank of England would 
expect to agree such treatment with individual banks). 
1.2. ASSETS 
Assets are measured by reference to their maturity, unless. 
as in the case of overdrafts~ they are repayable on demand in 
practice only nominally, or unless they are marketable, or 
are known to be of doubtful maturity. 
1. Lending repayable on demand only nominally may yield 
some regular cash flow but this cannot be measured at 
all precisely. The Bank of England therefore propose 
an individual treatment with each bank. 
2. The treatment of marketable assets takes account of the 
extent to which they can be sold for cash quickly (or 
used as security for borrowing), incurring little or no 
cost penalty; and of any credit or investment risks 
which may make their potential value less predictable. 
It is important that the market for the asset should be 
sufficiently deep to ensure a stable demand for it. An 
important factor in this is the willingness of the 
central bank to use the asset in its normal market 
operations. These considerations are recognised in the 
measurement by applying varying discounts normally 
against the market value of marketable assets, all of 
which} 
ladder. 
assets:-
are included at the start of the maturity 
The following discounts apply to sterling 
Nil Discount 
5% Discount 
10% Discount 
-Treasury, eligible local authority and 
eligible bank bills. 
-Government and Government guaranteed 
marketable securities with less than 
twelve months remaining term to 
maturity. 
-Other bills and certificates of deposit 
with less than six months remaining term 
to maturity. 
-Other Government~ Government guaranteed. 
and local authority marketable 
securities with less than five years 
remaining term to maturity or at 
variable rates. 
-Other bills, certificates of deposit 
and FRNs with less than five years 
remaining term to maturity. 
-Other Government~ Government guaranteed 
and local authority marketable debt with 
more than five years remaining term to 
maturity. 
Discount to be determined - All other marketable 
assets. 
(Similar discounts will obtain on comparable foreign 
currency assets. Assets not covered above will be a 
matter for agreement, on a QQIDID9D basis, arising out of 
discussion with individual banks. 
3. Assets known to be of doubtful value are excluded from 
the measurement, or treated on a case-by-case basis. 
4. Contractual standby facilities made available to the 
bank by other banks provide support which should be 
recognised, and they are therefore included as a slight 
asset. Due regard, however, will be paid to their 
reamaining term and the possibility that they may not 
be renewed. Standby facilities provided by a bank to 
other banks are treated in the same way as commitments 
to lend at some uncertain future date. 
1.3. OTHER ITEMS 
1. Where items in course of transmission or collection are 
material, credits in course of transmission are 
deducted from debits in course of collection and the 
balance added to assets at the start of the maturity 
ladder. 
2. Items in suspense are normally treated on a gross 
basis. 
In principle the measurement takes in all assets and 
liabilities. Thus, liabilities should include any 
significant non-deposit liabilities which mature within the 
time span of the measurement: for example tax liabili ties. 
Similarly assets should include non-financial assets which 
are marketable within the time span of the measurement. 
Source: Bank of England, 'The Measurement of Liquidity'. 
~ Qf England Quarterly Bulletin, September 1982. 
\ 
• 
J .1. 
APrEmnx lO EI.NK OF f.NGLAND IIANI: STATlS1'lCS RETUr.N FOR}! n:; 
Liabi I itios 
Item no. 
Notes in circulation 
2 Doposit liabHiti(l5 
2·1 Sigh! dCP05!!S 
I 
2·l I UK banking soctor: 
correspondent balances 
~'3 other 
2·4 UK public sector 
'2'5 Other UK residents 
2·6 Qvel'!'eas offices of tho reJ".t!lrting bimk: gross 
deposits (excluding wor~ing capitill) 
~'7 Other oversells residents 
"!modep,)~its 
I 
UK bankji"~ social 
UK pd.lie sector 
! I DC'~\~)silS V/ilh (,j'igiliaf mat\,rily of 2 ~'t<ars or less 
I i Other deposits 
IOlhNl'Krc.!.iLlcnls , 
1 Depcsilswithoriginal r:\Dturjlvo~2yellrs or;es~ 
StetlinQ 
Interest Non-Interest 
bctlring iJearing 
,---- I 
-- -
· · · 
-
· · · 
---------. 
· · · 
· · · 
· · · 
· · · ~. 
-1 
·2·16 I Other rl('posj~s .. .• .• .. •. ,Overseas office:; of the repor'ting b<.>nk: gross I dapnsi!s (c",cliJding V'.'orking capita!) •• ---------r,-' i 
~'17 
}'18 
:Z'19 
~'20 
"2·21 
- , 
j 
, 
, 
,., 
i Olhflr (·verseas residents •• •• . . 
Depo.!.ils with original maturity of 2 years or less 
i Other deposits 
I i Cc. tilk.,ltC$ of deposit issued 
: Promissory notes. bills and other negotiable paper issued 
Items in cusponse 
"(excluding internal accounts) 
i 
I 
Credit ltom:l in courso oftra.nsmi::sion to 
UK offices of tho rer.Ofting bank 
Other banks in the UK 
I 
Banks and bonking offices overseas 
Capite! and other funds 
[. 
\A)orking capital provided by overseas offices! in form of deposits i not in form of deposit!;. 
0lher capital and olherfunds (lr.cluding all internal account:o) •. 
· -
I: 
r I· 
I 
E 
I 
.. 
r 
Column 1 
Stc::rling 
£O~Os 
Column2 
Other currencies 
r--] 
-"l 
--
------
-i 
--] 
--
----
---'-i 
_____ =J 
.--
--1 ~ 
: _l 
:1 _J 
I 
~ 
J 
"] 
J 
, 
i 
i _ 
Total1i3bilitios (equals item 21 Total ass('t\s) 
! 
L __ I ---j 
I -----, _J AccoptAnl;4H" ne. 
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"\. 
'.' 
" 
\ 
• 
.~ ....... ~ ..•....• , .. --- ~.--~.~-... ,-. ,-~ .... ".' .•. ' .... '. 
J.2. 
j ItdmrO, 
. , 
i 10 ! Cash 
I, , 0" ,I 
I , Ban.!; of [nglalld notes and UK coin 1'0'2 I. Olhcrnotcsandcoin 
110-3 I Balances with Bank or England (o>:cluding special and s<1pplcmentarydopo$its) •• 
,I 
I 
i 11 Debit itoms in course of col:ectinl1 on 
I 1'1 -, UKofficcsofthc reponing b:trok 
, 
111'2 Other banks, etc .• in the UK .• 
j 11·3 Banks and banking offices overseas 
i 
·1,2 Market loans 
I , 
·12·1 Placed with listf'.d banks. listed discount maiketinstitutionsand listed brokers 
12·2 
~12'3 
I I,,·, 
i t ,_ 
Monoy at call with H!>tcd discol!nt market institutions 
Other money with listed (Escounl nl3rket institutions 
Money tll cailll'Jilh listed brokers 
Other money with listed brokers 
Sterling I Interest l.Jon-lnterest 
1'2'0 
I 1'2-7 
;12-8 
}12'9 
}12"0 
112"1 
~'2'12 , 
; 1 2-13 
. I 
:12·14 I 
, 
:'2-15 
'13·1 
j: 
'4 
'~14'1 , 
. .1 '4 '2 
:14·3 
, 
114·4 
i 
!14'5 
!14'6 , 
.14'7 
, 
;14·8 
14·9 
i 
i'5 
115,' 
hS'2 
;'5-3 
',5·4 
! 
Balances with and loans und advances to 
listccll.i:Jnks: \,;otl<:spondenl bal"flces 
:othcr 
Certificates of deposit issued by othc.r listed banks 
Plomi.isOr{notc::, bills cnd Olhcr negotiable p.;lper 
Plilced with other UK rf'~idents 
UK local authorities 
UK public corpt'lr8tions 
O~her UK re::idcnts 
bearing banring 
\ . \. 
I • I ; 
.. .. .. .. .. .. 
issued hy other listed banks .. .. 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
.. .. .. . . .. .. .. 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Placed overseas: b~Iancflswith,endloansendadvanc 
: balances with, and IClans and advan 
cs to, overseas offices of the reponing bank. 
et's tn, other banks overseas 
Speci<tl <lnd supplementary deposits with Cank of England: special 
Bills (excluding l(Jnding u!1r1crspccial schemes - item 15 below) 
l'KTreasurybills 
Northern Ireland Treasury bi1l~ 
UK local authority bills :cli!J!bloforredi$count at Bankof England 
others 
Other public sector bills 
UK bank bills: f:ligibleforreciiscount at Bank of England 
other 
Other UK bills 
Overscos bills 
: supplemcnt.:.ry 
Lending under special schemes for exports and shipbuilding 
Ey.ports 
MeJium and lon",·terrn rvfinanceable lending at fixt'd rntos 
I ~hor~.t~fm I«flding at ralcs IO!<lled to baso rete 
I ShlpbUlld\llg .. •• •• •• . : •• 
I 
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.. .. 
(.:0005 
Column 2 Column 1 
Starling Othc-r curr~ndos L __ .-J· ____ l
b f J 
[ C 
• r·-------r------·~ 
· 
=l -l · · I 
--j 
· 
--.. ---.. ~ r--------
1---------.--~ 
r.-
[ ] 
· 
· 
· 
1 
• 
Itl)m no. 
IS , 
, 
,HH 
. 10'2 
! 
16·3 
, 
)6'4 
165 
/6'6 
\7 
i 
'S 
Other loaM Dncl advanc5s 
Northern Irdand Govornment 
. UKlocalaulhorllies .. 
Publk: corporatiol1S •• 
Other puhl!c sector 
Olhel' UKresid(!nls 
averso!!!': 
Assots leased to Cl!stomers 
In.vostments 
18-1 Brit:shgcvornm:;ntstoc!,s .• 
18·2 With 00') ytll'lr Orl()fS \n final maturity 
\ 
Assets (continued) 
} ,8'3 With over on6 year but nOl more Ihan 16 months 10 final matlHity 
! 8'~ Wllh over 18 month<; bm not more than [j years to final matuthy 
! 8'5 With over 5 years to final 1n1't:.rrily end undatod 
is-6 Northern Irl,lltin::l governmer'lts:ocJ.:s 
j 8·7 Tax<!eposlt accourrts 
I B-9 UK klc:.1 autho!ltv stuckf> an.) L'onds 
18'9 Qthor pul:>!ir; sector s~ocks and bonds 
,9·.0 Irwe;,jmflnt" iillil't(ld I,;.an::'s 
~8 '11 , 
, 
is-12 
I 
. 8·13 
19 
i3'1 
In 
! 
to 
I 
!C'1 
:02 , 
'2 
I 
U·1 
! 
'3 
! 
'4 
Other U K ir:vcslloents 
. Overseas invf,::.trnl;nts: 
I·' Wori;ing ca,pinl pr~· .. iclC;d for aversea>: offices in form of derosits •• OtherwolkLngccPlti~1 " .. •• " .. .. .. 
I i Other 
I'tems In suspensa (excluding internal accounts) 
! New ISSIJ8 applicatlons 
I 
lather •• 
IOtheressC'ts 
, 
lNAt spot p,1s[tion in gold 
IOther assets ,. 
iTot., .".t. (&q"," ltom C Total H'bniHes) 
;Accoptances (etc.) •• 
reccptances .. 
'11 ~~b~;:nS::t:;~ctor 
Banksovcrs.caS 
Other ovcneas residents .• I 
i Othe~ i 
;Rorinanced lending lit (!xod rates: exports 
I 
i 
I 
. sl,ipbuilding 
Totnl {~mount of o·/crdraft.lo:ln nod &CCfJ;ltD~cefaciliti(l8 (,u\~tanrlj!1r! .' 
Colunm 1 
Stcrlin~1 
£0005 
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Other curr()lIci.~s 
. L 
-
-=l 
-
.--------. 
-
L..I ___ -'"1 _____ -' 
,--"""1---
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-
• 
-
, 
------j . 
I -.-----J 
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-
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I [ :=J 
! 
! 
[ -T 
SOURCE: lnt'er-Banl: Rf'search Orgc1l1isntion Report Nn.309, Nover:lhcr 1976. 
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